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Abstract

This article uses an institutional network governance approach to explore the overlapping dimension of the policy fields between security, development, and human rights, reflected in the US and German provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan. The past two decades have witnessed a gradually changing paradigm in academic and policy debates regarding the questions of the normative basis of world order and possibilities for tackling imminent threats to security and peace (i.e. intra-state armed conflicts, failed states, terrorism, poverty, and deepening inequality). The introduction of concepts such as "human security" and "the right to humanitarian intervention/responsibility to protect (R2P)" as well as critical examinations of peace-, nation-, and state-building missions (PNSB) have led to a relativist tendency of state sovereignty and a changing attitude regarding how to address the intersection of security, development, and human rights. Despite this shift, the policy commitments to integrating these policy considerations remain puzzling. How have they been redefined, conceptualized, and put into practice? I argue that an integrated conceptual approach has facilitated the redefinition of common policy goals, principles, and the mobilization of resources. At the same time, civil and military cooperation, as demonstrated in the multifunctional work of PRTs, has been Janus-headed—permanently caught in an ongoing tension between the war on terror and short-term stability operation on the one hand and long-term durable peace and development on the other. The misunderstanding of its *interim* character, the dynamics of Afghan environment, the blurring of policy lines, and the differences between national PRT models have made it difficult to systematically assess the efficiency and legitimacy of each policy frame and program.

Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed a gradually changing paradigm in academic and policy debates regarding the questions of the normative basis of world order and possibilities for tackling imminent threats to security and peace (i.e. intra-state armed conflicts, failed states, terrorism, poverty, and deepening inequality) at different levels. The introduction of concepts such as "human security" and "the right to humanitarian intervention/responsibility to protect (R2P)" as well as critical examinations of peace-, nation-, and state-building missions (PNSB) have led to a relativist tendency of state sovereignty and a changing attitude to address the intersection of security, development, and human rights (UNDP, 1994; Brahimi Report, 2000; the UN Millennium Declaration, 2000; the World Summit Declaration, 2005; UN core documents, 2004 and 2005). Actors involved are increasingly aware that these three policy fields are interdependent and that they should form an integral part of any comprehensive conflict resolution and sustainable development strategy.

To date, three cross-cutting debates in security studies; International Relations (IR) research; development, and human rights research; and policy-field analyses have begun to consider this intersection. First, the changing nature and scope of PNSB from a top-down approach to mutual commitment has upheld the importance of local ownership and questioned the assumption of the Western liberal democratic model of states in relation to international stability (Barnett, 2006; Johnston/Slyomovic, 2008; Valença, 2011). State- and nation-building historically constitute the efforts of (imperial) external actors to build effective and legitimate domestic institutions in young nation states in order to assure the great powers' spheres of influence there (Rubin, 2005: 94-95). State-building focuses on the establishment of political institutions and the creation of favorable economic circumstances. With the emergence of failed states, civil armed conflicts, and terrorism as top international concerns, (post-conflict) nation-building in the post-Cold War era has become more comprehensive and complex. It includes efforts to establish democratic institutions, institute security sectors reforms (SSR), facilitate economic and societal reconstruction, and encourage reparation and reconciliation. Without question, the interplay of security, development, human rights, justice, and peace issues has gained weight in international commitments.[2] In particular, in view of the limitations of and lessons learned from the past UN peace missions, the introduction and institutionalization of post-conflict peacebuilding (i.e. the establishment of the UN peacebuilding commission in 2005) has underlined the necessity of developing a more comprehensive approach in pursuit of different policy objectives. Post-conflict peace-building (PCPB) involves a multi-dimensional peace endeavour (ranging from state and nation-building, economic reconstruction, and development to socio-cultural and historical reparation and reconciliation etc.), where both the top-down and bottom-up approaches are needed for constructive and inclusive commitments between international and local actors.[3] Even though practitioners, regional and international organizations, and states might have conceptualized and operationalized their mandates differently (Barnett et al., 2007), the success of such peacebuilding work still hinges on whether or not a given approach has delivered a positive impact upon people's lives (Street et al,. 2008). The tensions and dilemmas of PNSB have engendered a reflection and learning process, leading to the questioning of the appropriateness of external intervention. Academic conjecture has called for the adoptionon of a different perspective (Slim, 1995; Leaning/Arie, 2000; McRae, 2001; Khagram/Clark/Raad, 2003; Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Ramcharan, 2004; Krause/Jütersonke, 2005; Grimm, 2005; Duffield, 2006; Paris/Sisk, 2009; Dayton/Kriesberg, 2009). Such a different perspective would, for example, incorporate another dimension of peace, namely, social justice by creating a social environment where egalitarian conditions exist and human rights and human dignity are

respected, regardless of the existence of the Western state model and values (Johnston/Slyomovic, 2008; Valença, 2011: 644).

Second, the introduction of "human security" (HS) as a concept and agenda in foreign policy and international politics has prompted controversial debates and challenged the state-centric understanding of how to preserve security (with such efforts being termed "national security," "cooperative security" and "comprehensive security"). However, the conventional notion of "national security" neglects the human element. In contrast, HS is about security of individuals and people. The 1994 UNDP report has explored the link between pervasive threats (such as poverty, terrorism, disease, and an unequal world order) and the lack of the human dimension of security. Specifically, the report identified seven realms of security that must be ensured and protected by any PNSB efforts: personal security, economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, political security, and community security (UNDP, 1994). The content of the report can be traced back to the ideas of human rights and a more humanitarian agenda. In spite of the critiques of its conceptual and analytical weaknesses, possible connections with masked ideologies, as well as the question of its applicability (Suhrke, 1999; Richmond, 2001; Paris, 2001; Stewart, 2004; de Larrinaga/Doucet, 2007; Chandler, 2008), such a human security paradigm or framework has gained relevance in the elaboration of policy options and scientific endeavors. For example, in recognizing the insufficiency of national security to protect *people's* security, some middle powers (notably Canada, Norway, and Japan) have incorporated the idea of HS into their foreign policy agendas.[4] Similarly, inspired by the concept of HS, the European Union (EU) has endorsed a new combination of military and civilian tools for establishing its security capabilities (EU 2003; Flechtner, 2006: l58; Kaldor/Glasius, 2004, 2005). Also, the potential of HS in uncovering the link between development, gender equality, specific regional experience of insecurity, and governance and developing further concepts and strategies for the delivery of sustainable development and peace cannot be underestimated.[5]

Third, against the backdrop of the polarized debates surrounding the concept of HS as an increasingly important element in international law, academics and practitioners have provided insights into the overlapping dimensions of these policy fields. While they note the limits of international human rights and development programs in addressing the question of gender inequality in developing countries (Nyamu, 2000), they acknowledge an emerging right of humanitarian assistance through military enforcement to restore democracy, to protect human rights and to promote human security (Fielding, 1994, 1995; Bruderlein, 2000). This new right has found full elaboration in the R2P doctrine as a basis for collective action to rescue populations in grave danger and, henceforth, as a part of a progressive foreign policy agenda (Banda, 2007). To be sure, the presentation of the doctrine "R2P" in establishing the foundations for a new normative and operational consensus on the role of military intervention has been a breakthrough in addressing the controversies of humanitarian intervention (HI).[6] The very notion of R2P encapsulates the growing necessity for "non-intervention" for "national security" to yield to the principle of international *responsibility* (i.e. to protect *foreign* populations under threat of mass killings and ethnic cleansing if and when the governments of such populations are either complicit or ineffectual.[7] Meanwhile, despite the introduction of the guiding principles and rules for military enforcement relevant to different actors, critics find that the R2P doctrine remains embedded in a vision of international rescue coming from outside, often driven by the logic of classical realism without appropriately including the needs and interests of local actors (Hamilton, 2006; Stahn, 2007; Mégret, 2009).

The debates mentioned above have demonstrated a meaningful change in international commitments to addressing the overlap between security, development, and human rights through the introduction of new norms and policy options. Still, uncertainties remain regarding the following question: How have the concepts and agendas of security, development, and

human rights been redefined, conceptualized, and put into practice prompting consensus, conversion, or conflict within the policy networks involved? The existing literature has so far failed to provide satisfactory systematic answers to this question. This is the case for both IR research and for the policy fields' research communities.

