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Missouri Public School Administrators' Perceived Effectiveness of Senate Bill No. 75

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by

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Declaration of Originality

I do hereby declare and attest to the fact that this is an original study based solely upon my own scholarly work at Lindenwood University and that I have not submitted it for any other college or university course or degree.

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Abstract

In this quantitative study, the perceptions of safety and preparedness of Missouri's high school administrators after participating in active shooter training as mandated by Missouri's Senate Bill No. 75 were analyzed. As school shootings continue, states have passed legislation to prepare schools to provide safety for students and faculty members (Shah, 2013b). There are currently limited data about the perceived effectiveness of Missouri's Senate Bill No. 75 and its ability to help administrators feel safe and prepared in the event of an active shooter. This study involved examination of what schools can do to prepare for a school shooting before one occurs and what schools can do during a school shooting. It also included information on what schools can expect after a shooting has occurred. Fifty-two Missouri high school administrators were surveyed, then data were aggregated by gender, years of educational experience, years of administrative experience, district size, and district location (urban or rural) as reported by the administrators. The majority, or 86.6%, of Missouri high school administrators felt more safe and prepared after participating in active shooter training. Differences did exist between rural and urban administrators in the perception of safety and preparedness with three of the smallest districts indicating feeling the least amount of safety and preparedness. When parsing data by gender only two of the 26 females did not feel prepared after training, while 10 males indicated they did not feel prepared after training. A slight majority, or 53.8%, of the administrators, were not in favor of arming selective school personnel after proper training.

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter One: Introduction

With the tragedies of Columbine and Sandy Hook, school safety efforts have become increasingly centered on the potential threat of an active shooter (Brydolf, 2013). Although Columbine was not the first school shooting, it is perceived as the harbinger of modern school shootings (Chen, Purdie-Vaughns, Phelan, Gary, & Yang, 2015). According to an October 2015 report, since the shootings that occurred at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado, on April 20, 1999, there have been 262 more school shootings (Roberts, 2015).

A week after the Sandy Hook shooting, Wayne LaPierre, Chief Executive Officer of the National Rifle Association (NRA), announced the organization supported placing armed security guards in every school in the country (NRA, 2013). He famously stated, "The only thing that stops a bad guy with a gun is a good guy with a gun," and then asked, "Would you rather have your 911 call bring a good guy with a gun from a mile away or a minute away?" (as cited in Keller, 2014, p. 687). Since then, three states have scrambled to enact legislation to provide protection to the school community (Bartels, 2013).

Missouri's legislative answer was Senate Bill No. 75, which was enacted in 2013. Missouri Senate Bill No. 75 requires schools to go through active shooter training on an annual basis. Schools cannot simply focus on academics (O'Meara, 2013). Schools have to provide for the physical safety of students (Marquis, 2013). The former concern for reading, writing, and arithmetic now competes with sheltering in place, taking to flight, or fight (Martínez, 2012). Duplechain and Morris (2014) stated, "School shootings are most commonly committed by either a student who goes to the school or by an intruder

from off campus who has a connection to someone within a particular school" (p. 145). Students during the Cold War drilled for a nuclear attack; students today drill for an active shooter (Fabbri, 2014). A nuclear attack has never occurred on American soil, yet 262 active shooter incidents have occurred in schools across the United States (Minninger & Wilder, 2014).

Provided in this chapter is a synopsis of shootings that have occurred. Names, dates, locations, and a brief sentence or two do not fully tell the story of personal tragedy and heartache these school shootings have created (Kennedy-Paine, Reeves, & Brock, 2013). In Chapter Two, the literature review provides background on why some individuals become active school shooters. Ferguson, Coulson, and Barnett (2011) noted, "Given that school shootings are generally rare, and many perpetrators are killed during their crimes, the availability of school shooters for research is obviously limited" (p. 141). For this reason, existing evidence of motivating factors that may have prompted the desire to kill classmates, teachers, and administrators is presented. Just as active shooters make preparations to commit their heinous crimes, schools make preparations for the active shooters (Rudick, 2011). The literature review includes examples of what schools currently do to prepare for an active shooter (O'Meara, 2013).

For many school districts, placing an armed school resource officer (SRO) in the school has become one option in addressing an active shooter (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Not all agree with placing an SRO in the school, as some suggest the presence of these officers creates a different set of problems (Weiler & Cray, 2011). There are some who believe SROs create a pipeline from the schoolhouse to the jailhouse (Shah, 2013a).

Existing literature offers practical things to do during an active shooter event (Fabbri, 2014). Examples illustrate what others have done during the first few critical moments of an active shooter event and what trained professionals recommend be done during an actual shooter event (Fitzgerald, 2013). Peer-reviewed literature also offers practical suggestions for schools to consider during the short-term period after a school shooting and in the long term (Waters, 2013).

The purpose of this study was to analyze Missouri public administrators' perceptions of Missouri Senate Bill No. 75. A total of 52 administrators, both male and female, from urban and rural districts with varying student populations, were polled about their perceptions of safety and preparedness after completing active shooter training as required by Senate Bill No. 75. Missouri high school administrators were also questioned about their approval or disapproval of arming selective school personnel after proper training.

Background of the Study

The process of learning in an organized form of training, or attending school, is a "dialectical one and produces qualitative changes in the student on the basis of overcoming the contradictions between the old and the new states, old and new knowledge, skills and experience" (Teneva, 2015, p. 238). The specific learning objectives of schools prepare students for outcomes in math, science, social studies, and language arts (Teneva, 2015). Preparation in the practical and fine arts is valuable in that it contributes to learning in other disciplines (Sabol, 2013). Additionally, schools bear some responsibility to promote physical activity in children, as it promotes pivotal health benefits for students by reducing cardiovascular disease risk factors "including

overweight/obesity and mental despair" (Møller et al., 2014, p. 2). Not only do schools impart academic curriculum, but safety programs with natural disaster drills to practice and prepare for emergencies are now an imperative part of student preparation (Viramontez, 2015). Perhaps the most pressing preparation schools make today is for the active shooter (Fabbri, 2014).

The fates of schools like Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky; Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas; Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado; and Sandy Hook Elementary in Newtown, Connecticut, have become too familiar (Schweit, 2013). Sadly, these are not the only schools to suffer an active shooter event (Schweit, 2013). Since Columbine suffered its attack on April 20, 1999, a growing list of attacks have occurred.

On November 19, 1999, Victor Cordova, age 12, shot and killed a 13-year-old classmate at Deming Middle School in Deming, New Mexico (Khadaroo, 2014b). On February 29, 2000, a six-year-old boy shot and killed six-year-old Kayla Rolland, a playmate at Buell Elementary School in Mount Morris Township, Michigan (D'Agostino, 2000). On May 26, 2000, 13-year-old Nathaniel Brazill was sent home for misbehaving (Boyd, 2001). Brazill returned to Lake Worth Community Middle School in Lake Worth, Florida, and killed his teacher, Barry Grunow (Boyd, 2001). On March 5, 2001, Charles "Andy" Williams, of Santana High School in Santee, California, killed two classmates, one 14 years old and one 17 years old (Coeyman, Chaddock, Wood, & Sappenfield, 2001). Williams injured 13 others (Coeyman et al., 2001).

On April 26, 2002, Robert Steinhaeuser, a 19-year-old expelled student of Gutenberg High School, in Erfurt, Germany, entered his former school and killed 16

people before committing suicide (Bowman, 2002). Fourteen-year-old James Sheets killed principal Eugene Segro of Red Lion Area Junior High School in Red Lion, Pennsylvania, in the cafeteria before killing himself, on April 24, 2003 (Tauber, 2007). On September 24, 2003, 15-year-old Jason McLaughlin of Rocori High School in Cold Spring, Minnesota, shot and killed 17-year-old Aaron Rollins and critically wounded another student who later died of his injuries (Bowman, 2004).

In September 2004, on the first day of school in Beslan School No. 1, in Beslan, Russia, Chechen militants took more than 1,100 students, parents, and staff hostage in the school gym (Reprintseva, 2014; Antonova, 2014). After the three-day ordeal was over, 331 hostages were killed, including 186 children (Antonova, 2014; Reprintseva, 2014). On March 21, 2005, Jeff Weise, age 16, killed his grandfather and his grandfather's girlfriend before killing five students, a teacher, and a security guard at Red Lake Senior High School in Red Lake, Minnesota (Salgado, 2005). Weise fired on police as they entered the school (Salgado, 2005). He later retreated and then killed himself (Salgado, 2005). On November 8, 2005, in Campbell County Comprehensive High School of Jacksboro, Tennessee, a 15-year-old student shot a principal and two assistant principals before a teacher was able to wrestle the gun away (Tonn, 2005). Ken Bruce, an assistant principal of the school, was killed (Tonn, 2005).

On August 30, 2006, Alvaro Castillo, 19-year-old former student of Orange High School, in Hillsborough, North Carolina, was arrested after he opened fire in the school's parking lot (Associated Press [AP], 2013). Castillo wounded students before his arrest and his father was found murdered at his home (Langman, 2016b). Kimveer Gill, age 25,

of Dawson College, Montreal, opened fire and killed one person and wounded 20 others (Payne, 2006). Gill was killed in a shootout with police (Payne, 2006).

On September 27 of 2006, adult Duane R. Morrison fatally shot 16-year-old Emily Keyes of Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colorado (Maxwell, 2006). Morrison took hostages and then killed himself (Maxwell, 2006). Two days later in Cazenovia, Wisconsin, a 15-year-old student fatally shot his principal at West High School (Butler, 2007). Three days later, Charles Carl Roberts, a 32-year-old milk truck driver, entered a one-room Amish schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania (Tauber, 2007). Roberts opened fire on a dozen girls before committing suicide (Tauber, 2007). He killed three girls and critically wounded seven others (Tauber, 2007).

On the 16th of April, 2007, Cho Seung-Hui killed 32 people on the Virginia Tech campus of Blacksburg, Virginia (Amada, 2007; Tauber, 2007). Steven Kazmiercak, 27, killed five people and injured 21 others on the campus of Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois (Sander, 2008). The former student then committed suicide (Sander, 2008). On February 23, 2010, Bruco Eastwood fired a rifle in the parking lot of Deer Creek Middle School in Littleton, Colorado (AP, 2013). Eastwood wounded two students before he was tackled by faculty and arrested (AP, 2013). On December 14, 2012, Adam Lanza, 20, shot and killed his mother and then drove to Sandy Hook Elementary School and killed 26 people, 20 of them small children (Domenech, 2013; Thompson, 2014). Sandy Hook is located in Newtown, Connecticut (Thompson, 2014).

On June 7, 2013, John Zawahri shot wildly into cars and a crowd, killing five people and wounding four others on the campus of Santa Monica College in Santa Monica, California (Rengifo, 2015). Zawahri was eventually killed by responding

officers (Rengifo, 2015). On December 13, 2013, an Arapahoe High School student entered the school carrying a shotgun (Khadaroo, 2014a). The student was looking for a particular teacher who had left the building (Khadaroo, 2014a). The student shot several students before killing himself (Knickerbocker, 2013).

School shootings are not limited to one geographic region of the United States (Neuman, Assaf, Cohen, & Knoll, 2015). In fact, school shootings are not limited to the United States (Neuman et al., 2015). Prevention becomes complex given no singular agent seems to identify potential killers (Neuman et al., 2015). According to Neuman et al. (2015):

> Despite the intensive clinical and forensic work on the subject of mass shooters, the complexity of the phenomena, its negligible proportion in the population, and the difficulty in gaining a psychiatric diagnosis prior to the act of shooting, leads to the current state of affairs where there is no single, clear, agreed upon, and informative clinical diagnosis that can be used for screening and prevention. (p. 2)

School shootings are increasing in both occurrence and devastation (Shah & McNeil, 2013). With more and more publicized acts of school violence, many have the perception schools are unsafe (Algozzine & McGee, 2011).

A review of existing literature regarding school shootings is provided in Chapter Two. Components of the review include what goes on before a school shooting occurs, factors that influence violence, steps schools and others take to prepare for school shootings, and the influence of SROs. Further information is presented on how others have responded during prior school shootings and on the long- and short-term responses to the aftermath. The literature presented will cover Missouri Senate Bill No. 75, the

legislation intended to prepare Missouri schools in the event of an active shooter incident, and preparatory measures for an active shooter incident. This study includes examination of the perceived effectiveness and feelings of safety by Missouri high school administrators who have participated in active shooter training.

Theoretical Framework

Abraham Maslow's (1943) Hierarchy of Needs is the theoretical framework from which this research was derived (see Figure 1). After the physiological needs of food, water, shelter, and warmth are met, all humans seek a sense of safety, which includes security, stability, and freedom from fear (Maslow, 1943). According to Brown, Neel, and Sherman (2015), "Human behavior is sensitive to moment-to-moment circumstances (i.e., situations)" (p. 10). According to Maslow (1943), "The need for safety is seen as an active and dominant mobilizer of the organism's resources only in emergencies, e.g., war, disease, natural catastrophes, crime waves, societal disorganization, neurosis, brain injury, chronically bad situation" (p. 377).



Figure 1. Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Adapted from "Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs," by S. A. McLeod, 2014, *SimplyPsychology*. Copyright 2014 by SimplyPsychology.org.

As an increase of violence permeates school campuses, there is a call for improved processes to protect children, teachers, administrators, and other campus stakeholders. According to Cowan and Rossen (2013):

> A string of high-profile traumatic events spanning nearly 20 years has proven unequivocally that school crisis response is not a choice; it is inevitable. Although most schools won't experience a tragedy as unthinkable and horrific as Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Conn. did, every school will face crises of varying magnitude. (p. 8)

While most training assumes compliant behaviors under duress, the nature of self-preservation may increase unpredictability during an actual crisis (Brown et al., 2015).

Cooperation is defined as paying a cost to give a greater benefit to one or more others and is "an integral part of human behavior and cornerstone of human societies" (Rand & Epstein, 2014, p. 1). It would seem the idea of cooperation may be opposite to the theory of natural selection in which "self-preservation develops those characteristics in the individual that are needed to succeed in the struggle for self-survival" (Allan, 2013, p. 287). The self-destructive behaviors seen in school shootings illustrate deficiencies or failure in Freud's ego functions, which normally serve to "warn, guide, and protect individuals from hazardous or dangerous involvements and behavior" (Khantzian & Mack, 1983, p. 209). If safety remains the second-most important human motivation, then can the conscious choice to follow-through with active shooter procedures override the central unconsciousness to self-preserve?

Statement of the Problem

Perceptual data inform stakeholders of how constituents feel and give insight on what changes may be made to improve the school environment (Bernhardt, 2013). Whether decisions are about increasing assessment scores or lengthening the school day, educators should examine multiple measures of data to make an informed and accurate decision (Bernhardt, 2013). According to Bernhardt (2013), these data should include measures of demographics, school processes, student learning, and stakeholder perceptions. In attempting to prepare for an active shooter, state legislatures and schools should include the perceptions, values and beliefs, attitudes, and observations of those on the school campus (Bernhardt, 2013).

In July of 2013, Missouri passed Senate Bill No. 75, which established the Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training for Schools Program, also know as ASIRT.

Each Missouri public and charter school district was required, by July 1, 2014, to include in its teacher and school employee training a component on how to properly respond to students who provide them with information about a threatening situation and how to address situations in which there is a potentially dangerous or armed intruder in the school (MO HCS SB75, 2013). Training should also include information and techniques on how to address situations where an active shooter is present in the school or on school property (MO HCS SB75, 2013).

There is currently limited data about the perceived feelings of safety and preparedness Senate Bill No. 75 has created for high school administrators across the state of Missouri. This study consisted of a population of administrators of varied school sizes, from both rural and urban settings, who represented both genders. The perceptual data reveal, "what is going on in the school right now, give[s] clues as to what needs to be done to improve, how to improve to get different results and even what is possible with respect to improvement" regarding perceptions of safety and preparedness in the event of an active shooter incident (Bernhardt, 2013, p. 4).

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study was to measure the perceived feeling of preparedness and safety of Missouri's public school administrators after participation in the Missouri Senate Bill No. 75 required ASIRT Program. There are currently no studies on the perceived effectiveness of this bill in Missouri. Information gleaned from this study may contribute to additional state policy and practice regarding school safety.

Research questions and hypotheses. The following research questions guided the study:

1. After completing active shooter training, what are the perceptions of high school administrators in preparing to deal with an active shooter incident?

2. What is the difference between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

$H2_0$: There is no difference between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident.

3. What is the difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

$H3_0$: There is no difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident.

4. What is the difference in the perceptions of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training after 20 years or greater experience as compared to those with less than 20 years of experience?

$H4_0$: There is no difference in the perceptions of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training after 20 years or greater experience as compared to those with less than 20 years of experience.

5. What percentage of Missouri high school public administrators favor arming school administrators who have completed formal training?

Definitions of Key Terms

For the purposes of this study, the following terms are defined:

Active shooter. An active shooter is defined as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms, and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims (Ericksen, 2013).

Administrators. Administrators include superintendents, assistant superintendents, principals, and assistant principals.

School Resource Officer (SRO). School resource officers are sworn law enforcement officers who are specially selected and trained to promote safety within schools (Finn, Townsend, Shively, & Rich, 2014). Officers are typically employed by law enforcement agencies, such as the local police department or sheriff's office, and are usually funded through local law enforcement or education budgets (Finn et al., 2014).

Limitations and Assumptions

The following limitations were identified in this study:

Sample demographics. While the random sample of 52 administrators for this study was likely to yield meaningful results, certain limitations of the study should be noted (Fraenkel, Wallen, & Hyun, 2015). Missouri is a concealed carry permit state which authorizes "the carrying of a concealed firearm on or about the applicant's person or within a vehicle" (§571.101.1, RSs Mo 2015). However, it is the Missouri School Board Association's position that "boards can, by policy, declare district property gun

free and prohibit anyone, including those with conceal and carry permits, from bringing firearms onto district property" (Missouri Center for Education Safety [CES], 2015, p. 1). This study did not address the sampled population's perceptions of concealed carry permits or the right to carry weapons outside the home. An equal stratified sample of those for and against the right to conceal and carry arms may have yielded different conclusions about perceptions of safety after active shooter training.

