Student Scholarship

Document Type

Research Paper

Abstract

This thesis examines the intricate and often overlooked role of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees for the District of Columbia in governing the nation's capital. Because Washington, D.C. lacks a traditional representative government, these fifteen congressional members exercise ultimate authority over the city's policy and finances by controlling its only available funds. The author highlights a unique constitutional arrangement where Congress holds exclusive legislation over the District, resulting in a system where residents pay taxes above the national average yet remain powerless to decide how those funds are allocated. 

The study details the internal dynamics of these subcommittees, noting that the House unit often acts as a conservative brake by stripping budgets down to their bare bones, while the Senate serves as an informal appeal body where items are frequently reinstated. This fiscal tug-of-war is heavily influenced by the personalities and backgrounds of the subcommittee chairmen, specifically Representative William N. Natcher and Senator Robert C. Byrd. While Natcher is described as maintaining a more flexible and cooperative atmosphere, Byrd is characterized as more uncompromising, particularly regarding controversial social programs like Aid to Dependent Children. 

The document also explores the external pressures affecting these legislative bodies, including the influence of District Commissioners, department heads, and various private interest groups. Despite these influences, the author concludes that the subcommittees are often unfairly blamed for systemic delays and fiscal imbalances that are actually rooted in the rigid separation of authorization and appropriation powers. Ultimately, the research illustrates how the lack of home rule forces the District into a state of financial dependency on a congressional subunit that views the assignment as a training ground for higher political ambitions.

Research Highlights

The Problem: The subcommittees for the District of Columbia within the U.S. Congress exercise absolute control over the budget, policy, and administration of the Nation’s Capital, despite the District having a population of nearly two million residents with limited franchise and no voting representation in the lower house. 

The Method: This study utilizes personal interviews with Congressmen and subcommittee staff, supplemented by general background readings and budget messages, to analyze the internal workings, membership motivations, and responsiveness of the House and Senate Appropriations Subcommittees. 

Quantitative Finding: As of 1963, Federally owned land accounts for 43% of the city, with an additional 7% owned by tax-exempt organizations; the school-age child population rose by 23% between 1950 and 1960 while the total population decreased; an estimated $157,676 was spent by the District for the August 28, 1963 Civil Rights rally. 

Qualitative Finding: Subcommittee assignments for the District of Columbia are viewed as low-prestige "training grounds" or "apprenticeships" where members mark time before moving to more desirable assignments; the House subcommittee typically functions as a "brake" by cutting budget items with the expectation that the Senate will act as an "appeal body" to restore or increase funds. 

Finding: Congressional control is characterized by a "Dixie domination" of leadership, where subcommittee chairmen like Representative William N. Natcher and Senator Robert C. Byrd exert primary influence over local policy, often overriding the preferences of District Commissioners and residents on controversial issues such as Aid to Dependent Children and mass transit. 

Publication Date

1-1964

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

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