Supported by an institutional network governance framework, this article analyzes a new policy approach (civil and military cooperation) and tries to find some first hints in addressing remaining questions.[8] Taking the US and German provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan as case studies, the study examines the overlapping complexity of policy fields between security, development, and human rights. It aims to explore the evolving character of interrelated conceptual frameworks in security, development, and human rights and the intersection thereof. Through the analysis of case studies, this paper also aims to understand how these frameworks have been put into practice (programming, strategies, options and consequences) and what the implications of doing so have been.

My arguments are as follows: First, new issue networks have emerged and penetrated the existing policy paradigms following the perception of new threats, the redefinition of problem formulation, and the elaboration of new policy discourses. Second, an *integrated* conceptual approach between security, development, and human rights has facilitated the redefinition of policy goals, principles, the mobilization of resources, and implementation. Both consensus/conversion and conflict over policies have prompted the necessity of cultivating the capacity of agencies involved to go beyond the norms of each policy frame in the pursuit of positive results. At stake are issues of flexibility and adaptability in the evaluation of policy development. At the same time, civil and military cooperation, as demonstrated in the multifunctional work of PRTs, has been permanently caught in an ongoing tension between the war on terror and short-term stability operation on the one hand and long-term durable peace and development on the other. The misunderstanding of multi-agency PRT as interim stability operation paving the way for long-term reconstruction and development work, the blurring of policy boundaries with conflicting priorities of agendas, patchwork-like development projects and security initiatives accompanied by civilian causalities, inadequate use of resources, insufficient knowledge of local institutional settings, as well as the elusive role of local actors (notably political elites, the warlords, and the Taliban) are all responsible for such development.

To elaborate these arguments, chapter two adopts an institutional network governance framework with a focus on the consensus and conflict dimensions of policy networks at institutional and interactions levels and the complex interplay between security, development, and human rights. Based on this institutional network governance framework, chapter three detects the emergence of the concepts of CIMIC and PRTs as an overlap issue and examines the US and German military missions in Afghanistan. Chapter four then assesses the interplay found in the practice of PRTs and implications of such interplay for policy networks.

Exploring the Nexus between Security, Development and Human Rights – An Institutional Policy Network Governance Framework

Contrary to the relatively clear division between high politics (within which security issues enjoy high priority) and low politics (within which development and human rights issues are regarded as secondary) in foreign policy arenas during the Cold War, the past two decades have seen the increasing importance of development and human rights issues in relation to national and global security issues. While a widening and deepening sense of "security" has begun to include a people-centered approach (making the nexus between development, security, and peace crucial in development thinking and practice) (Uvin, 2002), epistemic and NGOs communities have also elaborated new strategies to address the nexus of security,

development, and human rights (Nelson/Dorsey, 2003; Painter, 2004). The relationship between pervasive human rights violations, the lack of access to education and resources, and the root causes of conflict and insecurity are clear.[9] How has this linkage between security, development, and human rights been approached? To what extent has this linkage prompted framework conflicts and a paradigm change of each policy area?

Institutional Policy Networks Governance and Its Consensus/Conflict Dimensions

The study of governance networks involves the discovery of non-hierarchical forms of governance based on negotiated interaction between a plurality of public, semi-public, and private actors (Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 3). It argues that policy, defined as a desired outcome, is a result of governing processes. These processes are no longer fully controlled by the government but are increasingly subject to a variety of actors whose interactions give rise to a relatively stable pattern of policy-making that constitutes a specific form of regulation or mode of *pluricentric* coordination (Mayntz, 1993). Correspondingly, the term "network" seems to have become a new paradigm of fragmentation, complexity, and new social dynamics (Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 5; Börzel, 1998) in which structures for communication and interaction between a variety of actors emerge and become stable. Besides formally institutionalized decision-makers, networks include many interconnected actors, each of which draw on particular resources to influence the way public and private policies are formulated and implemented (Marin/Mayntz, 1991). In this sense, a governance network involves a relatively stable horizontal articulation of interdependent but operationally autonomous actors. These actors interact through negotiations, which take place within a regulative, normative, cognitive, and imaginary framework. This framework is self-regulating within limits set by external agencies and contributes to the production of public purpose (Sørensen /Torfing, 2007a: 9). In particular, as Sørensen/Torfing argue, governance networks as a distinctive mechanism of governance distinguish themselves from the hierarchical control of the state and the competitive regulation of the market, in which a reflexive rationality often dominates decision-making and the question of compliance through the generation of generalized trust and political obligation over time becomes sustained by self-constituted rules and norms (Sørensen/Torfing, 2007a: 11-12).

At the same time, the role of the institutional setting and processualism as a part of the broader conditions for the functioning of governance networks cannot be ignored. For one thing, as argued by Maynard-Moody/Herbert, administrative policy making is a separate, distinguishable process, not a stage or component of legislative policy-making. The institutional setting has a major influence on policy ideas, choices, and actions. Administrative agencies form a distinct institutional setting for policy politics and setting influences for policy outcomes (Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989). The subservient role of administrative agencies in the terminology of implementation is therefore conceptually flawed. The institutionalization process is circular: Agencies and programs are created to implement specific policies. Once established, they develop their own norms, rules, and procedures that become difficult to change or redirect (Maynard-Moody/Herbert, 1989: 140). Furthermore, the idea of institutional processualism pertains to the capacity of institutions to elicit reasons for public policy that form the appropriate grounds for those policies (Barzelay/Gallego, 2006; Zeisberg, 2010). Such a processualism can serve as a praxis concept for the evaluation of the legitimacy of governmental processes; it can also open constitutional theory to empirical investigation regarding the extent to which institutions can and do foster the processualist ideal. Meanwhile, the institutional setting and processualism as praxis concepts may encounter their limits, where new policy options are created and a strong degree of adaptability and efficient coordination work among administrative agencies is highly desirable. In particular, as Sutton points out, a

"linear model" of policy-making, characterized by objective analysis of options and separation of policy from implementation, is inadequate. Instead, policy-process and policy implementation are best understood as a "chaos of purposes and accidents."[10]

The adoption of governance networks from an institutionalist perspective is supposed to examine whether and how consensus building and the development of their own logic of appropriateness to tackle complex, uncertain, and conflict-ridden policy problems and to reduce the risk of implementation resistance are on the right track (March/Olsen 1995: 27). At the same time, disturbances such as fluctuations in the composition of network actors, the presence of unresolved tensions and conflicts, weak and ineffective leadership, and frustration over the lack of clear results can reduce the possibilities of optimizing the functioning of governance networks on all dimensions (Klijn/Koppenjan, 2004; Scharpf, 1993). In addition, governance networks may increasingly be a challenge to governability, as they become autonomous and resist central guidance (Rhodes, 1996).

In view of the existence of different opinions with regard to the essential characteristics of the policy network phenomenon, one may need to re-assesses the concepts of "issue networks," "arenas" and "policy networks", address problems *across* networks, and explore the implications of consensus and conflict in policy networks at institutional and interaction levels.[11] Due to the specific issues at stake, the characteristics of the wider policy area or the particular historical development of interaction processes, "policy networks" may be conceived and develop differently. Lowi uses the term "arenas" and argues that depending on the nature and intensity of conflict or the clash of interests between a set of actors, a specific configuration of actors or "arena" develops. Some arenas have a more pluralist (open) character; others tend toward a more elitist (exclusive) structure (Lowi, 1963). In case problems cut across networks, interaction is possibly hampered by the presence of a variety of frames, paradigms, or policy cores firmly anchored in the networks of which the various representatives are a part. In that case, fundamental policy controversies may develop in which parties question each other's policy cores. Frame conflicts may also emerge when parties dispute whose frames are to be applied (Rein/Schön, 1986). Finally, a lack of joint values, shared language, and common rules may result in a "dialogue of the deaf," which blocks the realization of joint solutions and the tackling of societal problems (Klijn/Koopenjan, 2004; Koopenjan, 2007:146).