Instrumentation. The instrument for this research was a survey. There are notable threats to the validity of the instrumentation process in surveys, which can cause individuals to respond differently than how they may have otherwise responded (Fraenkel et al., 2015). Prior experience with gun-related violence might "upset or otherwise affect various individuals, causing them to respond to the 'survey' questions in a different way from how they would have responded if the event had not occurred" (Fraenkel et al., 2015, p. 407). Further, a threat to validity, known as location threat, can occur if the administrators surveyed completed the survey about school safety while in the school (Fraenkel et al., 2015).

The following assumptions were accepted:

1. It was assumed the survey responses of 52 participants yielded content validity as the questions yielded responses they were intended to measure (Fink, 2006).

2. The segmented analysis of male versus female respondents yielded statistically reliable results transferrable to the general population (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The survey is reliable in the consistency of measurement, that is the degree to which the questions used in a survey elicit the same type of information each time they are used under the same conditions (Fraenkel et al., 2015).

3. The responses of the participants were offered honestly and without bias.

Summary

The challenges educators and administrators face may vary along the edges, but providing a safe and effective learning environment, while managing limited resources efficiently, remains the major objective (Kennedy, 2016). School safety is at the forefront of American Politics (Elliott, 2015). School safety encompasses more than mass shootings (Elliott, 2015), yet emotionally charged regulation focuses most on firearm legislation (Elliott 2015). For some, the word "shooter" is too flavorless a term to describe the harshness of a student killer (Kirn, 2013, p. 32).

In Chapter Two, the literature review includes details from some of the most grisly active shooter incidents in history (Roberts, 2015). Additional literature describes the current protocol and expectation for educators and administrators to conduct before, during, and after an active shooter situation.

Chapter Two: Review of Literature

While student misbehavior has long been an issue for educators (Danforth & Smith, 2005, as cited in Ward & Gersten, 2013), there is little research to provide insight to the catalyst which may instigate a student to violence (Vernon, 2010). According to Newman (2013), "Heart-wrenching photos of innocent children and grieving adults dominate the news" (para. 1). Mark Twain (1973) once said, "Of all the animals, man is only one that is cruel. He is the only one that inflicts pain for the pleasure of doing it." A review of the literature provides a theme of an overall sense of urgency toward student safety (Schweit, 2013). Schools, businesses, and local agencies should prepare for rapid deployment through a coordinated effort in the event of an active shooter incident (Vernon, 2010).

In 2013, Missouri lawmakers authored Senate Bill 75, which modified provisions for public safety. The specific text of the bill requires public school districts and charter schools of Missouri to establish the Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training for Schools Program , also referred to as ASIRT (MoSB 75, 2013). The problem explored in this study was whether administrators perceived a sense of improved safety after complying with the state statute.

The chapter begins with the theoretical framework of Maslow's Hierarchy for self-actualization (1943).The literature in this chapter is organized and synthesized to provide insight on what to do before, during, or after an active shooter incident. Through the literature, a synopsis of school tragedy which prompted changes in school mandates and safety preparations is provided.

Theoretical Framework

Maslow's (1943) theory of human motivation, specifically the need for safety and security, served as the theoretical framework to examine whether administrators in Missouri feel prepared to adequately handle an active shooter incident after completing mandatory training. Maslow (1968) believed imbedded within human psyche is the directional tendency to actualize potential; in this case, actualizing potential would be to attain the feeling of safety after completing active shooter training. Concurrently, Maslow (1968) proposed a counterforce, the safety impulse, which compels one to resist change. According to Maslow (1968):

> Every human being has both sets of forces within him [or her]. One set clings to safety and defensiveness out of fear…The other set of forces impels him [or her] … toward confidence in the face of the external world. (p. 46).

In the 2014 article, "Examining School Safety and Gun Violence in America," President Obama was quoted as responding to the increased prevalence of gun violence incidents in public schools by executing an order to "develop and implement initiatives to prevent and reduce crime, including identifying any environmental changes that could help reduce crime in and around the school" (p. 8). President Obama continued, "It won't solve every problem. There will still be gun deaths. There will still be tragedies. There will still be violence. There will still be evil" ("Examining School Safety and Gun Violence in America," 2014, p. 8).

According to the Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence (CSPV) (2015), there are violence prevention programs, despite good intentions, which are either ineffective or actually do more harm than good. For example, Scared Straight, which is

supposed to deter delinquent youth from a life of crime by showing them life in prison, actually increases crime (CSPV, 2015). Yet shock probation programs like Scared Straight continue to be used throughout the country (CSPV, 2015). Ineffective prevention programs include boot camps, gun buybacks, peer counseling, summer jobs for at-risk youth, neighborhood watches, and home detention with electronic monitoring (CSPV, 2015).

According to Rundmo (as cited in Nielsen, Mearns, Matthiesen, & Eid, 2011), feeling unsafe at work can be considered a psychological stressor. So then, how do schools reduce the risk perception for administrators or the "perceived likelihood that an individual will experience the effect of danger" (Neilsen et al., 2011, p. 466)? Much like Maslow (1968), who acknowledged counterforces to safety and actualization, risk perception recognizes an individual's self-evaluation of the likelihood of harm is dependent on cognitions related to the source of danger (Neilsen et al., 2011). Each participant in this study completed active shooter training; therefore, perceptions of preparedness may be tied to unconscious processes (Crone & Beike, 2012).

Before School Shooting

Heath High School, West Paducah, Kentucky; Westside Middle School, Jonesboro, Arkansas; Columbine High School, Littleton, Colorado; and Sandy Hook Elementary, Newtown, Connecticut all share a tragic, violent history at what seemed liked normally peaceful schools (AP, 2013; Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Sadly, the tragedy of school related violence now causes an immediate association with Columbine and Sandy Hook and school shootings (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Elliott (2015)

noted, “As a result, the school safety debate tends to incite emotional response from legislatures, school districts, and parents alike” (para. 1).

Heath High School, Westside Middle School, Columbine High School, and Sandy Hook Elementary have not been the only four schools to fall prey to school shootings (AP, 2013). In the 10 years immediately following the Columbine attack, there were 108 more school shootings (Roberts, 2015). From 2009 to October of 2015, there were an additional 154 shootings, bringing the total to 262 shootings since Columbine in April of 1999 (Roberts, 2015).

Factors that influence violence. What causes a person to enter a school and shoot with the intent of taking innocent lives? This section includes a review of literature on various factors which influence this magnitude of violence. Disillusioned and angry youth, being mentally disturbed or socially ostracized, the desire for national media attention, being a copycat, the gun culture, video games, educational deficiencies, discipline, bullying, and society’s glorification of aggression and violence are just a few of the factors credited with today’s level of violence in schools (Kneer, Munko, Glock, & Bente, 2012; Metzl & MacLeish, 2015; Schered, 2013;,). Looking into the profile of some of the school shooters could give an answer as to why (Kneer et al., 2012).

Kip Kinkel killed his parents, both high school Spanish teachers, on May 20, 1998 (Hornblower, Faltermayer, Grace, Monroe, & Woodbury, 1998). He then spent the night with their bodies in the home, while setting bombs and booby-traps around the house (Hornblower et al., 1998). The next morning, Kinkel drove to Thurston High School with a semiautomatic rifle and a Glock pistol (Hornblower et al., 1998). Kinkel fired 48

rounds into his classmates, killing two and wounding eight others (Hornblower et al., 1998).

Katherine Ramsland (2015) espoused it was a combination of things that influenced Kinkel to become a school shooter. The parents of Kip Kinkel went to Spain for a year, placing Kip in a non-English-speaking school, which may have placed him at a severe academic disadvantage (Lachmann, 2006). Kinkel experienced early failures athletically, including athletic inferiority to his older sister (Hornblower et al., 1998). He was dyslexic, while growing up in an academically enriched family; noted as clumsy, while his father was a star tennis player; small and weak in stature and looked for ways to empower himself; and had a poorly managed temper and participated in anti-social behaviors (Hornblower et al., 1998). Kip Kinkel was eventually put on Prozac for his depression, but he stopped taking the medication when he seemed to be doing better (Lachmann, 2006). In Kinkel's journal, he wrote of how much he hated himself, how lonely he was, and how he wanted to be bigger (Hornblower et al., 1998). Lachman (2006) noted the continuum of violations of expectations may have been lending factors to Kip Kinkel becoming an active school shooter.

Expectations and violations of expectations may be drawn from empirical studies of infants (Lachmann, 2006). In the first years of life, babies develop expectations of how to interact with their caregivers (Metzl & MacLeish, 2015). Violations of those expectations may include the following: harmful substances ingested by mothers during pregnancy, chronic maternal stress during pregnancy, low birth weight, early maternal rejection or abuse, nutritional deficiencies, lack of consistency among caregivers in early life, ineffective discipline, and severe neglect (Lachmann, 2006). Kennedy-Paine et al.

(2015) pointed out none of these factors are considered causal, but in certain combinations and with certain dispositions, they can provoke anger, cause a lack of anger management skills, and can create violence against oneself and/or toward others.

School leaders have marked the Columbine school shootings as the crime the nation would never forget (Vail, 2009). Dyland Klebold, 17, and Eric Harris, 18, obsessed with violent video games and paramilitary techniques, spent over a year planning, collecting, and making weapons for their attack (Vail, 2009). Klebold and Harris were part of the "Trenchcoat Mafia," so-called because of their habit of wearing black trench coats (Kass, 1999, p. 5). Klebold and Harris had been bullied and scorned by their classmates (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Both left a long trail of diaries, video tapes, and emails documenting their motivations (Vail, 2009). The boys sent an email to the police the day before the attack, blaming parents and teachers for making children intolerant sheep and announcing their plans for suicide (Vail, 2009). The next day, Klebold and Harris walked into Columbine High School and unleashed 46 minutes of death and destruction (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014).

The Columbine shootings provided a profile of the shooters from the shooters' point of view (Chen et al., 2015). Klebold and Harris left behind five video tapes that chronicled their planning and preparation for the attack (Gibbs, Roche, Goldstein, Harrington, & Woodbury, 1999). Once parents had gone to sleep, Klebold and Harris would head to their basements to produce the videotapes (Gibbs et al., 1999). In one video, Harris took a swig from a bottle of Jack Daniels, while holding a sawed-off shotgun he nicknamed Arlene (Gibbs et al., 1999). Arlene was one of Harris' favorite characters from the gory Doom video game and books (Gibbs et al., 1999). Harris and

Klebold expressed hatred to a number of ethnic groups in the video(Gibbs et al., 1999). Klebold announced he hoped to kill 250 of them (Gibbs et al., 1999).

Klebold and Harris were taunted by what they termed the "jocks" of Columbine High School (Gibbs et al., 1999, p. 9). Klebold and Harris did not want to take out their rage on just the "jocks;" they wanted to be famous, and both school shooters believed there would be movies made of their actions in the future (Gibbs et al., 1999, p. 9). The shooters questioned which director could be trusted with the script: "Steven Spielberg or Quentin Tarantino" (Gibbs et al., 1999, p. 1). Klebold and Harris wanted to create a revolution for the disposed and envisioned the creation of a cult in which they would die as martyrs (Chen et al., 2015).

The Columbine Tapes also revealed Klebold and Harris not only had anger issues, but that Harris stopped taking his Luvox medication to let his anger flare (Chen et al., 2015). Klebold was noted for writing violent essays in his English class (Gibbs et al., 1999). Both Harris and Klebold expressed anger towards those whom they felt had belittled them all their lives (Gibbs et al., 1999). The factors that seemed to influence Klebold and Harris's violence included anger toward a society that seemed to reject them, violent video games and books, and the desire to be famous (Lachmann, 2006).

Wanting to be a copycat may have influenced some to be school shooters. After Columbine, students across the United States began to call in bomb threats, started wearing trench coats, and used the internet to praise what Harris and Klebold had done (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). It was not Paducah, or Jonesboro, or other cities in which school shootings had occurred that students wanted to imitate; students used the mantra "Columbine" (Ramsland, 2015).

On May 13, 1999, less than a month after the Columbine shootings, four middle school students were caught planning to force their principal at gunpoint to call a school assembly (Cloud et al., 1999). Two of the students were 14 years old, and two were 13 years old, and they intended to massacre everyone in the assembly (Ramsland, 2015). A week later, a sophomore at Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia, opened fire on his classmates, injuring six (Cloud et al., 1999). In June of that same year, a 13-year-old girl from Sunrise, Florida, was charged with planning to kill her classmates and teachers (Ramsland, 2015). The girl met with friends three days after Columbine and showed them a map of the school's surveillance system (Ramsland, 2015).

The copycats would slow in action until February 5, 2001 (Tonn, 2006), when three students in Hoyt, Kansas, were arrested for planning an attack on their school (Ramsland, 2015). Tonn (2006) wrote:

> In all, two suburban Kansas City, Missouri, teenagers were charged and five Riverton, Kansas, high school students were taken into custody after threatening to carry out school shootings to mark the anniversary of the 1999 attack at Columbine High School, officials said. (p. 6)

Amongst the bomb-making materials, maps, ammunition, and weapons found in their possession was a black trench coat (Ramsland, 2015).

Before Columbine and Sandy Hook were renowned for school violence, there were other school shootings. In January of 1979, 17-year-old Brenda Spencer got a rifle for Christmas (Bovsun, 2013). Spencer used that rifle to shoot into a neighboring elementary school across from her San Diego, California, home (Langman, 2016a). Eight students and a police officer were wounded, while two others were killed in the six-

hour standoff (Langman, 2016a). When the ordeal was over, Spencer shrugged her shoulders and explained, “I don’t like Mondays” (Bovsun, 2013, para. 11).

On March 2, 1987, 12-year-old Nathan Ferris brought a pistol to his Missouri school and killed another student who had been teasing him (Tauber, 2007). Ferris, described as an overweight loner, turned the gun on himself after killing the other student (Ramsland, 2015). Ferris, an honor student, had warned a friend not to attend school that day, yet, no one picked up on the signal Ferris was giving about his plan (Tauber, 2007).

On November 15, 1995, 17-year-old Jamie Rouse, dressed in black, went into his Richland School in Giles County, Tennessee, with a 22-calibre Remington Viper (O’Toole, 2000). Rouse shot two teachers in the head, killing one (Langman, 2016b). As Rouse smiled, he shot at the football coach, but a female student walked into the path, was shot in the throat, and died (O’Toole, 2000). Rouse had told five other students of his plans, but no one called for help (O’Toole, 2000).

On February 2, 1996, 14-year-old Barry Loukaitis dressed up like a Wild West gunslinger and entered his algebra class in Moses Lake, Washington (Frankly Media & KHQ, 2016). Hidden under Loukaitis’ duster were two pistols, a rifle, and almost 80 rounds of ammunition (Ramsland, 2015). Loukaitis shot and killed 14-year-old Manuel Vela, but before Louikaitis was subdued by faculty, he shot a 13-year-old girl and his algebra teacher (Frankly Media & KHQ, 2016). In the end, three were killed (Frankly Media & KHQ, 2016). Loukaitis blamed his actions on “mood swings” (Ramsland, 2015, p. 3).

Sixteen-year-old Evan Ramsey went to Bethel High School in Alaska on the 19th of February, 1997, and killed a boy with a shotgun (Johnson, 2006). Ramsey then shot

two other students before going to the administration office and killing Ron Edwards, the high school principal (Johnson, 2006). Ramsey was referred to as "retarded" and "spaz" by the other students (Ramsland, 2015, p. 5).

Ramsland (2015) noted many may have become school shooters simply because they wanted to be copycats of the Columbine shootings. In the days following the Columbine tragedy, students across the country started wearing trench coats to school, called in bomb threats, and praised Klebold and Harris across the Internet (AP, 2013). Schools in Arizona, New Jersey, Michigan, North Carolina, and the District of Columbia closed to investigate threats received (Algozzine & McGee, 2011). Students did not want to imitate Paducah or West Side; they were chanting the mantra "Columbine" (Ramsland, 2015).

Within weeks, plots were foiled or poorly executed to commit Columbine-style attacks across the country (Salgado, 2005). On May 13, 1999, four middle-school students were caught planning to force the school's principal at gunpoint to call an assembly, massacre everybody in the assembly, and then point the guns on themselves (Ramsland, 2015). On May 20, 1999, a sophomore at Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia, opened fire on schoolmates, injuring six (Cloud et al., 1999). On June 14, 1999, a 13-year-old girl was charged with planning to kill her classmates and teachers (Thompson, 2014). The girl had shown her friends a map of the school's surveillance system, a list of nine students and personnel she intended to target, and her getaway plan (Thompson, 2014). Her plans were developed just three days after Columbine (Ramsland, 2015).

The next copycats were revealed when in February of 2001, three students were arrested for planning an attack on their high school (Kelly, 2012). In their homes were found bomb-making materials, floorplans of the school, rifle and ammunition, and white supremacist drawings (Kelly, 2012). Charles Andrew Williams carried out his attack on Santana High School in Santee, California (Van Brunt, 2012). Williams brought his father's .22-calibre revolver and killed two students, ages 14 and 17, and wounded 13 others in the high school restroom (Van Brunt, 2012). Less than two years after Columbine, Williams executed the deadliest attack on a school (Van Brunt, 2012).

Ramsland (2015) also noted the mental health of the young rampage killer. Solomon (2014) stated, "Inadequate gun control and poor mental-health care are problems that invariably define the debate after atrocities" (p. 2). On the one-year anniversary of Columbine, *The New York Times* published a series about American rampage killers of the past 50 years (Goodstein & Glaberson, 2000). Columbine was one of 13 for the year 1999 (Newman, 2013).

