Student Scholarship

Document Type

Research Paper

Abstract

This paper, authored by Laurie Bowman in 1951, examines the intricate and often blurred line between the constitutional duties of executive agencies and the practice of lobbying the legislative branch. The central theme explores the persistent struggle for power between the executive and legislative branches, noting a significant shift toward executive dominance beginning in 1933. While the Constitution vests all legislative power in Congress, the executive branch frequently attempts to influence enactments to ensure they are favorable to departmental operations.

Bowman details the various "liaison offices" established by agencies such as the Army, Navy, Air Force, Civil Service Commission, and Veterans Administration. While these offices officially exist to answer informational requests and perform services for Congressmen, the author characterizes their activities as "indirect lobbying". These services range from routine administrative tasks, such as processing constituent inquiries about military discharges or civil service records, to more personal overtures like arranging air travel, hosting "briefing" luncheons, and providing social entertainment.

The study highlights a critical legal and ethical tension: Federal law prohibits the use of appropriated funds for personal services or communications intended to influence a Member of Congress on legislation, yet it permits official communications regarding necessary appropriations or business. Bowman illustrates how agencies like the State Department and the Department of Agriculture navigate this by employing "indirect" methods, such as utilizing public speeches to excite public opinion or hosting elaborate social gatherings at locations like Prospect House to "soften up" legislators. Ultimately, the paper concludes that while lobbying is practically necessary for modern government efficiency, excessive executive influence poses a risk to the traditional system of checks and balances.

Research Highlights

  • The Problem: The paper examines the tension between executive and legislative branches regarding the influence of government agencies on the drafting and passage of laws. 

  • The Method: The author utilizes interviews with members of Congress and agency officials, internal agency documents, and 1950 Buchanan Committee testimony to analyze liaison activities in the Veterans Administration, Civil Service, Army, Navy, and Air Force.

  • Quantitative Finding: In a six-month period, the Civil Service Liaison Office handled 38,426 telephone calls, 12,407 interviews, and 10,035 pieces of correspondence; the Air Force liaison staff in 1950 consisted of 54 officers and 78 civilians, including 22 lawyers; the Department of Defense referred 2,031 bills to its departments, with the Army receiving 885, the Navy 569, and the Air Force 287. 

  • Qualitative Finding: Executive agencies influence legislation through personal persuasion at social functions, technical briefings for congressional staff, the provision of "already formulated" legal language in reports, and the performance of personal services for legislators. 

  • Finding: While federal law prohibits the use of appropriated funds for direct lobbying, the line between providing technical information and influencing legislation is thin, often manifesting as "indirect lobbying" through constituent pressure or administrative assistance.

Publication Date

1-1951

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