The overlapping dimension between policy networks may prompt the development of consensus-building, policy integration or conversion, or conflict in varying degrees. Koppenjan notes that while both consensus and conflict perform important positive functions in policy networks, *too much* or *too little* consensus or conflict may make governance networks dysfunctional (Koopenjan, 2007:150). At the institutional level, consensus is an expression of the degree to which actors within the network have learned to interact. Conversion, in which inter-agency coordination among different policy networks is deemed to be institutionalized and the question of policy coherence becomes crucial, may emerge on the one hand. On the other hand, excessive consensus leads to a systematic oppression of problems, interests; and parties; too little consensus means that an institutionalized practice hardly exists. At the process level, consensus is a necessary precondition for interaction in situations of interdependency. However, too much consensus at this level means a lack of participation, options, and variety; too little consensus may lead to the escalation of conflicts.

At the institutional level, the presence of conflict indicates that the network is neither completely closed nor static, as the institutionalized values, norms, frames and rules are questioned. Excessive conflict means that a network may disintegrate; too little conflict leads to insufficient articulation of interests and inadequate allocation of resources and use of capacities within the network. At the interaction level, conflict may contribute to the articulation of formerly underrepresented interests, trigger the mobilization of new resources, information and

research, and promote the transparency of processes. However, excessive conflict at this level may lead to the stagnation of problem-solving; too little conflict within interactions may lead to the exclusion of important insights, interests, and options.

The implications of consensus and conflict within policy networks at both institutional and interaction levels are summarized in the table 2.1. It yields some important insights into good network governance. Instead of emphasizing consensus building and conflict regulation, efforts should be made to prevent and reverse overinvestment in consensus building and to pursue a *healthy* degree of conflict (Koppenjan, 2007: 149-50).

		Institutional level	**Interaction level**
Consensus / Conversion	Too much	Systematic exclusion of interests and parties; non-transparency; merging of policy paradigms, clear policy priorities and preferences	Exclusion or ignorance of problem perceptions, information, alternatives and innovation
	Functional	Offers certainty in uncertain setting; moderate conflict through enduring relations, adoption of cross-over policy perspectives	Simplifies and facilitates policy formation and implementation, problem-solving; reduces transaction costs
	Too little	No sustainable institutional arrangements or solutions	lack of trust; interaction is not brought about or reaches deadlock
Conflict / Division	Too much	Hinders process; network disintegrates	mistrust; competition for resources; high transaction costs; solutions are not brought about or are ineffective; with negative consequences for relations
	Functional	Prevents closeness; does justice to pluriformity; promotes transparency, conflict management, fruitful policy evaluation	has mobilizing and accelerating effects; contributes to information provision, variety, quality and innovation
	Too little	Insufficient articulation of interests; inadequate planning and allocation of resources and use of capacities	Lack of commitment and variety; centralized or little mobilization of resources

Table 2.1: Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at institutional and interaction levels within policy networks (a modified version based on Koppenjan 2007: 151)

Changing Paradigms? The Interplay between "Security," "Development," and "Human Rights" from the Perspective of Network Governance

Security issues networks are traditionally rooted in a neorealist understanding of security, which primarily focuses on the state as both the subject as well as the object of security policy (Waltz, 1979). The state is conceptualized as the only legitimate provider of security. Only the state possesses the capabilities which are necessary to ensure sovereignty, national security, and territorial integrity against competing states within an anarchic international system. Therefore, military security and material capabilities are emphasized. Similarly, the neoinstitutionalist understanding of security considers the state to be the main subject and object of security policy (Krasner, 1983). Moreover, the merits of international institutions in general and international regimes more specifically as the most promising means

for ensuring the provision of security for a state (Keohane/Nye, 1977) can be considered on two levels. First, security regimes, i. e. "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectation converge" (Krasner, 1983: 1) in the security area might mitigate concrete conflicts among their participants and prevent violent conflict management. Secondly, international regimes in the policy fields of environment or human rights might serve as arenas in which states can practice non-violent mechanisms of conflict settlement. This practice might later on spill over into issue areas more directly related to security policy and thus contribute to the amelioration of conflicts through collective efforts.

In addition to traditional military threats studies, a variety of broadening understandings of security emerge in critical security studies (Tickner, 1995; Ullmann, 1983; Buzan et al., 1997; Wæver, 1997, 2000; Burgess, 2007). A broadened understanding of security considers non-military threats from outside and inside a state, such as environmental scarcity and degradation, spread of diseases, mass refugee movements, terrorism, or nuclear catastrophes. Ullman suggests a similar broadening of national security, without considering its deepening (Ullman, 1983: 133-135). The state is still in the center of such a broadening understanding of security, where terms such as economic security, environmental security, social security, or military security only indicate different forms (and *not* fundamentally different concepts) of security (Ullman, 1983: 152; Baldwin, 1997: 23). In comparison, the emergence of the concept of "human security" (HS) in the 1990s as a response to two changing dimensions of the international order —referred to as globalization and the end of the Cold War— entails both a deepened as well as broadened understanding of security. To date, these political and economic transformations have increased the risk of internal conflict and shifted the locus of "insecurity" from the nation state and its allies to the individual and the community. This shift has led to the recognition that to protect and promote human development in the future, donors will first have to address the issue of human security—the question of security in people's daily lives (Leaning/Ari, 2000), which involves four distinctive features: a focus on the individual, a concern with values of personal safety and freedom, the consideration of indirect threats, and an emphasis on non-coercive means (Bajpai, 2000).

In particular, coupled with the introduction of R2P, HS as a new security framework has fundamentally challenged the core frames of traditional security policy and offered new perspectives in connection with both development and human rights policies. The objective of human security is to safeguard the vital cores of all human lives from critical, pervasive threats in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment.[12] In other words, the security agenda from a broadening and deepening perspective is supposed not only to address those critical pervasive threats that cut into the core activities and functions of human lives in large scale but also pursue the goal of human fulfilment, with the focus on a limited core of individual activities and abilities (i.e. on a fundamental subset of human development and human rights). Lack of human security, for example, has adverse consequences on economic growth and poverty and thereby on development. Also, the lack of development, or imbalanced development that involves sharp horizontal inequalities, is an important cause of conflict with consequences of human rights violations (Stewart, 2004: 1). The widening and deepening understanding of security with two referent objects (state- and human-/people-centered) thus constitutes an evolving dialectic relation that offers a promising way to address the contemporary security agenda of state, trans-state, and intra-state security issues and the connections between them (Kerr, 2003). Furthermore, the HS framework enables a description of the realities of state failure and pervasive insecurity, therefore helping elaborate strategies in a state and taking into account agency, interests, and incentives on the part of various local, national, regional and international actors (Bøås, 2005).

The identification and fight against critical and pervasive threats and the pursuit of human fulfillment (Alkire, 2003) illustrates the intersection of security, development, and

human rights and provides new perspectives for each policy network. Figure 2.1 illustrates this overlap between security, development, and human rights.

Figure 2.1: The linkage between security, development and human rights



Area B demonstrates the convergence of the global development and security agendas. At the normative and conceptual levels, one may find that there are three types of connections between the two. First, there exist immediate impacts of security/insecurity on well-being and, consequently, on development achievements. The second type of connection involves the way in which insecurity affects (non-security) elements of development and economic growth (i. e. the ways in which it involves the *instrumental* role of security). Thirdly, one needs to explore the ways that development affects security, or the *instrumental* role of development (Stewart, 2004). Based on this conceptual convergence, the interconnectedness between security and development at policy and implementation levels can no longer be ignored. Security policies may become one part of development policy because insofar as they enhance security, they will contribute to development. Policies towards development may become part of security policies because enhanced development increases security. Hence, these connections suggest a quite radical revision of both security and development policies and their *multiple* roles. Following this revision, security is considered an *intrinsic* aspect of development and vice versa. Also, the development costs of insecurity and the ways in which development (underdevelopment and inequalities) affects security have increasingly gained attention in the process of policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation (Stewart, 2004: 11ff).