Ramsland (2015) noted rampage killers are better educated than most killers, are likely to have some type of military experience, and are more likely to commit suicide. The most significant influence for their murders appears to be some sort of mental illness (Chen et al., 2015). Of the 100 acts of violence by these rampage killers, one-third of the killers had histories of violence and half had made threats (Chen et al., 2015). Most of the attacks were the result of a build-up of rage over time, combined with depression (Chen et al., 2015). Ramsland (2015) quoted J. Reid Meloy, a forensic psychologist and expert on sociopathic behavior. Meloy said, "There's a planning and a purpose, and an emotional detachment that's very long term" (as cited in Ramsland, 2015, p. 3).

Of the 100 cases written about in *The New York Times*, 19 involved teenagers (Goodstein & Glaberson, 2000). Some common characteristics of teenage rampage killers set them apart from adult rampage killers (Chen et al., 2015). The adult rampage killers tended to act alone, while the teenage rampage killers tended to act with the support of their peers (Goodstein & Glaberson, 2000). Teenage rampage killers often tried to collaborate and get other students involved; they often boasted of their plans to other students (Chen et al., 2015). Teenage rampage killers committed suicide less often than their adult counterparts (Ferguson, Coulson, & Barnett, 2011). The youngest of killers were less emotionally detached than older rampage killers (Ferguson, Coulson, & Barnett, 2011). Most of the young rampage killers were White and preferred semiautomatic weapons (Goodstein & Glaberson, 2000). Almost half of the young rampage killers displayed some evidence of mental disturbance, including delusions and hallucinations (Goodstein & Glaberson, 2000).

Some are willing to think outside the box when it comes to the factors that influence school violence. C. Bradley Thompson (2014) proposed progressive education plays a role in the rise of school shootings and violence. Diane Ravitch (2002) expanded:

> According to Progressive education theory, children are the subjective creators of their own knowledge: the 'active builders of knowledge—little scientists who are constantly creating and testing their own theories of the world.' They believe that 'knowledge is not transmitted directly from one knower to another, but is actively built up by the learner.' (as cited in Thompson, 2014, p. 212)

Thompson (2014) believed progressive education shuns the traditional learning of the alphabet, the multiplication table, grammar, etc., and replaces it with a school in which

children are left to learn for themselves. Under Thompson's (2014) idea of the progressive education, students should not be taught what is right and what is wrong; students are to decide for themselves what is right and what is wrong. Thompson (2014) noted progressive education's primary concern is to indoctrinate and socialize students with certain social attitudes rather than to educate them.

Thompson (2014) then linked whole-language instruction to the demise of reading scores in the upper grades. Thompson (2014) believed whole-language's memorization of the shape of a word turned English into a form of hieroglyphics. By the time a student has finished the fourth grade, he or she can recognize 1,400 simple words (Friesen & Butera, 2012). Thompson (2014) stated a student will encounter serious problems when leaving the basal readers and is confronted with more sophisticated texts in science, literature, history, or math. Students will then be faced with tens of thousands of new words they must read and decode (Friesen & Butera, 2012). Thompson (2014) indicated it is this inability to read that leads to children being frustrated, humiliated, resentful, and angry. This, in turn, causes students to act out and seek attention in negative ways (Thompson, 2014).

Thompson (2014) also cited overactive and disruptive boys are being drugged with legal medicine. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)(2016), 14% of boys ages 5-17 were diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) between 2011 and 2013. Ritalin is a central nervous system stimulant which affects chemicals in the brain and nerves and is used to treat ADHD (CDC, 2016). Moreover, "Illegal stimulant use has increased for several years in the U.S., particularly prescription stimulants prescribed for Attention Deficit Disorder.

The propensity for youths to use medications sans prescription or to overuse for a 'high' has increased" (Pilkinton & Cannatella, 2012, p. 409). The estimated prevalence rates of ADHD increased 21.8% over the four year period from 2003 to 2007 ((Pilkinton & Cannatella, 2012).

Thompson (2014) considered Constructivist's use of "discovery learning" and "cooperative learning" in whole math as an anti-conceptual method that keeps children at a concrete-bound, perceptual level of cognition that never allows students to form and deal with higher-level abstractions (p. 215). Thompson (2014) believed as children grow, they will flounder in a chaotic sea of concretes with no objective, logical principles to guide them. By undermining children's ability to read or to do simple math, children are left with reduced abilities to understand good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust (Thompson, 2014).

Thompson (2014) said another factor to consider is the pseudo-self-esteem movement. While much research exists regarding the importance of positive reinforcement and praise for redirecting children, it is important to note, artificial praise may generate a long-term expectation of praise for doing nothing and problem behaviors may arise without reward (Call & Lomas Mevers, 2014). When the reality of academic or job demands confront the "ribbon for participation" individual, the world can turn ugly (Thompson, 2014, p. 216).

Thompson (2014) believed several characteristics of Progressive education have created a climate conducive to students becoming school shooters. Whole language reading and conceptual mathematics, combined with a love affair with self-esteem, have created students with no real moral compass (Thompson, 2014). Today's if-it-feels-

good-do-it mentality has created some very dangerous individuals (Thompson, 2014). Progressive education has created students who have no way to handle failure and will turn their anger and frustrations on their peers (Thompson, 2014).

School shootings are not limited to primary or secondary schools. The Virginia Tech shootings were preceded by deadly violence on at least 12 other college campuses going back to the Kent State shootings of 1970 (Amada, 2007; Jenson, 2007). Seven of the 12 college shootings have occurred since 1991, and four have occurred since 2000 (Jenson, 2007).

School resource officers. School resource officer (SRO) programs began in Flint, Michigan, in the 1950s (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The SRO program began to increase in popularity after the school violence of the 1990s (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The definition of a SRO is a sworn police officer who is assigned to a school or group of schools to promote a safe learning environment for all involved with the school (Cray & Weiler, 2011). Schools may have one of three variations of a SRO (Cray & Weiler, 2011). The first is where law enforcement officers visit the school, formally or informally (Cray & Weiler, 2011). The law enforcement officers make their presence visible on different occasions (Finn et al., 2014). The second type of SRO is a paid security guard on site (Cray & Weiler, 2011). These are not sworn law enforcement officers, nor are they employed by the local law enforcement agency (Finn et al., 2014). They are a constant presence on site and are typically involved in the entering and exiting of school grounds (Finn et al., 2014). The third type of SRO is the true SRO (Cray & Weiler, 2011).

Districts working to prevent shootings or violent campus events are hiring more resources officers (DeNisco, 2014). Not everybody is fully convinced SROs are the perfect solution to school violence (Vitale, 2015). Many are afraid the influx of SROs in the school setting will raise the stakes of school discipline and push more students into the juvenile-justice system for matters that could have been handled within the school setting (Shah, 2013a). Vitale (2015) believed police offers have no business setting foot in the classroom. The Justice Policy Institute noted, it is long past time to remove all law enforcement officers from schools (Hughes & Fenster, 2011).

Even those in favor of adding SROs warn the right persons must be hired as SROs, or the program will have negative consequences (Shah, 2013a). Maurice Canady, executive director of the National Association of SROs, said, "Just putting officers in schools with no training…that's a recipe for disaster" (as cited in Shah, 2013a, p. 14). Canady continued, "That's where the school-to-prison movement gets some of its momentum" (as cited in Shah, 2013a, p. 14). True SROs do more than just stand vigilant against school shooters (DeNisco, 2014). These SROs are now trained to be first responders in an emergency situation, as opposed to just locking a building down and waiting for outside help (DeNisco, 2014). The SROs teach classes on distracted driving and underage drinking, direct traffic before and after school, and are informal counselors who build relationships with students during the day (Shah, 2013a).

Jasmine Jauregui, 19, a graduate of Norwalk High School in Norwalk, California, recently marched in protest of SROs outside the U.S. Capitol (Shah, 2013a). As a member of a gang, Ms. Jauregui felt as if the SROs were always watching her and her friends (Shah, 2013a). Jauregui and those marching chanted, "You can't build peace with

a piece" (Shah, 2013a, p. 14), referring to the weapons in the possession of the SROs. Ms. Jauregui's concern was that she could not confide in someone who had the ability to arrest her (Shah, 2013a). Sarah Hinger, a staff lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union said, "We're criminalizing what is a lot of routine student behavior. What student disruptions rise to the point of being criminal is very much dependent on how school officials and police officers react and interact with that student behavior" (as cited in Blad, 2016, p. 14).

Those opposed to the increase of SROs cite a 2010 Texas report that revealed as schools added SROs, criminal citations of students at school rose (Blad, 2016). Those same opponents also noted the citations were disproportionately given to Black and Hispanic students (Shah, 2013a). Judith Browne Dianis, a co-director of the Washington-based Advancement Project, a civil rights advocacy group, said, "The same thing that students would get suspended for, they were getting arrested for" (as cited in Shah, 2013a, p. 14).

The success of the SRO program requires at least six things (Weiler & Cray, 2011). First, the right police officer must be chosen (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The right police officer is one who is adept in dealing with minors (DeNisco, 2016)). The second key to a successful SRO program is that the officer must be trained with knowledge of educational settings, juvenile law, special education law, and giving classroom presentations (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Thirdly, the SRO and administrators are encouraged to review and have a clear understanding of one another's roles (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The fourth is the perception of the job of the SRO within the local police department (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Many police departments might consider the SRO as

an armed babysitter (Blad, 2016). This perception would make the job undesirable, and more qualified officers may be less likely to take the job (DeNisco, 2016). The fifth key to success for the SRO program focuses on the funding for the program (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Without funding, no amount of success will keep it functioning (DeNisco, 2016). The sixth key is for the SRO program to keep a clearly defined role as one who ensures a safe learning environment (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The SRO program must not develop into a school-to-prison pipeline as many of its critics claim will result (Blad, 2016).

With better building designs, advanced electronics technology, an increased law enforcement presence, policies and procedures, more and more legislation, and products to help prepare and try to prevent an attack, the teacher who listens may be just as effective as an SRO (Benguhe, 2013). Rachel Jupin developed a positive relationship with one of her students, Amy (Benguhe, 2013). That positive relationship enabled Amy to confide in Mrs. Jupin that her friends were planning a Columbine-style attack on their New Bedford High School and its 3,250 students and faculty (Benguhe, 2013). It was Mrs. Jupin who convinced Amy to tell her story to the legal authorities, which headed off another school tragedy (Benguhe, 2013).

Preparedness. With the increasing numbers of school shootings, schools continue to push for ways to prepare for these events. Rollison et al. (2013) stated:

> Schools alone do not have the capacity to plan and implement the wide range of interventions needed to ensure a safe school environment for students. A collaborative approach among education and other community systems can best address the intersecting factors that contribute to antisocial behaviors. (p. 445)

After the Sandy Hook tragedy, schools began to re-examine their safety plans (Brydolf, 2013). Kennedy (2013) wrote, "Deaths from gun violence and natural disasters provide education institutions with vivid reminders that the safety to students and staff is paramount" (p. 19). Collaboration with a variety of groups, including social services, parents, and law enforcement, is something that schools should try to do when developing and re-examining their safety plans. (Brydolf, 2013). Schools may adopt a variety of techniques in preparing for a school shooter. Counseling, parent education, and mental health services are strategies schools can use to help identify potential problems (Algozzine & McGee, 2011). Security measures include hardware, drills, plans, and resource officers (Brydolf, 2013).

Many schools are questioning the previously held belief that to "shelter in place" is the best strategy for dealing with an active shooter (Brydolf, 2013, p. 5). Many schools and safety agencies are switching to a more aggressive approach that urges faculty and students to scatter or fight back (Hamilton, 2014). Vicki Bauman of the Stanislaus County Office of Education conducts regional school safety trainings for the California Department of Education (Brydolf, 2013). Ms. Bauman noted the faculty and students at Sandy Hook "did everything right, but the children died anyway" (as cited in Brydolf, 2013, p. 5).

Some believe the schools' efforts to prepared are too focused on firepower (Arnold, 2015). Pediatrician Robert K. Ross is the president and CEO of the California Endowment (Brydolf, 2013). Ross claimed, "We have a crisis of disengaged, disconnected, and disempowered young people, many whom of whom are wrestling with

mental illness" (as cited in Brydolf, 2013, p. 6). Ross pointed to the one-to-one thousand ratio of school counselors per student in California's schools. Ross contended:

> Instead of gates, guns, and metal detectors, let's invest in the things we know will make us safer: counselors, health care, teaching positive behavior, and making sure we have services to reach out to disconnected youth and pull them back on tract. That's the best way to make our schools and communities safe and violence-free. (as cited in Brydolf, 2013, p. 6)

Lawrence Fitzgerald (2013) noted school security measures often are classified along the five steps of the security continuum: deter, detect, delay, respond, and cover Fitzgerald (2013) stated the importance of deterring, detecting, and delaying by saying if schools wait until the respond stage, loss of life will likely occur. A responder is usually just a few minutes away when seconds count (Fitzgerald, 2013).

Referencing a New York Police Department report that chronicled 230 active-shooter cases over 40 years, Fitzgerald (2013) noted 97% of the attackers were males. The majority of the shooters were between 10 and 24 years of age, had mental or emotional issues, and had a grievance toward someone in the school (Fitzgerald, 2013). Most of these attackers planned their attacks in advance, meaning there was no "mental snap" that took place (Fitzgerald, 2013, p. 24). Most of those who attacked their schools had a pattern of selecting their targets, surveying and gathering information, testing and evaluating the school's security, reconsidering and reconfirming their targets and goals, acquiring supplies, gaining access and conducting the attack, and finally planning an escape (Ferguson, Coulson, & Barnett, 2011).

Fitzgerald (2013) recommended signage that states uniformed and plain-clothed police officers conduct routine patrols inside and outside the school. Congressman Trent Franks, a Republican and gun owner in Arizona, pointed out, "Arizona has a much lower gun-violence rate" than other cities which prohibit conceal and carry (as cited in Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011, p. 24). The U.S. Department of Justice recommends armed patrol (Finn et al., 2014). Also concerning signage, Fitzgerald (2013) believed signs noting the staff have been issued stun guns or similar devices should be displayed in visible places. In the article, Fitzgerald (2013) did not recommend placing a sign stating staff are allowed to carry concealed weapons. The author did believe schools should leave possible attackers with doubts about the strength of potential resistance (Fitzgerald, 2013).

Another deterrent to potential threat is to have multiple adults observe all persons as they enter the school and engage them in conversation (Fabbri, 2014). Having an adult greet everyone who enters the school helps create a soft barrier a shooter must go through before entering the school (Fabbri, 2014). Those observing the people entering the school can look for individuals who are agitated, disturbed, or out of place (Fitzgerald, 2013).

Delaying entry to a school involves the use of physical and virtual characteristics to frustrate or impede an attacker in the execution of his or her attack (Fitzgerald, 2013). Schools need to control who enters a school and how they enter a school (Duplechain & Morris, 2014). Many schools have substituted electromagnetic locks for conventional locks (Finn, et al., 2014). Schools have also placed ballistic film on glass surrounding the entries to their buildings (Fitzgerald, 2013). Delaying an attacker's entrance can buy

students and staff valuable time to shelter in place, evacuate, or prepare to fight (Fabbri, 2014).

Layered security is another measure to delay and deter attackers (Fitzgerald, 2013). In layered security, an attacker must avoid being noticed by alert teachers surrounding the entrance point of the school (Brydolf, 2013). Would-be attackers must avoid random patrols of law enforcement, staff, or security personnel through the parking lot and surrounding grounds (Blad, 2014). Those wanting to attack the school then must defeat a controlled-access entry point into the building (Fitzgerald, 2013). After gaining immediate access, an attacker must then defeat or bypass the person assigned at the entry area (Fabbri, 2014). Next, the attacker has to face staff armed with defensive devices such as spray, stun gun, or firearm (Fitzgerald, 2013). The attacker's next challenge is to deal with armed law enforcement in the school (Fitzgerald, 2013). If an attacker is successful to this point, the shooter must now enter locked and barricaded classrooms (Kennedy, 2013). If the attacker is able to proceed, he or she is now faced with dealing with faculty and staff who have been trained in storming and immobilizing an aggressor (Keller, 2014).

Those who fail to prepare are actually preparing to fail (Molnar, 2013). Schools must plan a part of their budgets to provide for security preparations (Hamilton, 2014). Schools are spending millions of dollars to implement a variety of security measures (Molnar, 2013). Companies are answering the demand for products to provide safety measures in schools (O'Meara, 2013). Schools are setting aside money to purchase bullet-proof handheld white boards (Molnar, 2013). HABCO Industries offers a briefcase with an 800,000 volt stun gun, pepper spray, smoke grenade, and 13-foot

window ladder (Molnar, 2013). Single-entry points with magnetic locks, bullet-proof glass, personnel to monitor access full time, resource officers, deterrent weapons, training to faculty and staff, surveillance equipment, and extra lighting all cost districts money (Waters, 2013).

Mike Kennedy (2010) provided some low-cost steps for schools to prepare for an active shooter. Trees and shrubbery should be kept trimmed to provide adequate monitoring of the school grounds (Kennedy, 2010). Access to roofs and windows should be prevented, monitoring anything that could be used as a ladder for access (Kennedy, 2010). Schools need to secure roof hatches, skylights, and rooftop access doors while routinely inspecting all lighting for damage and burnt-out bulbs (Kaiser, 2013). Parking lots should have traffic-calming devices such as stop signs, speed bumps, and markings (Kennedy, 2010). School staff should limit the use of building entrances to as few as possible (Waters, 2013). Schools also need to number doors and rooms in a logical, sequential pattern so emergency responders can find them quickly (Schwartz, 2013). The last budget-friendly piece is to ensure all classrooms have some communication abilities with the office (Waters, 2013).

Schools should also prepare to communicate to stakeholders should an emergency occur (Shah et al., 2013). School administrators must determine with whom they will need to communicate during a crisis and the best means of communication (Schwartz, 2013). Those entrusted to make decisions must determine where people will be, the method to communicate, and the appropriate response time for communication (Schered, 2013). Communication can be as high tech as text messages, recorded messages, social

media, and email, to low-tech options such as flyers strategically located on bulletin boards (Plummer & Johnson, 2008).

Sara Schwartz (2013) believed the best school planning occurs through the use of a safety audit. Schwartz (2013) named four topics to be considered in a school's safety audit. The first is the physical security and surveillance on campus (Schwartz, 2013). The second is the safety-related policies and procedures applicable to students (Schwartz, 2013). The third is the safety-related policies and procedures that are applicable to employees, volunteers, visitors, and contractors (Schwartz, 2013). The last is the crisis management plan (Schwartz, 2013).

Under the physical security and surveillance of the campus, schools should consider areas that may create a heightened risk to safety, such as secluded areas or areas that need more lighting (Rydeen, 2013). Included under physical security would be security personnel (Rudick, 2011). Schools should make sure they have adequate security personnel who are appropriately trained (Plummer & Johnson, 2008). Under this part of the audit, schools should take a look at policies on visitors, weapons, and security camera surveillance, and what they should do should they discover weapons on campus (Schwartz, 2013). Included in this, schools should consider the procedures to notify law enforcement, members of the crisis team, parents, and students (Molnar, 2013).

Under the safety-related policies and procedures applicable to students, schools should take a comprehensive review of the school's student/parent handbook (Schwartz, 2013). Policies and procedures should establish clear and consistent expectations with respect to the safety of the students (Molnar, 2013). Schools should make sure faculty are enforcing the policies and students are following the procedures (Schwartz, 2013).

Under the safety-related policies and procedures for employees, volunteers, visitors, and contractors, schools should start with the employee handbook (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Relevant policies should be assessed on their clarity, the frequency of their violation, and whether there should be any additional issues addressed (Rydeen, 2013). Also to be considered is the screening of employees, volunteers, and those servicing the needs of the school (Schwartz, 2013).

Schwartz (2013) provided 11 tips to consider when conducting a safety audit for a school. First, decide who will conduct the process (Schwartz, 2013). The audit can be done in-house, with legal counsel, or through a safety audit professional (Viramontez, 2015). Schools should decide who will be on the safety audit team (Schwartz, 2013). Administrators, faculty, parents, and/or legal counsel are some of the options to consider when forming a safety audit team (Waters, 2013). Next, consider partnering with law enforcement, emergency responders, and experienced legal counsel (Weiler & Cray, 2011). Then determine the scope of the safety audit (Schwartz, 2013). The audit can focus on a limited area, such as an active shooter, or it can focus on the overall safety of the school (Blad, 2014). The safety audit should include an identification of the policies and procedures to be reviewed and assessed by the safety audit team (Schwartz, 2013).

Schwartz (2013) recommended selecting a variety of audit tools and methods, such as surveys, focus groups, interviews, observations, and trial exercises. Schwartz (2013) also recommended establishing a timeline for the audit. This timeline should be reasonable given the school's schedule and the schedule of the team's members (Weiler & Cray, 2011). The safety audit team should do its best to stay with the timeline (Schwartz, 2013). The safety audit should also involve as many representatives as

possible who are genuinely vested in the school culture (Blad, 2014). As the audit comes to a close, schools should prepare an audit report, prioritize the needed improvements, and finally, implement the suggested improvements (Schwartz, 2013).

When considering preparing for an active shooter, schools are thinking differently when designing safe facilities. A central element of design in newer schools is the theory of crime prevention through environmental design (McLester, 2011). It is believed if new schools are carefully designed the physical environment can deter crime by limiting the opportunities for and vulnerabilities to negative influences (Brydolf, 2013). Some things newer schools are designed with include fewer entrances and exits, space at the entrances allotted for metal detectors, and security guards (Kaiser, 2013). Entrances are well-lit, have alarms, lock from in the inside, and require non-school personnel to undergo screening before gaining admittance into the school building (Kaiser, 2013). Morones, Dorko, and Peele (2013) stated, “They've been watching the world from malls, gas stations, and other public places for decades, but now, surveillance cameras are becoming a standard, even expected, fixture in school hallways” (p. 12). Video cameras are more integrated in the design of new schools, along with natural surveillance (Morones et al., 2013). Natural surveillance would include large glass windows around administrative offices with unobstructed views to the street to ensure the office staff can spot people approaching the main entrance (McLester, 2011).

Tip lines have gotten a fresh look as a safety initiative in the preparation for an active shooter (Blad, 2014). Supporters say the tip line provides students a confidential way to deliver administration and law enforcement authorities information that could prevent a school attack (Mongan & Walker, 2012). The tip line can also be used to report

bullying and thoughts of suicide (Blad, 2014). A private, nonprofit organization called Safe2Tell has received reports and aided in the prevention of 266 separate school attacks since its creation in 2004 (Payne & Elliott, 2011). That same year, Safe2Tell reported it had received 1,438 plans of suicide and 2,386 reports of bullying (Payne & Elliott, 2011). The U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center released a report in 2002 containing an analysis of 37 school attacks from 1974 to 2000 (Blad, 2014). In 31 out of the 37 attacks, the attacker told at least one person of his or her plan before the attack occurred (Blad, 2014). In 22 of the 37 attacks, the attacker told two or more people of the attack, including peers, classmates, siblings, and friends (Blad, 2014).

During School Shooting

The FBI put out a Law Enforcement Bulletin in September of 2010 entitled "Those Terrible First Few Minutes" (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). The bulletin is a description of what occurs and what can transpire during the first few minutes of a school shooting (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). No one goes to school knowing for sure he or she is going to be involved in a school shooting, but everybody goes to school believing they could be involved in a school shooting (Rand & Epstein, 2014). Once a school shooting begins, the new technology and equipment, planning and preparation, and scenarios and drills are really put to the test (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Unfortunately, it is not a test of passing or failing, but of life and death.

Unless the SRO is immediately confronted by the school shooter, law enforcement officials are generally the second responders (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). The tactics for responding to an active shooter have changed dramatically since the Columbine High School shootings in 1999 (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Previously held

thought was once a shooter is discovered, the school is to go into a lockdown (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). The students and teachers are expected to hide in an inconspicuous area behind locked and barricaded classroom doors with the lights and all electronic equipment turned off (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). The potential victims are to remain as quiet as possible, making a difficult target for the active shooter and providing law enforcement with enough time to respond to the scene (O'Meara, 2013). The protocol of hiding also aids law enforcement to more readily identify the shooter without the camouflage of students and staff intermingling in mass hysteria (Schweit, 2013). This plan is based on the assumption the school shooter will begin his or her actions while students are in their classrooms and that the first and only second responders will be law enforcement (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

Should an active shooter begin his or her actions during a transition period, at meal time, or during an assembly, school personnel are to direct students into the nearest classroom possible (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). If students are in larger areas such as a library, a performance theater, or gymnasium, protocols are to be developed to cover these vulnerable and predictable times (O'Meara, 2013). Active shooter training sessions attempt to teach officials how to manage all aspects of attacks, from the basic direction of emergency vehicles to and from scenes, to ensuring at least some officers are able to field-treat the wounded (Viramontez, 2015).

Reactions to an active shooter incident are going to be different depending on whether students are on a college, high school, middle school, elementary, or pre-school campus (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). The level of direction and protection will be greater the lower the age of the students (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Students in the

lower grades are going to need greater direction and supervision and will be less likely to add in an attack on an active shooter (Ward & Gersten, 2013). Students in the upper grades can be directed to flee on their own and can be very capable of a strong counterattack (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

It is entirely possible an active shooter's first victims will be the office administration responsible for initiating the lockdown (Waters, 2013). If this is the case, the first notification many will receive that there is an active shooter will be the sound of gunshots and screams (O'Meara, 2013). If administrators are incapacitated, teachers and staff will have to make autonomous decisions for the safety of themselves and their students (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

When faced with an active shooter, all school staff must be able to make a quick assessment of the threat and take multiple steps in their responses (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Those steps would include disseminating appropriate information to the school and to the outside authorities while initiating available defensive mechanisms (O'Meara, 2013). The first priority is to notify those within the school of the active shooter and then notify the law enforcement outside the school (Molnar, 2013).

Active shooters come from all facets of life (Neuman et al., 2015). They can be a member of the school population, the community, or a complete stranger (Neuman et al., 2015). The active shooter may devise an intricate plan or may act upon impulse (Newman, 2013). Rydeen (2013) added, "Although some are seeking enhanced counter-security measures, others are calling for understanding and addressing the lack of institutionalization and proper treatment of the severely mentally ill" (para. 9). He or she may be completely coherent, mentally ill, or under the influence of drugs (Neuman et al.,

2015). An active shooter may have a specific target in mind or may be motivated to randomly select victims (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

More than likely, the first person to engage an active shooter will be somebody with only minimal training and an orientation far from that of law enforcement (O'Meara, 2013). The first to actually engage an active shooter could be the principal, a teacher, a secretary, other staff, a parent or volunteer, or a student (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). The person to first engage the active shooter must clearly and concisely communicate the potential danger to others (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). If that communication cannot be made, the first notification may be gunshots and screams (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Communication must be internal, to notify the danger within the school system, before it is external, to notify the law enforcement agency (Kennedy, 2013). The early transmission of information may be as basic as "shots fired" (Buerger & Buerger, 2010, p. 4). That transmission of information must quickly turn to dissemination of a lockdown within the school and more specific information to law enforcement outside of school (Hamilton, 2014).

Secondary protocols will exist should an attack occur during the loading and unloading of buses, while students are outside for recess, during assemblies, or at transition times (Hamilton, 2014). At these times, students may be better served taking flight than trying to find a classroom, but there are outside considerations to keep in mind (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Propane tanks, busy highways, dead-end alleys, and bodies of water could all present hazards to those in flight (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

As of 2015, a new addition has been added to the protocols of an active shooter (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Hiding and securing surroundings is still option number

one (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). However, if locking down is not an option, fleeing is the second protocol (Fabbri, 2014). Faculty should direct students to find the fastest way away from the threat (Brydolf, 2013). It is important to note once locking down has occurred and fleeing is not an option, faculty should direct students to join them in fighting the attacker (Arnold, 2015). Books, staplers, scissors, metal cans, and metal fire extinguishers all become weapons if used as projectiles (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Most school shooters are victims who want to turn the table and become the victimizer, and once the shooter's victims turn the table, the shooter will return to being a victim (Arnold, 2015).

Columbine and other school shootings. The first school shooting to really make national news occurred at the University of Texas on August 1, 1966 (Eberly, 2003). Charles Whitman, a former Marine who attended the university, killed his mother and his wife in the pre-dawn hours, then left his house and went to the university's tower (Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014). Whitman clubbed and killed the receptionist, then killed two people and wounded two others before reaching the observation deck (Eberly, 2003). Once reaching the observation deck, Whitman shot and killed 10 more people and wounded 31 others (Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014). Police arrived and exchanged gunfire with Whitman for approximately 90 minutes (Eberly, 2003). Two policemen were eventually able to reach the observation deck and shoot and kill Whitman (Stearns, 2008). An autopsy revealed Whitman had a brain tumor, yet many were reluctant to blame Whitman's actions on the tumor (Stearns, 2008).

Just after 7:00 a.m. on April 16, 2007, Seung-Hui Cho went into Ambler Johnston Hall on the campus of Virginia Tech (Amada, 2007: Kennedy, 2007). Cho shot and

killed two students, but campus police assumed the two deaths were a murder-suicide (Tauber, 2007). When the coroner arrived and rolled the bodies over, law enforcement discovered no murder weapon (Amada, 2007). As the police were scrambling to find the shooter, Cho was making his way to Norris Hall, where he chained and locked the three entrances to the building (Tauber, 2007). Cho then proceeded to fire 170 rounds of ammunition in a nine-minute span (Kennedy, 2007). He went from classroom to classroom, from floor to floor, shooting at students with whom he had no connection before finally turning the gun on himself; in total, 27 students and five professors were dead (Tresniowski et al., 2007). More than 20 people were wounded trying to flee from Cho's attack (Kennedy, 2007).

Cho had previously harassed two women with unwelcome phone calls and visits to their dorm rooms (Amada, 2007). A third female student had reported Cho had been stalking her, and it was reported Cho had been taking beneath-the-table pictures of female students (Amada, 2007). Many of the Virginia Tech students had become leery of Cho, dropping classes if they discovered Cho was enrolled in them (Amada, 2007). Professors had developed code words with each other if Cho showed up in one of their offices (Amada, 2007).

On November 1, 1991, Gang Lu, a recent doctoral physics graduate of the University of Iowa, entered the university campus and murdered five people and paralyzed another before taking his own life (Miller, 2012). Lu was initially disgruntled because of perceived slights he was receiving from his academic department (Simonelis, 2015). On the snowy afternoon of November 1, 1991, Lu chose a regularly scheduled physics research meeting to attack those he felt had wronged him (Miller, 2012). Lu

entered the meeting and shot his dissertation chair, Professor Christoph Goertz (Simonelis, 2015). He then shot Linhua Shan, a quite cheerful and gregarious person by nature, whose academic work was being chosen over Lu's (Miller, 2012). Shan shared an office with Lu on the campus (Miller, 2012). Next, Lu shot Professor Robert Smith and Dwight Nicholson, Chairman of the Physics Department (Simonelis, 2015). Lu then walked into the office of the Associate Vice President for Academic Affairs, Dr. T. Anne Cleary, and shot and killed her (Miller, 2012). After shooting Cleary, Lu turned the gun on a student worker, Miya Rodolfo-Sioson Simonelis, 2015). Rodolfo-Sioson, who was paralyzed from the incident, was the only victim of Lu that he did not know personally Simonelis, 2015). Lu then turned the gun on himself (Miller, 2012).

The United States is not alone in school shootings. On April 26, 2002, Erfurt, Germany, suffered violence at the hands of 19-year-old Robert Steinhauser (Wallace, 2002). Steinhauser, a former student who was expelled from school for forging doctor's notes, entered Johann Gutenberg High School and went on a rampage for nearly two hours (Langman, 2016b). Dressed in black clothes, a black hat, and gloves, Steinhauser took a pistol and a pump-action shotgun and moved from room to room in pursuit of his victims, former teachers (Langman, 2016b). A school custodian was the first to notify the police at 11:05 a.m. with a call, "Come quick. There is a shooting here" (Wallace, 2002, p. 2). At 11:12 a.m., the first police arrived and Officer Andreas Gorksi, 42, stepped out of the patrol car (Wallace, 2002). Steinhauser leaned out of a window and shot Gorksi in the head, killing him (Wallace, 2002). At 11:15 a.m., 14-year-old Julia Schneider reported she heard two loud bangs in the hallway (Wallace, 2002). Schneider said the door was then thrown open, and Steinhauser shot her physics teacher, Mr.

Schwarzer (Wallace, 2002). Steinhauser killed 12 teachers, two students, a school administrator, and a policeman before Steinhauser was confronted by history teacher Rainer Heise (Langman, 2016b). Steinhauser took off his mask and said, "That's enough for today" (Wallace, 2002, p. 3). Teacher Rainer Heise shoved Steinhauser into a classroom where Steinhauser turned the gun on himself (Wallace, 2002).

Not all school shootings are perpetrated by teenage males (Bartlett, Wilson, Basken, Glenn, & Fischman, 2010). On February 12, 2010, 44-year-old Amy Bishop attended a meeting on the third floor of the Shelby Center for Science and Technology on the campus of the University of Alabama at Huntsville (Bartlett et al., 2010; Williams, 2011). Nearing 4:00 p.m., Ms. Bishop, motivated by her failure to get tenure, pulled out a 9-millimeter handgun and fired first at the department chair, Gopi K. Podila, hitting Podila in the head and killing him (Wieder, 2011). Bishop then went down the line and shot professors Adriel Johnson, Sr. and Maria Davis in the head, killing them (Wieder, 2011). After shooting Davis, Bishop took aim at staff member Stephanie Monticciolo (Bartlett et al., 2010). Next, Bishop took aim at associate professor Joseph Leahy, who was trying to take cover when he too was shot in the head (Bartlett et al., 2010). Both Monticciolo and Leahy survived their injuries (Wieder, 2011).

When Bishop's shootings began, Ms. Moriarity looked up from her papers, dove under the table, and crawled beneath the table toward Bishop, who was blocking the door (Wieder, 2011). Moriarity grabbed Bishop's leg and pushed at her (Bartlett et al., 2010). Moriarity yelled, "I have helped you before, I can help you again!" (as cited in Bartlett et al., 2010, p. 2). Bishop continued to shoot while Moriarity pushed at her legs before Bishop turned to Moriarity and fired twice, yet was out of ammunition (Bartlett et al.,

2010). As Bishop began to fumble through her purse for more ammunition, Moriarity took advantage of the opportunity and shut the door (Bartlett et al., 2010). Others helped Moriarity block the door with furniture (Bartlett et al., 2010). One of those helping Moriarity to block the door was Luis Cruz-Vera, who had been shot in the chest yet survived his injuries (Wieder, 2011). Bishop then left the meeting room and went to the second-floor restroom where she left the gun (Bartlett et al., 2010). Bishop calmly called her husband to come pick her up, but before Mr. Bishop could arrive, Amy Bishop was arrested by campus police (Wieder, 2011).

One of the most horrific school shootings occurred on December 14, 2012, when 20-year-old Adam Lanza entered Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, and killed 20 children and six adults (Brydolf, 2013). Lanza shot and killed his mother while she slept on the morning of the 14th (Thompson, 2014; Domench, 2013). After loading a 2010 Honda Civic with a Bushmaster Model XM15-E2S rifle, Glock 20 (10 mm), and a shotgun, Lanza headed to Sandy Hook Elementary School (Thompson, 2014). Arriving at the school prior to 9:30 a.m., Lanza parked in a No Parking zone (Thompson, 2014). Lanza approached the locked elementary school and shot out the glass next to the door (Changey & Robertson, 2013). As Lanza shot the glass, the school's principal, Dawn Hochsprung, 47, and the school psychologist, Mary Sherlach, 56, stepped into the lobby to see what was going on, and both were shot and killed instantly (Thompson, 2014).