To date, both the security and development policy communities have begun to respond to this interplay between security and development. On the part of the foreign and security policy community, the European Union (EU) for example, proclaims security as a precondition for development in its European Security Strategy (ESS). It views the tackling of poverty as one of the main challenges for European security. It also adopts avenues opened up for the notion of security and pleads to make multilateralism work through the consideration of the concerns of developing countries (EU, 2003). Therefore, European policy-makers emphasize a *two-way link* between development and security to be an increasingly core tenet of EU foreign policy (Youngs, 2007).[13] On the part of the development enterprise, a typology with a new focus on food and health (in)security and several useful post-development approaches have been deliberated that put forward the notions of "ownership," "help to self-help," and "equal

partnership." These alternative views have undoubtedly challenged the dominance of the neo-liberal development approach that emphasizes economic growth, privatization, and deregulation (Hopp/ Kloke-Lesch, 2004, 2005; IHRN, 2008). Efforts have also been made to understand the intersection of development, violence, and conflict resolution practice. This task involves the deliberation of a comprehensive policy mix for both short and long term that covers the methodologies (conflict vulnerability assessments; conflict impact assessments etc.), post-conflict agenda (reconciliation; security sector reform; demobilization, disarmament and reintegration etc.), and context (political economy of peacebuilding; role of corporations; relations with the military).[14]

Area C involves the intersection between human rights and security. A variety of studies have explored this controversial relationship at different levels (for example Vincent, 1986; Forsythe, 2000). For one thing, the protection of human rights by military means will directly challenge a state's sovereignty and its territorial integrity. The normative tension of international relations rooted in the UN Charter, namely, national sovereignty and the forbidden use of force versus human rights protection via military intervention, has found some release through the introduction of the R2P doctrine. Still, R2P hinges directly on the political will of a community of states to bring it into practice, particularly in terms of the availability and consumption of military resources (Bellamy, 2006: 145; Macfarlane et al., 2004). Secondly, there exists a strong interdependence between human rights violations and intractable conflicts at local, national, regional, and global levels: Abuse of human rights often leads to conflicts that threaten national and regional security, and conflict typically results in human rights violations. Thus, human rights and security issues in foreign policy have often been treated either as incompatible or assigned a narrow instrumental role to fulfil their political functions. Finally, the introduction of the R2P doctrine and the emphasis on military action has raised broader questions about the relationship between humanitarian action, development efforts, and military intervention in the post-intervention phase.[15] Meanwhile, the notion of HS seems to offer an alternative perspective, as the state is expected to elaborate concepts, strategies, and measures that will address critical and pervasive threats effectively and ensure both national security and human fulfillment. Finally, the HS framework can give new impulses for the conceptualization of international human rights, as it embodies the security concerns of societies and unravels insecurity issues where the most vulnerable can articulate their security and human rights in their own terms, without being excluded and alienated (Aballero-Anthony, 2004).

Area D involves the intersection between human rights and development. To be sure, human rights as internationally recognized standards constitute a basis for the accountability of governments, corporations, and NGOs. Human rights have become not only a new source of influence for NGOs' advocacy, but they have also challenged the market-dominated view of development that has prevailed since the 1980s. Development policy-makers and practitioners have recognized that international development agencies (IDAs), both multilateral and bilateral, must promote and protect international human rights when (in collaboration with the national and local governments) they engage in "development projects" that affect directly the basic needs and interests of local populations (Paul, 1988-89: 67). In this spirit, the UNDP's 2000 Human Development Report forcefully argues that development strategies must be anchored in human rights reasoning and must be influenced very early: in their conception and implementation. Ramcharan also underlines the change of UN work by *mainstreaming* human rights, which is critical for a successful development strategy (Ramcharan, 2004: 41-42). In particular, both human rights and development NGOs communities have adopted the following new approaches to address this intersection that have already had important implications for donor agencies and governments: a human rights-based approach (HRBA) to development,

joint advocacy work, and expanded attention to economic and social rights among human rights groups (Nelson/Dorsey, 2003).[16]

Finally, **Area A** deals with the overlap of security, development, and human rights, which embodies new threats and insecurities (e.g. new forms of nationalism, ethnic conflicts and civil war, information technology, biological and chemical warfare, resource conflicts, pandemics, mass migrations, transnational terrorism, and environmental dangers). Many of the significant risks arising from human and natural interactions do not emerge at global or local levels, but at *intermediate* scales. Therefore, concepts like "sustainable security," "sustainable development," and "HRBA" have become crucial in the examination of both opportunities as well as threats to security in order to offer implications for possible agenda of action, including *interconnected* frameworks, coalitions for change, interlocking institutional arrangements and disaggregated goals and indicators (Khagram et al., 2003). As material sufficiency lies at the core of human security, problems of poverty and deepening inequality that manifest structural human rights abuses are central concerns in both the security and development policy agendas (Thomas, 2001). In particular, recognizing the usefulness of the HS framework as it extends the understanding of security beyond state borders, the UN has called for a more *holistic* approach, focusing on people and their protection and empowerment so that natural and man-made disasters, such as hunger, disease, and socio-economic inequality can be effectively tackled. Thus, a consensus gradually emerges in the international community regarding the responsibility of the state to care *not only* for the wellbeing of its citizens, *but also* for people that may be threatened wherever they may be (UN GA, 2007).

In short, in view of the interconnectedness and interdependence between security, development and human rights, their interplay has been addressed not only in form of a critical conceptual assessment but also in policy design and implementation, both from a widening and deepening perspective in each policy field involved. It follows that the embracement of new concepts, discourses and approaches such as "the HS framework" (supported by the method of the assessment of pervasive threats and insecurity), "sustainable security," "sustainable development," and "a HRBA to development" has challenged existing core values and principles in each policy frame. The extent to which the formation and functioning of policy networks can healthily and effectively work for the pursuit of the proclaimed objectives has thus become crucial.

This chapter has elaborated an institutional network governance framework that highlights both the dimensions of policy consensus/conversion or conflict and the interplay of security, development, and human rights. To what extent this framework can help explain the complexity of policy networks is to be tested in the following analysis of the work of CIMIC/PRTs.

Policy Networks in Practice: The US and German Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan

Since the US-led invasion in the fall of 2001 that toppled the Taliban regime, Afghanistan (its government, economy, and infrastructure and society) has been reshaped in the midst of the global anti-terror war and state- und nation-building processes, supported by major military and political involvement of outside powers, including the US, the UN and NATO. Whereas the 2001 Bonn Agreement set up the blueprint of a new Afghanistan with democratic structure and institutions, the five-year Compact adopted in 2006 in London (in the context of its Interim National Development Strategy) marked a new phase of partnership between Afghanistan and the international community, directed toward long-term capacity building (Jalali, 2007: 39). In particular, the year 2011 witnessed a meaningful change in international commitments: a considerable reduction of the military components, the strengthening of

capacity-building and training mission in the areas of governance and security[17] and the preparation for The Transformation Decade of 2015-2024 after withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)-troops on December 31, 2014 (Bundesregierung, 2010 and 2011; International Afghanistan Conference, 2011).

To date, governance in Afghanistan has involved not only in a polycentric networking system with several major communicative circles (Bothe/Fischer-Lescano, 2002), it is also characterized by a high degree of intensity and complexity of policy networks, as security, development, humanitarian, and human rights issues become increasingly intertwined in the nation-building and peacebuilding processes. How have international, national, and local actors addressed the interplay of security, development, and human rights? This section first identifies the actors involved and their focus of policy engagement. It then explores the emergence, purpose, and development of civil and military cooperation (CIMIC) in the form of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). Through the examination of US and German PRTs, some first hints of policy conversion or conflicts between security, development, and human rights will be demonstrated.