Adam Lanza then shot a third staff member who was able to retreat into a conference room and make the first 911 call (Brydolf, 2013). Lanza then stepped into the administrative office and was unable to find the staff who had sought cover (Thompson,

2014). The gunman then stepped back into the lobby and shot another faculty member in the foot before moving into classrooms eight and 10 (Thompson, 2014). In classroom eight, Lanza shot and killed substitute teacher Lauren Rousseau, age 30 (Thompson, 2014). Adam Lanza also shot and killed Rachel D'Avino, 29, a behavioral therapist assisting Rousseau (Thompson, 2014). Lanza shot and killed 15 first-grade students in room eight; 14 were found deceased by police, while the 15th fatality was rushed to the Danbury Hospital and pronounced dead there (Chaney & Robertson, 2013). Sixteen children miraculously survived the carnage of room eight (Thompson, 2014).

Adam Lanza then stepped into room 10, where he shot and killed the teacher, Victoria Soto, age 27, and her assistant, Anne Marie Murphy, age 52, a behavioral therapist (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Lanza shot five students, killing four instantly (Thompson, 2014). The fifth student was taken to the hospital and died there (Thompson, 2014). Nine students fled from room 10 to safety, while two students were able to hide in the restroom of room 10 and survived (Thompson, 2014).

Police arrived at Sandy Hook Elementary School in less than three minutes from the first 911 call received (NRA, 2013). Unfortunately, less than a minute after the first officer arrived, the last shot was heard (Chaney & Robertson, 2013). Lanza used the 10-millimeter Glock 20 to fire a single shot to his head, killing himself (Chaney & Robertson, 2013).

After School Shooting

The true first responders to an active shooter are the students and faculty of the school who take flight, take cover, or take up the fight (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Within minutes of an active shooter taking first shots, professional first responders will

arrive on the campus (Mahoney, 2007). Law enforcement has drastically changed its planned response to an active shooter since the Columbine massacre of 1999 (Mahoney, 2007). Klebold and Harris were allowed to continue their rampage for over 40 minutes, because law enforcement's policy at that time was to wait for the arrival of a SWAT or tactical team to engage the shooter (Hamilton, 2014). Law enforcement policy has since changed to indicate the first law enforcement on the scene are to engage the target (Hamilton, 2014).

Once the active shooter is neutralized, law enforcement will secure the area (Schweit, 2013). The first responders will surround the perimeter, checking the exits and entrances into the buildings or campus (Schweit, 2013). Law enforcement will also sweep the building, making sure the threat is fully eliminated and informing the school population that the threat is removed (Prall, 2014). First responders will then have the grim task of triaging the wounded and removing the deceased (Hamilton, 2014). The school will have the task of identifying those wounded and deceased and informing anxious parents (Hamilton, 2014).

How schools respond. Once the active shooter threat is removed, the heartache and disciplined follow-up begins (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). According to Kennedy-Paine (2013), "Long-term recovery from crisis is not a single event but rather a journey that requires intentionality and, in many cases, more time than we might think" (p. 38). First responders, medical personnel, and law enforcement officials will converge on the campus (Ashby, 2007). Parents and community members will quickly flood the campus and the land-line phones of the district, and student and staff cell phones will ring nonstop (McDaniel & Ellis, 2009). The school, once the scene of education and learning,

is now a crime scene of hysteria (Shah, 2013b). Local, regional, and national media will demand information, while the school is faced with coordinating a response in the aftermath of the shooting (Stein, 2006). Surviving students will need to be paired with parents (Shah, 2013b). For those who did not survive the shooting, parents of students and family of faculty will also need to be notified (Hamilton, 2014). For those wounded and sent to medical facilities, additional family contacts will have to be made (Shah, 2013b).

As the former director of pupil services in Newtown, Connecticut, Michael Regan (2014) insisted schools must implement the three P's – plan, prepare, and practice – before a tragedy strikes. This will help schools set a strong foundation for their words and actions in the aftermath of a crisis (Regan, 2014). Regan (2014) called to remembrance Dwight D. Eisenhower's words, "Plans are worthless, but planning is everything" (p. 52). Organizing an effective response to a crisis begins with identifying the incident commander and determining how authority will be delegated (Blad, 2014). Responsibilities should be assigned within the chain of command, using considerable thought about the professional and personal attributes of the individuals involved (Regan, 2014; Blad 2014). Regan (2014) also noted people will not always respond as one would think during a real crisis.

Regan (2014) suggested schools plan and practice for a crisis in large scale, because it is easier to scale down than to improvise for much larger needs. Schools need to prepare to manage the generosity of others during the aftermath of a crisis (Ashby, 2007). Managing community members, mental health providers, government agencies, and state and national organizations that want to help can turn into a logistical nightmare

if not handled correctly (Ashby, 2007). Schools must set up a staging area to validate the credentials of those offering help (O'Meara, 2013). Regan (2014) also suggested setting up a system to manage charitable donations, both monetary and material, that will flow into the school.

It is because of this potential scrutiny that organizations must respond swiftly, proactively, and as openly and honestly as possible (O'Meara, 2013). Schools want to provide a swift response to requests for information (Stein, 2006). This will diminish the media's ability to filter, distort, and create emotionalism with high-profile situations (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014).

According to Andi Stein (2006), in the aftermath of a school shooting, there will need to be three channels of communication. The first channel of communication is the one inside the school district (Viramontez, 2015). Teachers and students will need to communicate to building-level administrators, and then building-level administrators will need to communicate to district-level administrators (Viramontez, 2015). The second channel of communication is that of the school district and its affiliates (Stein, 2006). The school must communicate to those agencies responding to assist in the aftermath (Ashby, 2007). The third channel of communication is that of the school to the public (Stein, 2006).

Short-term response. When a senseless act of violence occurred on the campus of Seattle Pacific University, the school responded in the short term with prayer (Steele, 2014). Seattle Pacific University is a church-related school (Steele, 2014). Students, faculty, and staff met for corporate worship and then met in small groups for prayer and lamentation (Steele, 2014). Prayer was made for the victims as well as the assailant

(Steele, 2014). Thankfulness was given for the heroes, the safety officers, and the medics (Steele, 2014). The people of Seattle Pacific University did not want to put a pious show on for the media there to observe them, but did hope God's healing grace could be seen through the tragedy that occurred on their campus (Steele, 2014).

During a school shooting, it is imperative communication occurs first to those in imminent danger, then to those who can appropriately respond to eliminate the threat (Galuszka, 2008). Communication then must occur to those who have family at the school (Ashby, 2007). In today's world, social media can spread information almost as it occurs or even as it occurs (Chaney & Robertson, 2013). Schools are tapping into that capability. Text and voice message systems are commonplace in schools (Waters, 2013). When Northern Illinois University experienced a school shooting on Valentine's Day, 2008, text messages went out at 3:20 p.m., and 11 more followed over the next two and a half hours (Galuszka, 2008). Schools are going to be faced with the daunting task of disseminating information to parents, family of employees, various law enforcement agencies, news outlets, and the public (Ashby, 2007). There are few in the public who still prefer a phone call over a text, voicemail, or email message (Waters, 2013). Electronic communication will increase more and more as technology advances (Waters, 2013).

Long-term response. The Gun Free School Act of 1994 was a piece of legislation that ushered in the birth of zero-tolerance policies (Mongan & Walker, 2012). According to Weiler and Armenta (2014):

> The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994 (GFSA; 20 U.S.C. §7151) requires that each state or outlying area receiving federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary

> Education Act have a law that requires all local education agencies (LEAs) in these states and outlying areas to expel from school for at least one year any student found bringing a firearm to school or possessing a firearm at school. (p. 116)

After enactment of the GFSA, schools began to discipline students for anything that resembled a gun (Mongan & Walker, 2012). Students have been disciplined for fashioning breakfast Pop-Tarts into a gun or for bringing squirt guns to school (Mongan & Walker, 2012). Regardless of the mental capacity to understand the implications of their actions, students have been disciplined for bringing guns to school (Black, 2015). The first of two justifications for zero-tolerance policies is that it serves as a deterrent to bringing lethal weapons to school (Black, 2015). The second justification is that schools assume and believe any weapon on school grounds presents a risk for every student, regardless of the circumstances (Black, 2015).

Long-term recovery after a school shooting has occurred is more of a journey that requires intentional effort and quite a bit of time (Kennedy-Paine, Reeves, & Brock, 2013). Kennedy-Paine et al. (2013) provided five lessons for schools to implement in the long-term recovery of a school crisis. The first lesson is to be prepared to recover before the shooting or any other crisis occurs (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). Surrounding school counselors, professional counselors, mental health agencies, faith-based communities, and charitable organizations should be networked before a crisis ever occurs (Metzel & MacLeish, 2015). When the crisis occurs, schools should not be struggling to make contacts and arrangements; most of the legwork should have already been done (O'Meara, 2013).

The second lesson for schools in their long-term response for recovery from a shooting or any other crisis is that immediate response influences long-term recovery (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). Once the shooting or other crisis occurs, students and staff must be adequately evaluated and supported (Sadri & Bowen, 2011). Professionals should evaluate students and staff for psychological traumatization (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Ongoing evaluation of students and staff is critical to ensure no psychological trauma has occurred (Ward & Gersten, 2013).

The third lesson for schools in their long-term response for recovery from a shooting or any other crisis is to provide adequate, appropriate, and sustainable mental health supports that require a balance of school and community professionals (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). Many school counseling departments are not equipped in either manpower or the level of professional training many students will require after a shooting or similar crisis (Ward & Gernsten, 2013). The school counselors will know the student body better than an outside agency, so the two must work together to see that the students and staff get the adequate, appropriate, and sustainable support needed (Brown, Neel, & Sherman, 2015).

The fourth lesson for schools in their long-term response for recovery is to be prepared to address a variety of reactions over the long term (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). After a shooting, many students may be quickly ready to get on with life, with school, and with learning (Brydolf, 2013). Others will have to deal with a friend who is gone, face their own physical recovery from being wounded, or experience the trauma of returning to the scene of the shooting (CSPV, 2015). Schools should consider giving a wellness survey to the student body three months after a shooting to assess the level of

coping and to identify any students in need of mental health support (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013).

The fifth lesson for schools in their long-term response for recovery from a crisis is to seek to find a new normal and to realize things may not be the same again (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013). Routine and structure can be comforting while exams can be postponed as students return to school after a shooting (CSPV, 2015). Schools should consider placing a memorial, which may be temporal or permanent, as a way for the student body to heal mentally and emotionally (Kennedy-Paine et al., 2013).

Schools that have had a school shooting occur are faced with the difficult decisions of when to come back to school and possibly where (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). Bill Bond was the principal of Heath High when a freshman showed up to school and began shooting students who had gathered for a morning prayer group (Borja, 2005). He and the other leaders of the West Paducah, Kentucky, school system wanted school to resume the following day (Borja, 2005).

The group stated the decision was a fairly easy one; the shooter said he shot students because he wanted to be in control and the administration did not want him in control (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). For other schools, the decision to return to school is not as easy (Smith, 2013). The students at Columbine did not return to school for two weeks (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). When the students did return, they attended another high school within the district (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013).

Each shooting and school is unique, but getting the students and staff back to school and into a routine is essential according to Cathy Paine, a retired school psychologist (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). Paine was working in the Springfield,

Oregon, school district when a freshman at Thurston High School killed two students and wounded 25 others in the school's cafeteria (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). The leaders of Thurston High School decided to return to school a few days after the shooting which had occurred in the cafeteria (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013). To make the return easier for the students, the school leaders brought in a massage therapist, food, and a therapy dog (Maxwell & Zubrzycki, 2013).

The Columbine shootings brought about many changes that have been lasting (AP, 2013). The first lasting change has been that because most school shootings do not occur spontaneously, shooters will frequently tell others of their plans (Chen et al., 2015). Because of this, any mention of shooting or killing of another student is taken very seriously (Vail, 2009).

The second change that occurred after the Columbine shootings was that schools began to lock their doors at all times (Vail, 2009). Schools no longer leave doors open even when not in use (Duplechain & Morris, 2014). Personnel now screen people as they enter the school building (Ericksen, 2013).

The third change Columbine brought about is the greater concern for a school's climate (American School Board Journal, May 2009). Anti-bullying and violence prevention programs are now standard in many schools across the country (Kennedy, 2016). To ensure consistency among federal, state, and local laws, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office for Civil Rights issued a letter that includes a clear definition of bullying (Ali, 2010).

Newtown Superintendent Janet Robinson granted an interview six months after the tragedy that occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary in December of 2012 (McLester,

2011). When looking at the long-term response of schools after a shooting, Robinson's interview sheds light on what happened in Sandy Hook and how they responded as a school (Brydolf, 2013). Robinson said she learned of the shooting while she was sitting in the district office, and her secretary told her the bus company had reported a shooting at Sandy Hook (McLester, 2011). Robinson replied, "That's impossible. It must be some kind of domestic dispute" (as cited in McLester, 2011, p. 75). Without any details, Robinson drove as close to the scene as she could, running the rest of the way to the school (McLester, 2011). Superintendent Robinson was met by a teacher who said, "Thank God you are here. Where is Dawn? We heard over the intercom that Dawn [Hochsprung] was shot. And we are all worried" (as cited in McLester, 2011, p. 76).

The police chief told Robinson casualties could be as high as 30 (McLester, 2011). Robinson noted later it was clear staff did not have enough children there for all of the parents who had gathered (McLester, 2011). Connecticut's governor would eventually tell those parents, "I can't stand this anymore. If you're in here, your family member is dead" (as cited in McLester, 2011, p. 76).

Superintendent Robinson was asked in the days following the tragedy what steps she and the school took and what programs were implemented to ease the pain and fear (Brydolf, 2013). Robinson said the tragedy took place on a Friday, and that on Saturday morning, her office staff and some district principals met in her office (McLester, 2011). Very soon, mental health specialists, trauma-trained professionals, the Commissioner of Education, and others from around the country began showing up to offer support (Chaney & Robertson, 2013). The Superintendent said they met with teachers on

Sunday to help them in dealing with students and their reactions to the shootings (McLester, 2011).

Robinson debated the challenging question of when to come back and wanted to get students back to school as quickly as appropriately possible (Brydolf, 2013). Newtown opened the other schools in its district, except for Sandy Hook, on the following Tuesday with mental health supports for its teachers, students, and parents (McLester, 2011). Newtown had substitutes on hand ready to step into a class if a teacher just needed to leave the room (McLester, 2011).

The Superintendent was asked how the students and staff were recovering (McLester, 2011). She said the students who were in the front hallway witnessed things you would not want any child to have to experience (McLester, 2011). Robinson noted those students still jump at the sound of a door slamming or if furniture on the floor above gets moved quickly (McLester, 2011). When asked how she was recovering herself, Robinson responded that working helps. The Superintendent added they were still working seven days a week and receiving many cards, letters, and emails from everywhere (McLester, 2011).

Next, Robinson was asked about the transition of Sandy Hook students to the nearby Monroe Chalk Hill School (McLester, 2011). Robinson said the empty school was a godsend from Monroe Superintendent James Agostine (McLester, 2011). The building had set empty for nearly two years, so it took a lot of work from 80 volunteers to get it ready to have school (McLester, 2011). The Superintendent noted someone even voluntarily put in a new gym floor to make the school ready to go (McLester, 2011). She

said they brought children into the building to see what was being done to help the students feel more comfortable returning to school (McLester, 2011).

Robinson was then asked about the district security team that was reinitiated with Police Chief Michael Kehoe and Captain Joe Rios at lead (McLester, 2011). The Superintendent noted the district had been very serious about security prior to the attack in December of 2012 (McLester, 2011). Newtown had buzz-in systems with cameras at every school (Morones et al.,, 2013). At the high school, security officers greeted people at the door, requiring identification and fingerprinting volunteers (McLester, 2011).

Newtown Superintendent Robinson was asked about the most important safety changes since the tragedy (McLester, 2011), and replied: "A third of U.S. public schools have armed guards. After Newtown, more may get them. But do they make kids safer?" (as cited in Ripley, 2013, p. 34). Robinson said the biggest thing is people are becoming more aware (McLester, 2011). The Superintendent added doors used to be propped open; now people are more aware of the ramifications of the crisis plan (McLester, 2011). She said the district is also working with the local police and have their own security people to work together (Morones et al., 2013). The police force and Newtown's own security people are rotated through the buildings to have a better understanding of the school buildings and their layouts (Morones et al., 2013). The police and security teams are heading up safety committees that are continually looking for areas of vulnerability (Blad, 2014).

Adam Lanza shot out a window to gain entrance to Sandy Hook Elementary (NRA, 2013). Robinson was asked if the new security would hold back an intruder (McLester, 2011). The Superintendent mentioned many schools built in the 1950s have

Lock Glass designed to keep the glass intact so it will not be as easy for an intruder to shoot out and quickly gain access to the building (McLester, 2011).

The next question in the interview of Newtown Superintendent Janet Robinson was what she wanted to say to fellow superintendents about security measures and coping with tragedy (McLester, 2011). Robinson said there is no playbook and that educators have to do what is right for kids (McLester, 2011). The district leader had a great concern for balancing the demands for security while still allowing kids to be kids (Brydolf, 2013). Newtown's School Superintendent did not want Newtown's security to make the students feel the only time they were safe was inside a fortress with someone armed protecting them(McLester, 2011).

The last question asked of Robinson dealt with her reputation of being the chief of a district that had weathered the worst school massacre in U.S. history (Brydolf, 2013). Robinson was asked how she would shift that memory (McLester, 2011). She responded she knew that reputation would exist but she knew there was not anything that could have been done to prevent what occurred (McLester, 2011). Robinson knew Newtown could do things about recovery to help people feel confident again and get on with their lives (Brydolf, 2013).

How others respond. Klebold and Harris killed 12 students and one teacher over a span of 47 minutes at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado (Martínez, 2012). Law enforcement was on the scene within the first few minutes, but protocol at that time was to wait for the tactical response team to arrive before engaging the shooters (Chen et al., 2015). Law enforcement agencies have been prompted to alter their tactical

procedures by training their officers to respond quickly to a school incident and to engage the assailant or assailants (Martínez, 2012).