Derived from a socio-cultural and -political agent-based model, the power structure in Afghanistan can be described as having two core elements: (1) patron-client and affiliations relationships and (2) accumulation and re-distribution of resources between elite and non-elite agents (Geller/Alam, 2010: 14-15). There are six communicative circles that include international and Afghan actors. They involve hierarchical and horizontal networking forms with diverse or/and conflicting motivations, policy foci, and interests. First, legitimized by UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 and by the self-defense in the sense of the Art. 51 of the UN-Charter, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) pursues the goal to fight against *Al Qaeda* and the Taliban with the participation of military forces from Australia, Great Britain, France, Canada, and Germany under US-command. OEF's policy focus is then the pursuit of national, regional, and military security. Second, regional actors and neighbors in the form a group of *six plus two* (Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China and Turkmenistan, plus the USA and Russia) have played a significant role in the fight against transnational terrorism. Still, the role of Pakistan as a strategic partner remains controversial. On the one hand, some observe that Pakistan has changed its approach from a double-edged strategy to that of close cooperation with the US counterterrorism efforts (Ghosh, 2010). On the other hand, Pakistan continues to provide sanctuary support to the *Quetta Shura*, the *Haqqani* network, the *Hekmatyar* group and *Al Qaeda.* Key Afghan policy-makers have asked for more clarity with regard to the question of who are friends and foes in the midst of the global anti-terror war (Spanta, 2010). The policy focus of regional actors then involves military and political security issues and the maintenance of spheres of influence (Pakistan in particular).

Third, there exists the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan (UNSMA), established by the UN General Assembly in December 1993 to seek the views of a broad spectrum of Afghanistan's political leadership on how the UN could assist the country to bring about national reconstruction. Its Special Representative for Afghanistan has a mandate to manage *peacemaking* activities involving the warring parties and others concerned, with a view to facilitating the establishment of a fully representative multi-ethnic and broad-based government. The UNSMA's major concerns involve political stability and development issues. Fourth, there are warlords, the Taliban, the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP), and the Afghan central government. Though Afghan warlords—without Taliban participation—signed the 2001 Bonn Agreement that settled the provisional arrangements for the re-establishment of permanent government institutions, many Afghan local leaders have held and still hold a skeptical and resistant attitude toward the Bonn Agreement, which designs a model of central democracy. A strong central democratic government would threaten their power spheres at the local level. Therefore, many such groups

are ready to adopt militant methods (including the support of Islamic fundamentalists, terrorists, insurgents, and criminals) to defend their political, economic, and tribal interests.[18] It follows that the major concern of Afghan local and national leaders largely diverges. On the one hand, local warlords focus on the question of ethnic political representation and narrow tribal and economic concerns. Despite its limited coercive capacity, the Afghan central government has to fulfill its political role as mediator among divergent local interests and also as a reliable partner toward the international donors and actors. On the other hand, ANA and the ANP are trained to take over the task of the provision of national and political security.[19]

Fifth, based on resolution 1386 of December 2001, the Security Council (SC) followed up on its security assistance pledge and authorized the member states participating in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to "take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate." The SC has clearly stated that the ISAF is under the US Central Command, so there is no interference to the successful completion of OEF (UN document S/2001/1217). Normally, OEF has focused on the ongoing search for *Al Qaeda* and fighting remnants of the Taliban in the southern and eastern areas, although reconstruction activities are also a key part of the military strategy. The ISAF has focused on consolidating security in Kabul and its environs. Since 2003, the ISAF under NATO command has embarked on a phased expansion, scheduled to cover the whole country by November 2006. In other words, ISAF's policy focus prioritizes the provision of military security, which serves as a prerequisite for the carrying out of reconstruction and development projects.

Finally, there are civil actors, both internationals and Afghans themselves. The UN and donor states, for example, have focused on supporting the political stabilization and building of new Afghan political institutions, reconstruction, and economic recovery. Bilateral aid for reconstruction and development has come from dozens of countries, with USAID being the largest contributor. International NGOs have also been involved in providing relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, development, and peacebuilding assistance. For example, supported by international NGOs, an Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF) was established in December 2001 with the aim of integrating the Afghan civil society into peacebuilding and reconstruction processes (Goeschel/Schnabel, 2005: 10). Moreover, a surge of private security contractors (PSC) with foreign and local employees has marked the flourishing of the out-sourcing strategy of the military to save money and time for the provision of security for its facilities. The security operations of these contractors are designed to protect traveling convoys and guard U.S. bases in troubled southern provinces such as those located in *Helmand* and *Kandahar*. At the same time, serious questions have arisen as to how these private forces are managed, when they can legally use deadly force, and what happens if they break the rules.[20]

The Emergence of the CIMIC and PRTs Concepts

The idea of the CIMIC is itself a tactical doctrine, which NATO formulated in its Directive MC 411/1 in July 2001 and later substantialized in its Allied Joint Publication (AJP-9) in June 2003. In it, CIMIC is defined as "the co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (AJP, 2003). The primary function of CIMIC is to support the military mission. Therefore, a *networking* relationship between military and civil actors shall be maintained for information, personnel and equipments exchanges so that successful military missions can be ensured. In other words, the implementation of the idea of CIMIC means that soldiers will take over humanitarian and development work in war-torn/conflict situations over a specific period, for which they are not trained. However, the logic standing behind this new concept is that as social and development activities will boost the acceptance of local populations toward the

military and thus reduce the danger of attacks, the new role of soldiers is designed to fulfill their military assignment *and* to protect military forces (Burghardt/Pietz, 2006).

The PRT concept was launched by the US in November 2002, as coalition commanders began to prepare the transition of OEF from its war fighting phases to its stabilization and reconstruction phases. The overall idea was to use small joint civil-military teams to expand the legitimacy of the central government to the regions and enhance security by supporting security sector reform and facilitating the reconstruction process. Important elements of the PRT concept include: (1) the integration of civil and military components for the generation of synergy effects in the stabilization and reconstruction processes (Schmuck, 2008: 117) and (2) the insurance of *force protection* through improved military security measures and through civil measures so that the presence of foreign personnel can be recognized by the local communities (Brandstetter, 2005; Hofman, 2008: 31). This multinational program has been characterized by an emphasis on flexibility, a proliferation of national models, and an *ad hoc* approach to security and development (Perito, 2005).

The first three PRTs were deployed by the US between December 2002 and March 2003, and the PRT Working Principles issued in February 2003 identified three areas of activity: security, reconstruction, and central government support (Perito, 2005; Hett, 2005). In addition, the principles also stated that the PRTs would engage in relief operations in certain circumstances. The US invited other countries to establish similar teams. By November 2009, a total of 26 PRTs had been established with the participation of 14 nations whose personnel came from 40 nations (VENRO, 2009). Twelve PRTs have been managed by the US-led Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A) conducting OEF, and the remaining 14 have been led by ISAF. Although the PRTs differ in size, composition, and operational style, a number of common features stand out: They are joint teams of civilian and military personnel consisting of 50-300 personnel. They are generally made up by military personnel (90-95 per cent of total), political advisors, and development experts. The level of civil-military integration varies, and each team has been tailored to ensure that they have the capabilities suited to mission requirements in their respective regions through different mixes of resources but with common components of defense, diplomatic, and development staffs (the so-called 3-D structure).

This 3-D structure is represented in all cases but with varying emphasis on the D's (Irvine, 2011: 49). A PRT is typically composed of military and civilian members with interagency and possibly multinational attachments. It will have a Headquarter (HQ) and Civil-Military Affairs (CA)/Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) sections, a civilian-led reconstruction team, engineers, security and military observer teams, linguists and interpreters, and a medical team (Jacobsen, 2005; Brandstetter, 2005). PRTs have a broad mandate that covers the following areas: (1) They engage key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces while monitoring and reporting on important political, military, and reconstruction developments; (2) they work with Afghan authorities to provide security, including support for key events such as the Constitutional *Loya Jirga,* presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia forces; (3) they assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units assigned to the provinces; (4) PRTs work closely together with the Afghan Government, the UN, other donors, and NGOs to provide needed development and humanitarian assistance.

In view of the structure of leadership, one can divide PRT into two categories: light PRT, with a hierarchical military leadership (the US, United Kingdom and New Zealand variants) and heavy PRT, with a double civil-military leadership (the German model). With the full spectrum of headquarter functions and the capability to maintain situational awareness over an extended time period, a heavy PRT guarantees a *systematic and integral* approach in identifying development requirements, decision making, and planning, as well as evaluating

progress. In contrast, a light PRT addresses security issues with a light footprint approach and is forced to concentrate these efforts and development tasks i a few persons, dealing with numerous roles and functions simultaneously (Brandstetter, 2005: 13; Ishizuka, 2007).