Prior to Columbine, law enforcement waited for the Strategic Weapons and Tactical (SWAT) teams to engage active shooters (Martínez, 2012). The slow response time of the SWAT teams enabled active shooters to kill and wound larger numbers of people (Knickerbocker, 2013). Across the nation, police departments are training their officers to confront active shooters as quickly and as aggressively as possible to end the threat before the shooter can kill or wound more people (Martínez, 2012).

Police officer training now includes how they are to communicate with one another as they work their way through a facility during an active shooter event (Knickerbocker, 2013). Police are to let each other know when areas of a building have been cleared (Brydolf, 2013). Police are also trained to enter in certain tactical positions such as the four-officer diamond formation, the four-officer Y-formation, or the four-officer T-formation (Martínez, 2012). In this training, police are taught to trigger control, maintaining muzzle control and using their flashlights if in low light situations (Martínez, 2012). Police officers are also now trained with rifles and ballistic shields (Elliott, 2015). To minimize casualties, officers are now trained to search for the active shooter in a quick manner and effectively confront the shooter (Fabbri, 2014).

Many of the school shootings are over within four to five minutes (Martínez, 2012). Because of the short span of time, it is critical schools quickly communicate with law enforcement as much knowledge about the shooter or shooters as possible Fabbri, 2014). This kind of response is not for the typical batteries and assaults that can occur on a school campus, but for the active shooter scenario (Hamilton, 2014).

Police officials have also learned active shooters are not interested in negotiating with anybody (Neuman et al., 2015). When police attempt to negotiate with active shooters, casualties continue to rise (Minninger & Wilder, 2012). According to a New York City Police Department report on active shooters, 46% of active shooters are stopped by law enforcement officers or other bystanders (Martínez, 2012). According to the same report, 40% of active shooters either commit suicide or attempt suicide (Martínez, 2012). A majority of active shooters do not wish to engage in a shootout with police, thus law enforcement believe as soon as the active shooter is engaged, the shooter will take his or her own life (Martínez, 2012). Officers must keep in mind an active shooter is not willing to negotiate and may only stop shooting after being killed or after committing suicide (Martínez, 2012).

Law enforcement officers are faced with sobering statistics that have emerged from active shooter events (Schweit, 2013). A solo officer responding to an active shooter event will arrive on the scene with a 57% chance of the shooting still being underway (Schweit, 2013). The first officer on the scene of an active shooter will have a 75% chance of having to confront the perpetrator to end the threat (Schweit, 2013). The responding officer of an active shooter will have a 33% chance of being shot as he or she engages the active shooter (Schweit, 2013).

Legislative responses. After the Newtown, Connecticut, killing of 20 children and six adults at Sandy Hook Elementary School, legislators have introduced roughly 2,356 gun bills (Bartels, 2013). The Sunlight Foundation, an organization that monitors transparency in government, conducted a study of 1,500 of those bills and found the bills to be roughly split between weakening or strengthening gun restrictions (Bartels, 2013).

Prior to the Sandy Hook shootings, only 35% of gun bills would have strengthened regulations (Bartels, 2013).

Colorado suffered the Aurora theater shootings that resulted in the deaths of 12 people and injuries to 58, while five months later Newtown, Connecticut, the Sandy Hook shootings resulted in the deaths of 20 students and six adults (Blair et al., 2014). Lepore's (2012) research found the following:

> In many states, to purchase a gun from a licensed dealer you need a permit, which requires you to complete firearms-safety training, not unlike driver's education. But, even if all states required this, not everyone who buys a gun would have to take a class. That's because forty per cent of the guns purchased in the United States are bought from private sellers at gun shows, or through other private exchanges, such as classified ads, which fall under what is known as the "gun-show loophole" and are thus unregulated. (p. 3)

Both Colorado and Connecticut passed greater restrictions on guns; both have Democratic governors and Democratic-controlled legislatures (Elliott, 2015). Connecticut passed a single bill that many consider to be the strictest gun control bill in the nation (Bartels, 2013). The Connecticut bill expanded the assault weapons ban, prohibited high-capacity magazines, required background checks on all firearms sales, mandated registration to purchase ammunition and all guns, and increased funding for security and mental health treatment (Bartels, 2013).

Colorado passed five new gun laws, which is surprising for a western state where gun ownership is high with a long history of gun use to hunt and protect property (Zornick, 2012). Colorado's new gun laws limit ammunition magazines to 15 rounds,

mandate universal background checks on the sale and transfer of weapons, require gun buyers to pay for background checks, ban certain domestic violence offenders from owning guns, and require applicants for concealed-carry permits to demonstrate their competence with a gun in the presence of a certified instructor (Zornick, 2012).

While supporters of the tougher gun laws call them common-sense reforms, Second Amendment activists viewed the pair of 2012 shootings as evidence the country needs more guns (Bartels, 2013). Jeffrey Goldberg (2012) wrote, “How do we reduce gun crime and Aurora-style mass shootings when Americans already own nearly 300 million guns? Maybe by allowing more people to carry guns” (p. 72). Goldberg continued, “Maybe it’s possible to distract a heavily armed psychotic by throwing a pencil at him. But the psychotic would likely respond by shooting the pencil thrower” (p. 73).

The Second Amendment activists argue the Newtown and Aurora killers specifically chose a theater and a school because they knew they would be soft targets - filled with unarmed occupants (Bartels, 2013). William, a graduate student at the nearby University of Colorado (Boulder), finds the gun-control law common sense (Brownstein, 2013). Brownstein (2013) continued, "There needs to be at least as much regulation and training as there is to operate a motor vehicle," (p. 11).

Connecticut’s gun bill was more bipartisan than Colorado’s gun bills (Bartels, 2013). Connecticut’s Senate vote on the bill that finally passed was 26-10, with 20 of 22 Democrats and six of 14 Republicans in favor of the bill (Bartels, 2013). Connecticut’s House vote was 105-44, with 85 of 99 Democrats and 20 of 52 Republicans in favor of the bill (Bartels, 2013). One of each party was absent from the vote (Bartels, 2013).

Colorado's gun bills were definitely more partisan (Paulson, 2013). Many of Colorado's gun rights supporters were angered over the influence of New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg in Colorado's legislative process (Paulson, 2013). Many of the citizens of rural Colorado who cherish their Second Amendment right to bear arms threatened to secede from Colorado after the passing of Colorado's gun laws (Paulson, 2013).

In 2013, legislators in more than 30 states introduced bills that would authorize K-12 school personnel to carry firearms (Bartels, 2013). In some states, school staff members with concealed-carry permits are allowed to bring a weapon to school if they are granted permission from the school board or administration (District Administration, 2015). Arming more people, especially school staff members, drew sharp criticism from many in education, including teachers' unions and principals' associations (Elliott, 2015). President Obama, likewise, seemed unconvinced that additional weaponry was the best solution (Shah, Maxwell, Sparks, Ujifusa, & Zubrzycki, 2013). These bills varied from having the school principal carry a concealed weapon to starting a school marshal program to train teachers, administrators, and janitors how to use guns (Arnold, 2015; Bartels, 2013). In the state of Alabama, volunteer emergency security forces of current and retired school employees must establish policies addressing the carrying and storing of weapons (Elliott, 2015). In Arkansas, if a church operates a school, that school may allow people with conceal-carry permits to carry on school property (Bartels, 2013). Colleges in Arkansas may allow faculty to carry if the governing board of that college does not have a policy prohibiting it (Keller, 2014; Weinberg, 2013).

In Kansas, school districts may also allow conceal-carry employees to carry their firearms on campus if their district does not have a policy prohibiting it (Bartels, 2013).

South Dakota passed a "school sentinels" law that allows districts to create, establish, and supervise the arming of school employees (Prall, 2013, p. 2). Tennessee allows certain school employees to carry firearms on school grounds if they are legally certified, meet qualifications, and have written permission from the authorities (Bartels, 2013). Texas passed the Protection of Texas Children Act under House Bill 1009, which allows schools to designate an employee as a marshal who can use a firearm to deal with a potential active shooter (Bartels, 2013).

Gun control. After Jared Loughner opened fire into a crowd and wounded Arizona's Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and killed six others in January of 2011, the debate over America's gun culture again resurfaced (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011). Guns, whether liked or not, fit into Americana as much as the covered wagon and the infield-fly rule (Goldberg, 2012). America's love of firearms dates back to the revolutionaries and pioneers who really did cling to their guns and their religion (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011).

The debate over gun control increases every time a crazed individual takes a weapon and kills innocent people (Goldberg, 2012). Prior to Gabrielle's shooting, Arizona passed legislation allowing citizens to carry concealed weapons without a permit (Elliott, 2015). Arizona Republican Congressman Trent Franks pointed out Arizona has a much lower gun-violence rate than Washington, DC, which has much more restrictive gun laws (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011). Congressman Franks said, "Criminals always prefer unarmed citizens" (as cited in Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011, p. 26).

Gifford disagreed:

Senators say they fear the N.R.A. and the gun lobby. But I think that fear must be nothing compared to the fear the first graders in Sandy Hook Elementary School felt as their lives ended in a hail of bullets. (as cited in Taranto, 2013, para. 1)

Unfortunately for Gifford and those killed and wounded by Loughner, no well-armed citizen was able to stop Loughner from his shooting (Elliott, 2015). Those in favor of more restrictive gun laws will note that nationally, less than 1% of all gun deaths involve self-defense; the rest are from accidents, homicides, and suicides (see Figure 2). Another statistic quoted by those in favor of gun restrictions is that of 23 high-income countries, the U.S. had 80% of the gun deaths with a gun homicide rate nearly 20 times higher than the rest (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011). Still, the NRA reported 25 states have adopted "your home is your castle" laws that allow homeowners wide latitude to shoot people on their property without fear of prosecution (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011, p. 27). The NRA also noted there only 20 states that prohibit or severely restrict the carrying of firearms in public (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011).

	Violent Crime 2007-2011		Property Crime 2007-2011	
	Total	Percent	Total	Percent
Total Number of Crimes	29,618,300	100	84,495,500	100
Self-Protective Behavior				
Offered no resistance	12,987,300	43.8	10,162,000	12.0
Threatened or attacked with a firearm	235,700	0.8	103,000	0.1
Threatened or attacked with other weapon	391,100	1.3	38,200	-
Threatened or attacked without a weapon	6,552,900	22.1	421,300	0.5
Nonconfrontational tactics include yelling, running, or arguing	7,768,700	26.2	1,187,100	1.4
Other reaction	1,641,300	5.5	223,400	0.3
Unknown reaction	41,300	0.1	12,200*	-
Property crime, victim not present.	+	+	72,348,200	85.6
- Less than 0.05 percent	+ Not applicable			

Figure 2. Self-protective behaviors, by type of crime, 2007-2011 (Planty & Truman, 2013, Table 11, p. 12).

Even after the mass killings at Columbine and Virginia Tech, gun control has made little headway at the federal level (Chen et al., 2015; Amada, 2007). The Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence gave a progressive Chicago Democratic President Obama, who is a longtime gun-control advocate, an F on their report of his leadership on gun control (Lawrence, 2013). The Republicans are usually in agreement with the NRA, and the Democrats are often afraid to go against the gun establishment (Stone, 2013). This fear by Democrats can be traced to the mid-term elections of 1994 when the Republicans swept the election (Grunwald & Newton-Small, 2011). The Democrats felt the sweep of the Republicans was largely to blame because of Clinton's crime bill that included a 10-year ban on many assault weapons and huge magazines (Stone, 2013).

Summary

Schools must do more than just meet the academic needs of students (Martínez, 2012). Schools must also provide a positive learning environment, and that includes

keeping students and faculty safe (Martínez, 2012). In order for schools to meet both the safety and educational needs of students, communities must be vigilant looking for the factors that influence violence (Harlow & Roberts, 2010). Societal factors such as "a *School Shooter* video game in which the player stalks and shoots fellow students and teachers in school settings" (Rhen, 2011, para. 1) brings a new sense of urgency to this vigilance. Violent video games, entertainment that glorifies violence, bullying, gun culture, copycats, students who need counseling, the breakdown of the family, and anti-social behavior are just a few of the elements that in the wrong combination can lead to violent behavior (D'Agostino, 2000; Kneer et al., 2012).

Many schools are employing SROs in their attempt to prepare for and to deter an active shooter (Finn et. al, 2014). Those in favor of SROs like the presence of law enforcement in the school building (Cray & Weiler, 2011). The armed officer is both a deterrent and a first responder who is already on the scene (Finn et al., 2014). Those who oppose placing resource officers in the school believe it leads to an increase in juveniles in the legal system (Weiler & Cray, 2011).

State legislatures are requiring schools to participate in active shooter training each year (Fabbri, 2014). Many schools participate in safety audits, examining facilities and procedures of the district in preparation for an active shooter (Minninger & Wilder, 2014). Tip lines, surveillance cameras, and delayed entry systems are options many schools have chosen to prepare for an active shooter (Minninger & Wilder, 2014).

All the theories, all the policies and procedures, and all the latest technology will be put to the test when an actual school shooting occurs (Prall, 2014). The first communication of a school shooting may very well be the sounds of shots fired and the

screams of the first victims (Schweit, 2013). Responses to an active school shooter will depend upon the age group being attacked (Prall, 2014). The school community must make a quick assessment of the situation that is rapidly developing and decide to shelter in place, take to flight, or fight the attacker (Fabbri, 2014). To end an active shooter situation, the victims must turn the attacker back into a victim (Fabbri, 2014).

Sadly, school shooters have become notorious in modern America (Blair, Martaindale, & Nichols, 2014). From Charles Whitman at the University of Texas in 1966 to Seung-Hui Cho at Virginia Tech in 2007 to Adam Lanza at Sandy Hook in 2012, school shooters have left a trail of devastation from elementary schools to colleges (Amada, 2007; Blair et al., 2014). The United States is not the only country to see an increase in active shooters in its schoolhouses (Reprintseva, 2014). Germany and Russia are just two of the foreign countries to have suffered from an active shooter (Reprintseva, 2014).

Once the active shooter threat is eliminated, the difficult work continues (Hamilton, 2014). Professional first responders will be arriving on the scene to secure the area and to triage the wounded (Fitzgerald, 2013). Communication will be a priority in the early part of the aftermath (Hamilton, 2014). Schools will need to communicate with all the stakeholders of the school community (Hamilton, 2014). Next of kin will need to be notified (Hamilton, 2014). Depending upon the magnitude, planning could be extensive (Hamilton, 2014). Schools must be prepared to deal with national media, politicians, lawyers, those seeking to offer assistance, and those legally responsible for dealing with a crime scene (Minninger & Wilder, 2014).

Chapter Two included a review of existing literature on previous incidents and current aims for preparedness in the event of an active shooter. Chapter Three contains a description of the collection and analysis of data to gain a deeper understanding of school administrator perspectives after completing state-mandated active shooter training. This study resulted in data that may not have been currently available to school administrators.

Chapter Three: Methodology

This chapter contains a description of the methodology of the research study and the approach to data collection and analysis. The purpose of this quantitative study was to gain a deeper understanding of school administrator perspectives after completing required active shooter training. This study will inform organizational leaders and fill a gap in the body of research.

Problem and Purpose Overview

While active-shooter incidents occur in all settings, they often happen in small communities where police departments are "limited by budget constraints and small workforces" (Schweit, 2013, p. 1). For these communities, over 43% of the time, "the crime is over before the police arrive" (Schweit, 2013, p. 2). Regardless of school size, a rapid, safe, and successful response to a shooting incident requires preparation (Vernon, 2010). Missouri SB 75 now requires active shooter training for public and charter schools of Missouri and may increase the ability to cope with an active shooter incident regardless of school size (Maslow, 1943;§571.101.1, RSMo 2015). According to the Missouri Center for Education Safety (CES, 2015):

> Teaching and learning do not occur without a safe and secure environment for learners and those who instruct and support them. Indeed, high performance cultures at pre-K to 12 schools and higher education require a nurturing context that is dependent upon a safe and secure environment. Safety at pre-K to 12 schools and higher education institutions must be a community focused effort—community engagement is a requisite. This requires the collaboration of federal, state, and local policymakers, those who administer and manage schools as well

> as higher education, law enforcement, and other emergency responders in planning and preparedness. (p. 1)

An Emergency Action Plan and Active Shooter Scenario stresses the importance of implementing an emergency action plan, communicating that plan to employees and promoting a safe environment where employees feel comfortable reporting unusual behavior (CES, 2015).

In order to function effectively, employees need to feel as though they are safe from physical and psychological harm (Sadri & Bowen, 2011). Although Missouri administrators' active shooter training should result in a clear understanding of intended responses before an incident occurs, there are no existing data which identify the administrators' perceptions of preparedness or safety (Vernon, 2010). This research will inform the Missouri legislature of administrators' perspectives on active shooter training. Currently, there exists no literature or data to indicate whether Missouri's efforts to enhance preparedness through Active Shooter Training actually improve the perceptions of safety on Missouri public school campuses. Information from this study may be used to fill the gap in current knowledge to shape future legislation.

Research questions and hypotheses. The following research questions guided the study:

1. After completing active shooter training, what are the perceptions of high school administrators in preparing to deal with an active shooter incident?

2. What is the difference between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators, who have completed active shooter training, in their perception of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

$H2_0$: There is no difference between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators, who have completed active shooter training, in their perception of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident.

3. What is the difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators, who have completed active shooter training, in their perception of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

$H3_0$: There is no difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators, who have completed active shooter training, in their perception of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident.

4. What is the difference in the perception of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators with 20 years or greater experience as compared with those with less than 20 years experience, who have completed active shooter training?

$H4_0$: There is no difference in the perception of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators with 20 years or greater experience as compared with those with less than 20 years experience, who have completed active shooter training.

5. What percentage of the Missouri high school public administrators, from the sample, favor arming school administrators who have completed formal training?

Research Design

The general design of this study was a quantitative investigation of Missouri high school administrator perceptions of preparedness for an active shooter incident. Victoria Bernhardt (2013), a leading authority in continuous school improvement, wrote of the importance of using multiple measures of data when determining the effectiveness of actions, processes, and programs. By assessing perceptions through surveys or

questionnaires, review of the data may provide an overview of where administrators believe Missouri schools are on the continuum to improved safety for Missouri students. Bernhardt (2013) noted questionnaires or interviews are an excellent way to "assess perceptions because they can be completed anonymously and readministered to assess the changes in perceptions over time" (p. 44).

For this study, the perceptual data were coded or chunked into segments and given a descriptor or code for quantitative analysis. Results from survey data may more readily reveal the perceptions of Missouri high school administrators and how these perceptions distribute across the continuum on one or more variables (e.g., urban verses rural, gender, and years of experience) regarding active shooter training. According to Fraenkel et al. (2015), a quantitative approach is likely to yield useful results as it allows the examiner to improve educational practice and develop more effective ways to practice his or her craft. By involving administrators working together on an issue of mutual concern, the examiner may test and evaluate various strategies for improving practice. The quantitative research method was appropriate for this study in order to examine the difference between cause-and-effect variables (Fraenkel et al., 2015). This type of research was chosen for the purpose of obtaining information to inform local practice regarding active shooter training and safety preparedness (Fraenkel et al., 2015).

Population and Sample

Fifty-two Missouri high school administrators were polled from various locations around the state. Twenty-six men and 26 women were chosen for the research sample. This two-stage random sampling first included a comprehensive list of Missouri school administrators who had completed active shooter training and were then randomly

segregated into an equal variance of men and women from whom to collect data (Fraenkel et al., 2015). According to Fraenkel et al. (2015), "This method is much more feasible than simple random sampling and more representative than cluster sampling" (p. 102).

Instrumentation

The instrument design was specific to this study. In order to ensure validity of the survey, the investigator began by committing the research questions to writing (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The research questions were then converted into hypotheses and null hypotheses (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The survey was administered to a limited number of participants in order to test whether it measured what was intended to be measured (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The survey instrument consisted of 10 questions (see Appendix A) to measure the perceived feelings of preparedness and safety of Missouri's public school administrators after participation in the Missouri Senate Bill No. 75 required Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training for Schools Program (ASIRT). Individual surveys were administered to extract participant perceptions .

Data Collection

Data collection began following the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval (see Appendix B). After the sample was selected and informed consent was obtained (see Appendix C), surveys were conducted from a purposive sample of Missouri high school administrators who had completed Active Shooter Training in Missouri. Missouri high school administrators were emailed informed consent forms and then participated in phone surveys to gain their perceptions. Through the survey data, the research may most effectively "describe, compare, or explain the knowledge, feelings,

values, and behavior" of the sample from the study and their perceptions toward the topic" (Fink, 2006, p. 1). Personal identifiers were removed from all survey data to maintain the confidentiality of respondents. Results were coded and tabulated.

Data Analysis

A tally or frequency count of responses was reported in a frequency table of distribution with a report of the mean, median, and mode of all responses. Data were recorded into an Excel spreadsheet and then uploaded into SPSS for analyses. Descriptive statistics detail results of the project.

Ethical Considerations

Valid informed consent was obtained from a sample of 52 Missouri high school administrators before administering surveys to thosewho had participated in active shooter training. Valid informed consent for all participants included the following: (1) disclosure of study procedures and potential risks to prospective research participants; (2) participant comprehension of the information; and (3) participant voluntary agreement, free of coercion and undue influence, for research participation.

The researcher administered surveys and redacted all personal identifiers from information before coding common threads of response. During this study and data-gathering stage, all data were secured on a pass-coded desktop computer for the extent of the study. No other humans have access to the researcher's storage media and/or equipment. Removable backup of data was created and secured in a locked file under the supervision of the researcher. Data will be retained for three years.

Summary

Schools need to provide an environment that is not only conducive to learning, but one in which students and faculty feel safe (Brydolf, 2013). With increasing numbers of active shooters in the school setting, states have passed legislation mandating training for schools to deal with an active shooter (Cray & Weiler, 2011). Missouri Senate Bill No. 75 requires schools to participate in active shooter training annually. Currently, there are limited data to indicate if the Active Shooter Training improves the perceptions of safety and preparedness on Missouri school campuses.

This study included gleaning perceptions of high school administrators in preparing to deal with an active shooter incident. Data concerning the difference between the perceptions of urban and rural Missouri high school administrators after completing active shooter training were collected. Data were also collected on the difference between male and female administrators after completing active shooter training. The study design involved looking at differences in the perceptions of administrators with 20 years or greater experience and those with less than 20 years of experience. Lastly, this study resulted in data on the number of administrators in favor of arming administrators who have completed formal training.

A quantitative research method was chosen to provide data with which to study the relationship between training and perceived effectiveness of training. Using administrators with mutual concern, various strategies were tested for improving practice.

Upon completion of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval, the sample was selected and informed consent was obtained. All of the 52 Missouri high school

administrators who were surveyed granted valid informed consent. This consent was granted with disclosure of study procedures and potential risks to the participants. It was granted with participant comprehension of the information and was voluntarily given without coercion or undue influence.

Phone surveys were conducted to answer 10 questions measuring the perceived feelings of preparedness and safety of Missouri's public school administrators after Active Shooter Training.

Personal identifiers were removed from all data to maintain confidentiality of those being surveyed. Results were then coded and tabulated.

A tally or frequency count of survey responses was reported in a frequency table of distribution with a report of the mean, medium, and mode of all responses. An Excel spreadsheet was used to record the data to upload into SPSS for analyses.

All data were secured under pass-coded desktop computer for the extent of the study. No other humans have access to the data. Backup data are secured in a locked file and will be retained for three years.

In Chapter Four, the findings are presented. Narratives of survey responses provide insight into the perceptions of Missouri administrators. In addition, comparative analyses of rural versus suburban administrative impressions of preparedness are revealed.

Chapter Four: Analysis of Data

Since the Columbine school shootings in April of 1999, there have been 262 more school shootings (Roberts, 2015). States have enacted legislation to prepare schools for an active shooter (Bartels, 2013). Missouri passed Senate Bill No. 75, which mandates all schools in the state of Missouri participate in active shooter training on an annual basis. There are currently minimal data on the perceived preparedness and feelings of safety of Missouri high school administrators who have participated in the active shooter training.

Fifty-two Missouri high school administrators were selected to be surveyed based upon their gender, school district size, and school location. In this quantitative study, each administrator was surveyed over the phone with a set of 10 questions. The first set of questions allowed for disaggregation of data by respondent demographics. Demographic questions were asked to indicate age, public school experience, gender, number of years as an academic administrator, and number of years in current academic position. Demographic data were explored with the expectation perspectives might differ among those with varied experience in the amount of apprehension and preparedness felt after active shooter training.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate perceptions which guide administrators, teachers, students, and other stakeholders in addressing safety concerns and preparatory changes in the likelihood of an active shooter incident. The surveys were designed to comprehend how administrators regard existing policies implemented to deal with school threats and safety. Justification for the research questions was based on literature reviewed.

Research Question 1

After completing active shooter training, what are the perceptions of high school administrators in preparing to deal with an active shooter incident?

Victoria L. Bernhardt (2013) is one of the leading authors regarding data analysis for continuous school improvement. In her writing, she suggested, "We do not act differently from what we perceive" (Bernhardt, 2013, p. 42). Bernhardt (2013) continued that if researchers want to know what administrators perceive about the environment, researchers need to ask them. Common approaches to gaining these perceptions are through surveys or interviews (Bernhardt, 2013).

The sample for this study provided information through surveys , which were useful as a means of analysis and will allow the audience, administrators, to take action on the results. The responses to survey question 10, which corresponds with Research Question 1, were coded for both manifest and latent content to arrive at "reasonably reliable and valid" results (Fraenkel et al., 2015, p. 483). The common threads which emerged through coding were that administrators believed additional and ongoing training is essential for all school stakeholders. A more specific description of results is presented in Chapter Five.

Research Question 2

What is the difference between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

Survey question 8 read, "On the following continuum, how do you feel Senate Bill No. 75 Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training has helped you feel prepared

against the threat of an active shooter?" The sample of administrators were asked to choose from a continuum with a Likert scale from 1-5 with 1 being "Worse" and 5 being "Definitely More Prepared." As seen in Table 1, 86.6% of respondents indicated an increase in preparedness after completing active shooter training.

Table 1

Frequency Table: All Participants' Preparedness

	Frequency	Percent
Worse	0	0.0
Slightly Worse	1	1.9
None	6	11.5
Slightly More	21	40.4
Definitely More	24	46.2
Total	52	100.0

The respondents were segregated by urban and rural population indicators, and responses were then analyzed using a paired-sample *t*-test with SPSS predictive analytics software. This parametric technique for analyzing the data was chosen to see if the difference between the means of the two samples was significant (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The following assumptions were made before conducting this analysis. It was assumed the dependent variable of preparedness was measured on a continuous scale from 1-5. It was assumed there were two categorical, related groups, urban administrators and rural administrators. It was assumed there were no significant outliers as a Likert scale of 1-5 was provided. The distribution of the differences between rural and urban administrators was normally distributed.

The results for this dependent *t*-test may be seen in Table 2 and reveal a significant difference at $p < 0.05$ between the responses from administrators from urban and rural populations. A detailed report may be found in Chapter Five.

Table 2

Paired-Samples t-Test: Population and District Size Comparisons

		M	*SD*	*SEM*	Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1	Pop. Size - Prepared?	-2.712	.871	.121	.000
Pair 2	Dist. Size - Prepared?	-1.712	1.696	.235	.000

Research Question 3

What is the difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training in their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident?

The respondents were segregated by male and female population indicators, and their responses were then analyzed using a paired-sample *t*-test with SPSS predictive analytics software. This parametric technique for analyzing the data was chosen to see if the difference between the means of the two samples was significant (Fraenkel et al., 2015). The following assumptions were made before conducting this analysis. It was assumed the dependent variable of preparedness was measured on a continuous scale from 1-5. It was assumed there were two categorical, related groups, female administrators and male administrators. It was assumed there were no significant outliers, as a Likert scale of 1-5 was provided. The distribution of the differences between female and male administrators was approximately normally distributed.

The results for this dependent *t*-test may be seen in Table 3 and reveal a significant difference at $p < 0.05$ between the responses of male and female administrators. Further findings are reported in Chapter Five.

Table 3

Paired-Samples t-Test: Gender Perceptions of Safety and Preparedness

		M	*SD*	*SEM*	Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1	Gender - Safety?	-3.808	1.011	.140	.000
Pair 2	Gender - Prepared?	-3.442	1.037	.144	.000

Research Question 4

What is the difference in the perceptions of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training after 20 years or greater experience as compared to those with less than 20 years of experience?

Frequency analysis is a descriptive statistical method that shows the number of occurrences of each response chosen by the respondents (Fraenkel et al., 2015). For Research Question 4, the data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and a frequency analysis table (see Table 4). Administrators with more years of experience indicated a greater perception of preparedness after training. Of the 52 Missouri high school administrators surveyed, 45 (or 86.6%) felt slightly or definitely more prepared after participating in active shooter training (see Table 5). Only 11.5% (or six administrators) felt no change after participating in training. Only one administrator felt slightly worse after participating in active shooter training.

Table 4

Frequency Analysis: Experience & Perceptions of Preparedness

	6 - 10 yrs	11 - 15 yrs	16 - 19 yrs	20 - 40 yrs	Total
Worse	0	0	0	0	0
Slightly Worse	0	1	0	0	1
None	0	1	2	3	6
Slightly More	2	6	8	6	22
Definitely More	1	3	7	12	23

Table 5

Percentage Analysis: Experience & Perceptions of Preparedness

	6 - 10 yrs	11 - 15 yrs	16 - 19 yrs	20 - 40 yrs	Total
Worse	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Slightly Worse	.00	.08	.00	.00	.02
None	.00	.08	.18	.14	.16
Slightly More	.67	.56	.47	.29	.42
Definitely More	.33	.27	.41	.57	.44

Research Question 5

What percentage of Missouri high school public administrators favor arming school administrators who have completed formal training?

The second amendment to the *United States Constitution* states, "A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed" (as cited in Arnold, 2015, p. 481). In the court case *District of Columbia v. Heller*, the United States Supreme Court held for the first time that the Second Amendment of the *U.S. Constitution* protected an individual's right to use arms in the immediate self-defense of one's home (Arnold, 2015). The issue of arming citizens is especially contentious when it is "connected with schools" (Arnold, 2015, p. 482). It should not be surprising then that when SPSS predictive analytics software was used to conduct a frequency analysis and to produce a valid percentage of respondents who favored arming school personnel after completing formal training, more than half of the school administrators expressed school personnel should remain unarmed (see Table 6).

Table 6

Frequency Analysis Administrators Favor Arming

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Yes	24	46.2	46.2
No	28	53.8	53.8
Total	52	100.0	100.0

Summary

Each state has a different standpoint regarding the law on guns in schools and school zones:

> Those in favor of more gun control and those in favor of less gun control both have the same goal - to end gun violence. Unfortunately, the approaches of both groups to reaching that goal are diametrically opposed. However, since Heller and McDonald, one option has been foreclosed to the people - it is no longer a constitutional option to disarm Americans, especially if they are in defense of hearth and home. (Arnold, 2015, p. 498)

Missouri SB 75 allows guns to be concealed carried into schools with the consent of the governing body of the higher education institution or a school official or the district school board.

In Chapter Four, the data were presented in tables comparing the perceptions of administrators before and after AST. The comparisons did reveal conclusive data leading to the rejection of all null hypotheses. In Chapter Five, the findings from the study, limitations to the research, implications for practice, and suggestions for future research are discussed.

Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusions

With increasing incidents of school shootings, legislatures and school stakeholders have sought ways to prepare for an active school shooter (O'Meara, 2013). Literature related to this study was presented to review school preparedness in the event of an active shooter, what to do during a school shooting, and what to do once the shooting is over. Missouri Senate Bill No. 75 requires schools to participate in active shooter training on an annual basis. Currently, there are minimal existing data about the perceived feelings of preparedness and safety this training has provided to Missouri high school administrators. Fifty-two Missouri high school administrators were surveyed with a series of questions related to active shooter training in the state of Missouri. An equal number of male and female administrators were polled, as well as an equal number of rural and urban administrators.

The sampled population of administrators were asked to choose from a Likert scale continuum from 1-5 with 1 being "Worse" and 5 being "Definitely More Prepared." Administrators were also asked if they were in favor of allowing administrators and selected faculty to carry a concealed weapon after proper training.

Findings

Research question 1. In response to the first research question, a majority of the comments made by Missouri high school administrators were in favor of Senate Bill No. 75. Comments from the survey indicated administrators appreciated the bill's focus on safety for Missouri students. Administrators believed the training meant more practice, and more practice meant more was learned by stakeholders. One administrator

commented, “School safety is continually evolving. We try to be proactive. Sadly, we learn after the fact.”

The conceal-carry question was the most divisive issue. Administrators from rural settings indicated strong favor for arming school personnel. One administrator said, “We are very rural. We are 15-20 minutes from help.” Another commented, “God help us all if any administrator had to face this. I’d be okay with being armed. I’d still prefer an outside agency.” One even commented he did not think a concealed weapon is enough, especially against an AR-type rifle. Others were strictly opposed to arming school personnel. One administrator commented, “Extremely strong against weapons in school. Even scared that we have to have conversation.”

Research question 2. In response to the second research question, data were used to determine if there was a difference in perceptions between urban and rural Missouri high school administrators’ feelings of preparedness after active shooter training.

As seen from the data in Table 2, the significance level from a paired-samples *t*-test of both population and district-size comparisons yielded $p < 0.0005$. Therefore, there was a significant difference in perceptions, and the null hypothesis was rejected.

The significant difference in the responses of urban and rural Missouri high school administrators may be attributed to a few different factors when reviewing the coded data. First, response time for law enforcement may be longer for those administrators of rural school districts. One administrator reported it would take law enforcement at least 20 minutes to respond to an incident at his school. When related to previous incidents, police arrived at Sandy Hook Elementary School in less than three

minutes from the first 911 call received (Sedensky, 2013). Even administrators of larger, urban districts noted the difference. One administrator commented, "We are located in town, with help from our local police department. If I was in a rural area, it would be different."

The second factor that may create differences in the responses of urban and rural Missouri high school administrators is that many of the urban districts had SROs. One administrator of a large, urban district, when asked about allowing administrators and selected personnel to carry a concealed weapon after proper training, responded, "We are fortunate to have our own department of safety. If in a smaller, rural district, I'd say yes." Having an armed SRO on staff full time would create greater feelings of safety and preparedness to defend against an active shooter (Cray & Weiler, 2011). Rural administrators fear an active shooter may have a longer time to create devastation before armed law enforcement can respond (Nielsen et al., 2011). The burden of thwarting the intent of an active shooter in rural settings may fall to the school itself (Prall, 2014).

Research question 3. The third research question was used to analyze the difference between male and female Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training and their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident.

As seen from the data in Table 3, the significance level from a paired-samples *t*-test for genders of both safety and preparedness yielded $p < 0.0005$. Therefore, there was a significant difference between the perceptions of preparedness for men and women, and the null hypothesis was rejected.

Research question 4. The fourth research question was used to analyze the difference in the perceptions of preparedness between Missouri high school administrators with 20 years or greater experience as compared to those with less than 20 years' experience who have completed active shooter training.

For Research Question 4, the data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and a frequency analysis table (see Table 4). Forty-five of the 52 respondents, or 86% (see Table 5), indicated an improved perception of preparedness after completing the active shooter training. For those with less than 20 years' experience, 90% indicated an improved perception of preparedness after completing the active shooter training. There was a 4% difference between the groups; therefore, the null hypothesis must be rejected.

Research question 5. For research question 5, descriptive statistics were used to find the percentage of Missouri high school public administrators from the sample who favored arming school administrators after completing formal training.