The US PRTs

The US drafted the idea of PRTs, but the American way of formulating and implementing this concept differs greatly from other nations' PRTs. For the US, PRTs have been convenient political instruments to contribute to their respective exit strategies by getting its allies into the country and pull its forces out (Irvine, 2011: 27). The US approach is based on the traditional strategies of *counter-insurgency* and *winning hearts and minds*, which the US military has adopted for almost one decade in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Civil actors in the PRTs are subordinated under military leadership. They all pursue the goals formulated in OEF, namely, the uprooting of transnational terrorism (*Al Qaeda* and the Taliban) and the pursuit of sustainable stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan.

At the institutional level, the entire PRT program is designed to benefit from an agreed upon concept of operations and an effective *central* coordinating authority. Its model features a complement of approximately 50 to 100 members (most of them from the military and three civilian government representatives from the State Department, the Agency for International Development (USAID) and from the Department of Agriculture (USDA)). There is also usually an Afghan representative from the Ministry of the Interior on the PRT. To be sure, the US PRTs profit from *interagency* delimitation of civilian and military roles and improved civilian agency staffing, funding, and administrative support (Perito, 2005). They focus on issues of governance, force protection, and quick impact development projects. Of great importance in each PRT is the Civil Military Operation Center (CMOC), which coordinates the work of PRTs with humanitarian organizations. Civil Affairs Teams and civil experts are responsible for the deliverance of services in less secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan. For example, USAID's field program officers monitor all US reconstruction and development efforts. They work to build relationships with local leaders, identify local needs, and report on significant developments.

While most US PRTs have retained the original PRT model (that emphasizes hierarchical military leadership), efforts have also been made to adopt the German model of the PRT: a double civil-military leadership (Schmunk, 2008: 117). The PRT for Panjshir-Tal has been led by both the US military and a representative from the State Department, Tom Kelsey. As Kelsey noted, a visit made by the US and Afghan leaders in June 2009 highlighted the success Panjshir has achieved with the assistance of the PRT in security, governance, and development, which "has become a model for the rest of Afghanistan."[21]

In particular, the US PRTs in Regional-Command-East have demonstrated how the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements (from training, fielding, and funding, to partnership with maneuver units in the field) can be brought together to create the desired stabilizing effects in a Counter-Insurgency (COIN) effort (McCaffrey, 2009). They have been required to adjust their mindset to think about kinetic and non-kinetic operations, serving both as a security *and* development agency at the same time.[22] For example, as officers and soldiers carry out a mission to reopen a school in Afghanistan, it fits rightly into the Army's counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN): protect the people, provide them with security and government services, and they will turn away from insurgency (Klein, 2010a).[23] The question at stake is no longer how the enemy can be engaged, but how the local district governor can be engaged. This counterinsurgency doctrine has already found positive resonance among Afghan and Pakistani leaders.

Meanwhile, the effects of the rules of engagement remain limited, as soldiers involved in PRTs often find themselves trapped by the dilemma of self-protection and prohibition to harm a civilian. Frustrations and uncertainties emerge when PRT efforts appear to be in vain and when "winning over" the local people does not produce concrete results.[24] In particular, critics find that reconstruction projects have suffered from a lack of coordination and oversight. Military involvement in development brought criticism from relief agencies that claimed such tactics put development experts at risk by blurring the distinction between combatants and humanitarian workers (VENRO, 2009). Worse, in view of the surge of international and local PSCs, the local population in urban and rural areas alike had difficulties in clearly differentiating between PSCs and the existing international military establishment (including the PRTs), which appeared to further reduce the likelihood of PRTs' success in winning the hearts and minds of the Afghan people (Swisspeace, 2007: 28). Even though US PRTs have striven to refine their medial cultural program in the south and east, where Pashtuns are the majority ethnic group, the work of PRTs remains largely limited, as the PRT might have become a means of serving the provider rather than the customer.[25] Finally, continuing differences and divisions between civilian representatives and military commanders regarding COIN have had negative consequences including poor coordination and deteriorating relations with the Afghan central government (WP, 2010; DeYoung, 2010).

The German PRTs

Germany's involvement in Afghanistan can be attributed to its commitment to the NATO alliance against the backdrop of the global anti-terror war rather than to important strategic interests (Runge, 2008). The German model is distinctive from the U.S. model in that it is much larger, has dual military and civilian leadership, a large force protection component, and a clear separation of the military, diplomatic, and development parts.

There are currently two German PRTs in Afghanistan, which are stationed mainly in the northern provinces (Kunduz & Fayzabad). In October 2003, the *Bundeswehr* (German federal armed forces) took over a US PRT and since then has developed a third model of PRT (besides the US and the UK models), which emerged as the first PRT in the context of ISAF and under NATO's command. In the largest German PRT, in Kunduz, there are approximately 500-600 German soldiers with civil representatives from the Federal Foreign Ministry (AA) and the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI). Unlike US and UK PRTs, which are involved mainly with military engagement and are led by the military, the German PRTs are characterized by a *double* civil and military leadership, namely led by both the AA and the Federal Ministry of the Defense (BMVg). Besides this distinction, both the BMI and the Federal Ministry of Development Cooperation (BMZ) have participated in the implementation of the German PRT concept. At the institutional level, coordination and cooperation work among four ministries is deemed to be of great advantage for a more effective result, as their cooperation should constitute an integrative *modus operandi,* conceptual and operational (*Bundesregierung*,2008; Paul, 2008: 16). The responsibilities of each ministry are clearly defined. For example, whereas the AA is responsible for the coordination of the civil aspects of PRTs and the contact with local and international decision makers, the BMZ coordinates development projects and allocates project contracts (Hett, 2005).

Though the German PRTs differ from the US and UK models, they don't carry out development projects with a large scale but rather tackle those so-called *Quick Impact Projects* (QIPs), which are deemed to produce short term results and also protect armed forces. The CIMIC projects are generally financed by the AA, BMZ, and private actors. The QIPs have been mainly financed by the *Provincial Development Funds (PDF)*. Still, in comparison with

the German operations in the Balkans, its PRTs engagement remains proportionally insufficient in Afghanistan.

The content of German PRT work consists of three aspects. First, PRT officers establish civil and military relationships with local actors, representatives of the UNAMA, and international and local NGOs. Second, PRTs are to support local reconstruction projects so that the armed forces can be well accepted and recognized by the local population and so that force protection can better be achieved. Third, PRTs are supposed to support the armed forces through the information about the area picture, local military and civil actors, as well as social, economic, medical and ethnic situations in the region involved.

In particular, ISAF pursues a long term goal, in which the principle of "self-responsibility" is the core and in which the capabilities of the ANA should be strengthened (Deutsche Bundestag, 2005, 2007). Therefore, the German PRTs have developed a local peacebuilding approach, working together with local authorities and population (Nachtwei, 2008). They have for example, established a permanent Provincial Advisory Team (PAT) to widen the areas of engagement, where PRTs are not present (in the Provinces *Takhar, Jawsan, Sar-e Pol* and *Samangan*). Also, the consulting teams are supposed to fulfill this function, too. As of 2009, German PRTs have changed the focus of their involvement toward more training work with civilian elements in the fields of security, governance, reconstruction and institution building, so that the Afghan counterparts can profit from this strategic partnering cooperation and take charge in the provision of security and stability by their own in the near future. Consequently, the transfer of German PRTs' tasks to local counterparts has run more smoothly than other PRTs models, where the restructuring process from military to civil elements has taken much more time and incurred greater costs.[26]