The analysis showed only 46.2% favored arming Missouri high school administrators, while 53.8% were not in favor of arming Missouri high school administrators. This split decision aligns with current research by Weiler and Armenta (2014), who noted the debate promoting school safety as emotionally and politically charged. Wieler and Armenta (2014) reported:

> The general response focused on concerns such as accidents due to someone getting ahold of a weapon, limited training, lack of an adequate place to store the weapon(s), liability issues, establishing a climate of fear, and other concerns. (p. 117)

Among the responses for this study, one principal said, “While I’m not opposed to a School Resource Officer, I do NOT want faculty carrying.” Another respondent added, “God help us all if any administrator had to face this. I’d be OK to be armed, but I would prefer an outside agency.” An administrator from a suburban district said, “We are fortunate to have our own department of safety, but if I were in a smaller, rural district, I’d definitely say yes [to arming administration].”

Conclusions

The data in this study showed the vast majority of Missouri high school administrators feel safer and more prepared against an active shooter after having participated in active shooter training as mandated by Missouri Senate Bill No. 75. During the survey process for this study, administrators commented they felt the Missouri legislature “got it right” on this bill. The bill requires training on an annual basis, keeping the safety of the school community at the forefront of each school’s practices and procedures. The bill allows districts to answer the question of whether schools should arm selective school personnel after proper training. Those districts located close to law enforcement, or which have a SRO on campus, can choose to rely on that presence to help thwart an active school shooter. Rural districts that cannot afford a resource officer may choose to arm and train selective personnel to prepare for and stop an active school shooter.

The vulnerability of rural districts in preparing for an active shooter is probably one of the biggest differences that exist for rural districts verses urban districts in perceived feelings of safety and preparedness (Blad, 2014). Adam Lanza was able to kill 20 students and six adults with a police response of three minutes from the first 911 call

(Thompson, 2014). Rural administrators are well aware of the time it will take for law enforcement to respond to their locations, as seen by the responses in this study. The greatest number of administrators in favor of arming selected personnel after training came from rural school districts surveyed for this study. One rural administrator went so far as to suggest a pistol will not be enough when facing an assault rifle.

When comparing male verses female Missouri high school administrators and their perceptions of preparedness to deal with an active shooter incident, more female administrators felt definitely more prepared, while more male administrators felt slightly more prepared. Male administrators outnumbered female administrators two to one when answering *no difference* or *slightly worse* after completing training. This may be related to a more protective gender trait found in males (Goldsmith, 2009). For those males who answered *no difference* or *slightly worse,* the comment of one administrator may sum up their feelings, "No amount of training can really prepare you for an active shooter event."

When it came to years of experience, administrators with the greatest years of experience said they felt definitely more prepared for an active shooter event on a two to one ratio over those who felt slightly more prepared. Administrators with fewer than 15 years of experience had a two to one ratio of feeling slightly more prepared over definitely more prepared. The younger administrators may be more connected with electronic and social media, and thus, less willing to respond as definitely more prepared. More experienced administrators may be more appreciative of the Missouri legislation and professional development that it requires.

Lastly, the issue of arming selective school personnel after proper training is the most divisive of this study. It is not only divisive in the schools' preparation for an active

school shooter, but it is a nationally divisive subject as well. Of the 52 Missouri high school administrators who were surveyed, slightly more than 50% were opposed to arming selective personnel after proper training.

As shown in Table 6, 24 of the administrators were in favor of arming, while 28 were opposed. Four of the administrators who said *no* to arming selective school personnel after proper training made the following comments. One replied, "I almost said *yes* on conceal carry, but must say *no*." A second one said, "We are located in town; if I was in a rural area, it would be different." A third one commented, "I don't own a gun. Perhaps if I did, I would answer differently." The fourth one added, "I'd be okay to be armed, but I would prefer an outside agency." These four comments show that even though a slight majority said they were opposed to arming selective school personnel after proper training, results could just as easily have been a slight majority in favor of arming school personnel.

Implications for Practice

When preparing for an active shooter, schools should take a safety audit on a regular basis (Brydolf, 2013). Schools should have a layered system of protection before anyone can come into buildings (CES, 2015). Faculty who are aware of normal routines and can perceive when something is not right should be placed at the access points of a school's building (O'Meara, 2013). Faculty and students should be trained on what to do during a school shooting (O'Meara, 2013).

Making everyone (others within the school and law enforcement) aware of a school shooting is critical (Schwartz, 2013). Students and faculty have to be quick in their assessments of response to the shooting (Schwartz, 2013). The first option is to flee

(Shah, 2013b). If fleeing is not an option, potential victims must seek shelter (Shah, 2013b). If potential victims cannot lock doors and barricade themselves from the shooter, a third option is to fight off the shooter (Shah, 2013b). Fire extinguishers are excellent for diversion when deployed and as a weapon when crashing the metal container against the head of an active shooter (Shah, 2013b).

Once the shooting is over, the nightmare of an active shooter will still continue. Law enforcement, first responders, local and possibly national media, and families of survivors and victims will descend upon the school campus (Shah, 2013b). Schools must prepare for what can occur after a school shooting as much as they prepare for the shooting itself (O'Meara, 2013).

Missouri's legislative response to school shootings has been Senate Bill No. 75. As seen in this study, the majority of Missouri high school administrators felt more safe and prepared after having participated in the active shooter training. As one administrator noted, "The success of the training is largely dependent upon the company that leads the training."

The decision whether to arm selective personnel after proper training is a decision best made by individual districts. If 20 first-grade students and six adults can be slain within three minutes, as seen at Sandy Hook, any and all means necessary to keep the school community safe must be considered (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014). Weiler and Armenta (2014) shared their thoughts:

> One would hope that those who have proposed possible solutions to stem incidents of gun violence in schools, specifically legislators, are making proposals with school safety, not politics, in mind. And while legislators undoubtedly have

> a strong knowledge of how their constituents feel about this divisive issue, one wonders if they have bothered to solicit the opinions of those who would have to implement and monitor armed personnel in schools, the building principals. The opinions of principals might be quite different than a legislator's voting bloc. (p. 118)

Even with federal and state involvement, localism remains at the heart of educational policy (Elliott, 2015).

Recommendations for Future Research

Consideration for future studies may include the topic of arming selective school personnel after proper training. There is a need to collect data on the number of schools that actually do allow selective school personnel, after proper training, to carry a concealed weapon. With those data, information could be garnered as to the number of school shootings that have still occurred despite the school allowing personnel to carry a weapon. For schools that do allow personnel to carry concealed weapons, what are the amounts of accidental shootings and the number of incidents involving misuse of weapons? What does allowing personnel to carry a concealed weapon cost a school district in insurance premiums? What does the term "proper training" mean? What are the qualifiers of selective personnel? These are data that would prove beneficial to those schools serious in their consideration of allowing personnel to carry concealed weapons.

Summary

The number of school shootings began to increase in the late 1990s with the events that occurred at Pearl, Mississippi; West Paducah, Kentucky; West Side Middle School near Jonesboro, Arkansas; and Columbine in Littleton, Colorado. As the number

of school shootings increased, so too has the intensity of devastation (AP, 2013). The shootings at Virginia Tech in 2007 left 32 students and faculty dead with another 15 wounded (Chen et al., 2015). The shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, Connecticut, left 20 first-grade students and six faculty members dead (Schildkraut & Muschert, 2014).

Legislatures and school officials have worked together to pass legislation to prepare schools for an active shooter incident (Bartels, 2013). Missouri passed Senate Bill No. 75, which mandates all schools in the state of Missouri must annually participate in active shooter training. This study fills the gap of current data on the perceptions of Missouri high school administrators on feelings of safety and preparedness after participating in active shooter training. This study also included examination of research on what schools can do to prepare for an active shooter, what schools should do during an active shooter event, and what schools should be prepared to do after the active shooter event is over.

Various reasons have been given as to what would motivate an individual to become a school shooter. Dysfunctional and split families, violence-filled entertainment, the desire to be a copycat, bullying, and even progressive education have been just a few of the things credited with the increase of school shootings (Elliott, 2015). Whatever the cause, the increase of school shootings has led to increased preparation by schools for an active shooter (O'Meara, 2013).

Schools have taken many steps in preparing for an active shooter (Ashby, 2007). Frequent safety audits are conducted by schools (Ashby, 2007). Excessive shrubbery has been cleared and lighting increased around the perimeter of school buildings (Ashby,

2007). Many schools have placed a layered system of entrance as well as added security surveillance (Ashby, 2007). Schools have increased law enforcement presence on their campuses, and many have hired SROs on a fulltime basis (Ashby, 2007). Some have even armed selective personnel in their efforts to prepare for an active shooter. (Ashby, 2007).

The FBI put out a Law Enforcement Bulletin in September of 2010 entitled "Those Terrible First Few Minutes" (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Information is extremely critical during the first few moments of a school shooting (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Warning the school population and informing law enforcement is priority one (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Students and staff have to make a possible life-saving assessment of their three options during a school shooting (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). First, if possible, potential victims should flee the area (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Second, if fleeing is not an option, barricading from the shooter is option number two (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). If barricading is not an option, students and staff need to unite in their attacks of the attacker (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

Once the school shooter is eliminated, the school should be prepared for what is next (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Depending upon the severity of the shooting, many different groups will descend upon the school campus (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Law enforcement from various agencies and jurisdictions will arrive (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Medical personnel will try to help victims (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Local and possibly national media will arrive to cover the scene (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Community members will be there, many seeking to know the status of their own family members (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Counselors will be needed to address the lingering

effects of the school shooting (Buerger & Buerger, 2010). Also, depending on the extent of the carnage, the school facilities will also need to be addressed (Buerger & Buerger, 2010).

Data from this study show Missouri high school administrators have perceived feelings of safety and preparedness after participating in active shooter training. Fifty-two Missouri high school administrators were surveyed for this quantitative study. Equal numbers of male and female administrators were surveyed, as well as equal numbers of administrators from urban and rural settings.

The differences in this study can be attributed to the locations in which schools are found. Urban administrators were more likely to be opposed to arming staff compared to their rural counterparts who face a greater response time from law enforcement. Administrators with 20 or more years of experience were more likely to have more definite feelings of safety and preparedness than those with fewer than 20 years of experience.

Future studies may include data on schools that have allowed selective personnel to carry a concealed weapon. Data should also be obtained on incidents of an active shooter and incidents of misuse of the weapons. Data should be collected on the difference of insurance premiums for schools that arm their personnel. Research should also be conducted on what defines selective personnel and proper training.

It is the intent of the primary investigator that the efforts of this study will help schools in their continued endeavor to provide students with a safe learning environment.

Appendix A

Survey Template

In July of 2013, Missouri passed Senate Bill No. 75 which establishes Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training for Schools Program. Each school district and charter school may, by July 1, 2014, include in its teacher and school employee training a component on how to properly respond to students who provide them with information about a threatening situation and how to address situations in which there is a potentially dangerous or armed intruder in the school. Training may also include information and techniques on how to address situations where an active shooter is present in the school or on school property.

Each school district and charter school may conduct the training on an annual basis. If no formal training has previously occurred, the length of the training may be eight hours. The length of annual continuing training may be four hours.

All school personnel shall participate in a simulated active shooter and intruder response drill conducted and led by law enforcement professionals. Each drill may include an explanation of its purpose and a safety briefing. The training shall require each participant to know and understand how to respond in the event of an actual emergency on school property or at a school event. The drill may include:

(1) Allowing school personnel to respond to the simulated emergency in whatever way they have been trained or informed; and

(2) Allowing school personnel to attempt and implement new methods of responding to the simulated emergency based upon previously used unsuccessful methods of response.

All instructors for the program shall be certified by the department of public safety's peace officers standards training commission.

School districts and charter schools may consult and collaborate with law enforcement authorities, emergency response agencies, and other organizations and entities trained to deal with active shooters or potentially dangerous or armed intruders. Public schools shall foster an environment in which students feel comfortable sharing information they have regarding a potentially threatening or dangerous situation with a responsible adult.

Please answer the following short survey in relation to Senate Bill No. 75 and your perception of its effectiveness for you as an administrator in Missouri's public schools.

1. Your gender:

   Male Female

2. Years in current district:

   0-5 6-10 11-15 16-30+

3. Years of administrative experience:

   0-5 6-10 11-15 16-30+

4. Total years of educational experience:

   0-5 6-10 11-15 16-30+

5. Size of your district

   1-300 301-750 751-1,500 1,501-2,500 2,501+

6. District's location population

   0-500 501-1000 1,001-5,000 5,001-25,000 25,001+

7. On the following continuum, how do you feel Senate Bill No. 75 Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training has helped you feel safe against the threat of an active shooter and intruder?

Worse	Slightly Worse	None	Slightly More	Definitely More
1	2	3	4	5

8. On the following continuum, how do you feel Senate Bill No. 75 Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training has helped you feel prepared against the threat of an active shooter?

Worse	Slightly Worse	None	Slightly More	Definitely More
1	2	3	4	5

9. Are you in favor of allowing administrators and selected faculty to carry a concealed weapon after proper training?

Yes No

10. Do you have any further comments regarding Senate Bill No. 75 Active Shooter and Intruder Response Training?

Appendix B

LINDENWOOD

LINDENWOOD UNIVERSITY ST. CHARLES, MISSOURI

DATE:	June 16, 2015
TO:	Joby Steele, Doctorate
FROM:	Lindenwood University Institutional Review Board
STUDY TITLE:	[698055-1] Missouri Public Administrators' Perceived Effectiveness of Senate Bill No. 75
IRB REFERENCE #:	
SUBMISSION TYPE:	New Project
ACTION:	APPROVED
APPROVAL DATE:	June 16, 2015
EXPIRATION DATE:	June 16, 2016
REVIEW TYPE:	Expedited Review

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this research project. Lindenwood University Institutional Review Board has APPROVED your submission. This approval is based on an appropriate risk/benefit ratio and a study design wherein the risks have been minimized. All research must be conducted in accordance with this approved submission.

This submission has received Expedited Review based on the applicable federal regulation.

Please remember that informed consent is a process beginning with a description of the study and insurance of participant understanding followed by a signed consent form. Informed consent must continue throughout the study via a dialogue between the researcher and research participant. Federal regulations require each participant receive a copy of the signed consent document.

Please note that any revision to previously approved materials must be approved by this office prior to initiation. Please use the appropriate revision forms for this procedure.

All SERIOUS and UNEXPECTED adverse events must be reported to this office. Please use the appropriate adverse event forms for this procedure. All FDA and sponsor reporting requirements should also be followed.

All NON-COMPLIANCE issues or COMPLAINTS regarding this project must be reported promptly to the IRB.

This project has been determined to be a Minimal Risk project. Based on the risks, this project requires continuing review by this committee on an annual basis. Please use the completion/amendment form for this procedure. Your documentation for continuing review must be received with sufficient time for review and continued approval before the expiration date of June 16, 2016.

Please note that all research records must be retained for a minimum of three years.

If you have any questions, please contact Megan Woods at (636) 485-9005 or mwoods1@lindenwood.edu. Please include your study title and reference number in all correspondence with this office.

If you have any questions, please send them to mwoods1@lindenwood.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence with this committee.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Lindenwood University Institutional Review Board's records.

Appendix C

Lindenwood University

School of Education
209 S. Kingshighway
St. Charles, Missouri 63301

Informed Consent for Participation in Research Activities

Missouri Public Administrators' Perceived Effectiveness of Senate Bill No. 75

Principal Investigator Joby B. Steele
Telephone: [redacted] E-mail: jbs496@lionmail.lindenwood.edu

Participant _____ Contact info _____

1. You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Joby B. Steele under the guidance of Dr. Julie Williams. The purpose of this research is to study the perceived effectiveness of active shooter training for Missouri's public schools.

2. a) Your participation will involve a phone survey to a purposive sample of 25-60 of Missouri high school administrators who have completed active shooter training. Participants will be asked about their perception of preparing for an active shooter. The study will compare differences in rural and urban districts, male and female administrators, those with 20+ years of experience and those with less than 20 years of experience.

   b) The amount of time involved in your participation will be 3-5 minutes.

   Approximately [25-60] will be involved in this research.

3. There are no anticipated risks associated with this research.
4. There are no direct benefits for you participating in this study. However, your participation will contribute to the knowledge about the perceived effectiveness of Missouri Senate Bill No. 75.
5. Your participation is voluntary and you may choose not to participate in this research study or to withdraw your consent at any time. You may choose not to answer any questions that you do not want to answer. You will NOT be penalized in any way should you choose not to participate or to withdraw.

6. We will do everything we can to protect your privacy. As part of this effort, your identity will not be revealed in any publication or presentation that may result from this study and the information collected will remain in the possession of the investigator in a safe location.

7. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this study, or if any problems arise, you may call the Investigator, Joby B. Steele ([redacted] or the Supervising Faculty, Dr. Julie Williams [redacted]. You may also ask questions of or state concerns regarding your participation to the Lindenwood Institutional Review Board (IRB) through contacting Dr. Jann Weitzel, Vice President for Academic Affairs at 636-949-4846.

   I have read this consent form and have been given the opportunity to ask questions. I will also be given a copy of this consent form for my records. I consent to my participation in the research described above.

_____	_____
Participant's Signature Date	Participant's Printed Name
_____	_____
Signature of Principal Investigator Date	Investigator Printed Name

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Vita

Joby B. Steele was born November 2, 1970, in Jonesboro, Arkansas. Joby graduated from Mountain Home High School in Mountain Home, Arkansas, in May of 1989. He graduated with a Bachelor of Science in Education from Arkansas State University in Jonesboro, Arkansas, in August of 1993. Steele began teaching high school social studies with the Alton R-IV School District in August of 1993.

In 2003, he completed his Masters in Elementary and Secondary Education Administration from William Woods University in Fulton, Missouri. From 2003 to 2008, he served as the elementary principal at Alton Elementary School. During the 2008-2009 school year, he served as the assistant principal at West Plains Middle School. From 2009 to 2012, Mr. Steele served as the high school assistant principal at West Plains High School. From 2013 to present, he has served as high school principal at Alton R-IV School District in Alton, Missouri.