The German PRTs have so far received positive feedback among Afghan military and political leaders. Based on a study conducted by the BMVg, experts note that CIMICs have grown up with gathered experience. The German government also observed that international commitments including German efforts in Afghanistan have achieved significant results during the past decade. Still many things remain to be done.[27] The concept of CIMIC/PRT has become an important tool for the safeguarding of effective operations, particularly in such fluid security situations as in Afghanistan. However, PRTs' work covering security, good governance, and development issues have challenged the perceptions, capacity, and behavior of involved soldiers and officers of the *Bundeswehr,* which have a traditionally rigid structure and organization. Not only do soldiers and officers have to adapt to the new complex situations in trying to cultivate their intercultural competence, they also have to refine their military capacity in the midst of the internal restructuring process of the *Bundeswehr* (Seiffert, 2012: 79-85). The Kunduz accident in September 2009 in particular has made the issue of juridical status and security of soldiers in international criminal law more visible, as there exists a strong degree of ambivalence about the *rules of engagement* in such contested areas as in Afghanistan.[28]

Furthermore, critics express their frustrations and disappointments in several points. First, financial, human/personnel, material resources remain insufficient. Field personnel daily confront an impossible mission—to build a state without the culture of a nation state (Paul, 2008). Secondly, there are claims that these efforts are missing a coherent strategy, which is expected in the framework of successful state- and nation-building processes (Hett, 2005). Furthermore, the cooperation with local warlords, including the recruitment of former militiamen as PSCs for the protection of armed forces, has also been under attack. Finally, NGOs consider the incorporation of civil elements in the military operations to be inappropriate, as the proportion of the mixture between the civil and military elements have threatened the neutrality of NGOs and henceforth their acceptance in the population.

A comparison between the US and German PRTs is summarized in the table 3. 1.

	Structure	**Actors**	**Goals, Principles and Rules**	**Fields of engagements and strategies**
US PRTs	Hierarchy; military leadership; subordination under the global anti-terrorism war	Department of Defense (DOD); the State Department; USAID; the Department of Agriculture (USDA); private security contractors; Afghan political elites; international/US human rights and humanitarian organizations	Global anti-terror war; force protection; the pursuit of sustainable stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan	Winning hearts-and-minds-strategy; counter-terrorism; counterinsurgency (COIN); integrated sticks-and-carrots approach
German PRTs	Inter-ministerial (interagency) structure; horizontal coordination networks	Federal Ministry of Defense; Federal Ministry of Interiors; Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Federal Ministry of Development and Cooperation; German Technical Cooperation (GTZ); German civil contractors; international/German human rights and humanitarian organizations	To achieve sustainable security and stability; Assurance of democratization process; Afghan ownership in the nation-building process; Strengthening of the legitimacy of the Afghan central government in Kabul; Acceptance and recognition among the local population	PDF; PAT

Table 3.1: US and German PRTs in comparison

PRTs as Policy Instrument to Address the Overlap Issue – An Instituionalist Governenace Network Reading

The idea and formation of PRTs arose in the context of changing understandings of security (in both the widening and deepening sense) and a relativist tendency of national sovereignty, in the merging of development and security discourse and policy, in the bid for coherence in development and humanitarianism, and in the increasing politicization and instrumentalization of aid. These factors have changed the basis for action by international

actors responding to global threats and have led to new modes of intervention (Sidell, 2008). From an institutionalist network governance perspective and based on the interplay shown in the figure 2.1, the following paragraphs present some first hints of the interplay of issues between security, development, and human rights through the PRT work.

The overlap between security and development

In pursuing security, good governance and development in the state- and nationbuilding in Afghanistan, PRTs now are considered as the most appropriate policy option in a mid-range intensity of violence where instability still precludes heavy NGO involvement but where violence is not so acute that combat operations predominate. Different institutional arrangements, a constellation of resources and modes of interactions have led to different types of coordination and cooperation work between security and development agencies, IOs and NGOs. At the institutional level, as observed by an interagency team, US PRT military commanders need to incorporate civilian representatives into PRT strategy development and decision making (Feickert, 2006: 10). Civilian agencies also are asked to assign personnel with appropriate training and experience to PRTs in order to better fill key US PRT positions. In this sense, both military and civilian actors have to well tailor their resource commitment in order to facilitate policy coherence for the pursuit of policy goals. At the interactional level, whereas German PRT experience has demonstrated a constructive relationship with some development NGOs,[29] there are some NGOs that, from the very beginning, choose to distance themselves from any cooperation work with governmental agencies. They still have been able to obtain funds from Europe and establish local tribal support to carry out of their projects even in the regions under the US command.[30] Furthermore, as OED does not subordinate under a UN mandate, its PRTs work often has been viewed as part of anti-terror operations rather than as reconstruction activities. The soldiers are assigned to do COIN, for which they are not trained. This has led to a mixture between anti-terror operation and reconstruction work (Hett, 2005: 10 ff). For Afghan local communities, the question "who is doing what" has led to some kind of confusion and misunderstanding toward PRTs (their role and mandate) (Roberts, 2007).

The overlap between development and human rights

Though human rights and its promotion as a normative policy goal have not been officially incorporated in the PRT work, at the interactional level, some development projects with educational agenda to promote the rights of girls to education and the efforts of some human rights NGOs to promote gender issues within the PRTs can be viewed as creating some synergistic effects for the promotion of human rights (Roberts, 2007). For example, one lesson learned from a US PRT is that PRTs should always promote Afghan women's attendance at all provincial and district level meetings where possible.[31] At the same time, the PRT work has often prompted unrealistic expectations among the local population. As the discrepancy between expected results and reality has led to frustration and loss of trust, this loss of trust in the local population has in turn hindered the humanitarian and development work. In particular, as the NGO sector booms and NGO communities have spent up to 60 percent of their available funds *alone* for their administration and personnel costs, the Afghan government has begun to address the issue of NGOs' wasted funds and corruption in Afghanistan (Mayr, 2010; Goodhand / Sedra, 2006).

The overlap between security and human rights

At the interactional level, PRTs have confronted a cluster of contentious issues that arise in combat and non-permissive environments to cloud not only the relationship between international civilian assistance providers and international military forces but also the relationship between international military forces, the Afghan government and local communities. For one thing, the contentious issues surrounding the relationship between the international civilian assistance and the military include: the preservation of the humanitarian space that NGOs and IOs require to operate, the role of PRTs in promoting a secure environment, the use of military personnel to provide assistance, and information sharing and coordination. For example, there exist fundamental differences in the way the civilian assistance communities and military leaders conceive of a secure environment.[32] Also, the US and some of its NATO allies are engaged in their PRTs' work often to the point of merging security and assistance objectives, which has at times put their civilian counterparts in an inappropriate situation (Minear/Donini, 2006: 3). With regard to the relationship between the military and local communities, despite the strict counterinsurgency rules to minimize civilian deaths, the number of unintended collateral civilian deaths in the midst of counterinsurgency operation, as shown in NATO airstrike in September 2009, has highlighted the intrinsic tension between the maintenance of security and the protection of civilians in contested areas. In particular, as the US attempted to boost the number of alternative security forces, Human Rights Watch has documented alarming levels of abuse by the Afghan Local Police, a force created by the US in remote areas.[33]

The overlap between security, development and human rights

Has the practice of PRTs been able to ensure their proclaimed synergy effects in effectively addressing the interplay of security, development and human rights? Policy consensus and/or conflict can be recorded to be functional in the form of heavy PRTs (the German model), which means a relatively healthy degree of transparency, coordination work, policy evaluation, and trust at the institutional and interaction levels can be observed. In comparison, US PRTs in the form of light PRTs often fall short of adequate resources commitment and considering local needs (see the table 3.2). Still, the effects and success of a PRT remain highly contingent and depend on a variety of factors: the formulation of the strategic goal, mission requirement, demand of the host (local) government, and particularly the acceptance of the local population toward the stationed PRT. As long as PRTs are regarded as a part of the military, which has often prompted the recurrence of the collective memory of the past war experience and foreign invasion in Afghanistan, the credibility and success of PRTs will remain largely limited. In particular, NGOs have paid a considerably high price for such an alignment with the military in the framework of PRT work. Confronting an increasing number of aid workers (international and local) being victims of insurgencies, Donini considers this interplay of different issue networks to be a threat of the universality and neutrality of humanitarian action.[34] Hence, the functions of governance networks reflected in the work of PRTs can be considered as instrumental, where dominant security interests have striven to achieve their goals and the aligned civilian actors are often confronted with the challenges of the externality of their aid and development enterprise and the accompanied collateral damages and difficulties in carrying out their projects.

	Institutional level	**Interaction level**
US PRTs (Light PRTs)	Consensus/Conversion • **Too much:** clear policy priorities and preferences (global anti-terror war; force protection)	Consensus/Conversion • **Functional:** coordination and personnel arrangement problem between civilian and military actors
	Conflict • **Too little:** civilian embeddedness in the military structure; organizational fluctuation due to short time engagement	Conflict • **Too little:** Dependency on the breadth of capabilities of a small number of personnel; lack of consideration of the local mindset and needs
German PRTs (Heavy PRTs)	Consensus/Conversion • **Functional:** Inter-agency structure fosters mutual trust	Consensus/Conversion • **Functional:** facilitates cooperation and interfaces with civilian organizations (UN agencies and NGOs)
	Conflict • **Functional:** Each ministry maintains its resources planning authority; conflict management; fruitful policy evaluation; however certain disadvantages in the command structure	Conflict • **Functional:** has mobilizing and accelerating effects; contributes to information provision (OI: operational information)

T**able 3.2:** Consensus/Conversion and Conflict/Division at institutional and interaction levels within policy networks

Conclusions

Supported by an institutionalist network governance framework, this article addresses the intersection of security, development, and human rights through the analysis of CIMIC/PRT as a new policy approach in the complex nationbuilding in Afghanistan.

The analysis of the work of US and German PRTs shows that PRT model as an interagency and integrated policy approach has been able to fill the security-development gap (Uesugi, 2007) and prompted the redefinition of the norms and rules of each policy frame involved and called for more adaptability and widening capacity of each institution/agency involved to understand norms and rules of other policy counterparts. The PRTs have helped extend the authority of the Afghan government beyond Kabul. They have also facilitated reconstruction and dampened violence. At the same time, human rights issues have become elusive in the stability operation work of PRTs. Even while PRTs have helped pave the way from the transition toward the transformation period, where Afghan actors through strengthened capacity building can later take responsibility to guarantee the provision of security and development of their own country, PRTs fall short of addressing the underlying causes of insecurity in Afghanistan (the Taliban and *Al Qaida,* ethnic and regional rivalry, the infighting between warlords, increased lawlessness and banditry, and booming opium poppy cultivation and drug trade). In particular, due to the strong variation among different national models, the PRT model has had difficulties in measuring the effects of ongoing operations and determining whether the mission was on the right track. The methodology for assessment of progress was underdeveloped, and the participants had different appreciations of where the main challenges lay (Marklund, 2011). Thus, experts have suggested that the PRT should develop appropriate more mechanisms for the measurement of its progress and adopt a comprehensive strategy with an integrated sticks-and-carrots approach.[35] In particular, as some NGOs have successfully worked with local structures not only for the provision of security but also for the strengthening of the Afghan ownership in their development projects, the method of local embeddedness with the strong participation of local actors can surely provide innovative ideas for the modification of the PRT concept, which may efficiently address the drawbacks of the current PRT work (Schmeidl, 2006: 4).[36]

In view of the continuing weakness of the Afghan central government, whose political power has been mainly limited to the Kabul area and is still crippled by problems of corruption, many have become disillusioned about the feasibility of a Western model of presidential democracy in Afghanistan anchored in the 2001 Bonn Agreement (Baker, 2011). As noted by Biddle/Christia/Thier, the development of current politics unravels a tendency towards more decentralization—either in the form of a decentralized democracy (with federal states) or a less demanding model of mixed sovereignty—where local warlords would have more power even without democratic election and transparency. With this recognition in mind, for the US, NATO, the UN, international donors and NGOs, their major task is to work out an *acceptable* solution that would help put Afghanistan toward more security and sufficient stability in the near and long-term future (Biddle/Christia/Their, 2010).

Finally, as the dominance of security interests in the integral policy approach of PRT has often intruded into and challenged the policy frames of development activities and human rights work, the introduction of the Human Security discourse, it seems, has *yet* fundamentally transformed the traditional security paradigm. The questions of policy consensus/conversion and conflict and how they have been addressed have still been mainly caught in the (neo)realist mindset. Therefore, a possible research agenda to deepen our understanding of the nexus between security, development, and human rights may be twofold: First, a systematic uncovering of the functions of diverse horizontal interactions (cooperation, coordination, conflict and resistance) reflected in the governance networks will be needed. Second, the phenomenon of how different understandings of security, development, and human rights in different socio-cultural contexts have interacted with what paradigm conflicts and with what effects on the policy networks involved deserves more clarification.

[1] An early version of this article was presented at the 10th International CISS Millennium Conference "Global Cooperation: Alliances, Institutions, and International Relations," July 4-5, 2010, Venice, Italy. I thank Edward R. McMahon, Gavin Mount, and anonymous reviewers for helpful and constructive comments.
[2] As noted by Barnett, what once was a unilateral activity monopolized by powerful states has increasingly become a multilateral project (Barnett 2002).
[3] PCPB is defined as "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict" (Butros-Ghali 1992).
[4] For them, security between states remains a necessary condition for people's security. However, they notice that national security is insufficient to protect people's security. Canada for example has identified peacebuilding, peacekeeping, disarmament, the protection of the rights of children and economic development through rule-based trade as key areas of the HS endeavor (the so-called Ottawa/Canada approach). See Bajpai 2000: 17-20.
[5] Insights into the concept of HS in relation to global governance, development, gender equality, specific regional experience of environmental insecurity, and problems of governance and institutions. See Thomas 2001; Najam 2003; McKay 2004.
[6] Elaborated by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and adopted by the member states of the UN at the 2005 World Summit, this concept can be viewed as an attempt to make state boundaries more permeable (Broughton 2007: 3). Details about the controversies surrounding humanitarian intervention and regional responses see Macfarlane et al. 2004.
[7] The ideas of the R2P contain the more general principles of "sovereignty as responsibility," the responsibility to prevent conflict, to react, and to rebuild peace. The doctrine has particularly listed the more specific threshold criteria and operational and cautionary principles—right authority and due process—to ensure the ethical legitimacy of intervention. See ICISS 2001; Thakur 2002.
[8] The article is mainly based on desk research with sources from official documents, academic and agency papers, added by two expert interviews conducted respectively in September 2010 and March 2012.
[9] USAID finds for example that the deprivation of land rights constitutes one of root causes of food insecurity in the Greater Horn of Africa. See USAID 1994. *Breaking the Cycle of Despair: President Clinton's Initiative on the Horn of Africa. Building A Foundation for Food Security and Crisis Prevention in the Greater Horn of Africa: A Concept Paper for Discussion*. Nov. <http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ghai/cycle/causes.html>. Similarly, Womankind Worldwide, a UK-based development charity, argues that gender inequality is a root cause of poverty and insecurity in many developing countries. See Womankind Worldwide 2005. *Submission to the International Development Committee Session on Development and Conflict*. <www.womankind.org.uk>.
[10] Thus, a combination of concepts and tools from different disciplines can be deployed to put some order into the chaos, including policy narratives, policy communities, discourse analysis, regime theory, change management, and the role of street-level bureaucrats in implementation (Sutton 1999).
[11] Issue networks can be considered as *arenas* in complex policy processes. They are also occasionally an advocacy coalition where a set of actors negotiating with one another about the way to solve a specific problem or realize (or block) a particular project (Koppenjan 2007: 144-45).
[12] The action of "safeguard" means that HS is deliberately *protective*. One should develop strategies providing HS, identify the threats and then seek to prevent threats from materializing, mitigate harmful effects for those that eventuate, and help victims cope. In this sense, the vital cores of HS pertain to survival, to livelihood, and to basic dignity (Alkire 2003).
[13] At the same time, there exist some fundamental drawbacks in the ESS. It obviously omits that development is *also* a precondition for security. In some ways, the ESS is simply an exposition of European threat assessment and underlying principles to guide subsequent actions, rather than a genuine strategy – with agreed targets and objectives and detailed action plans for their achievement (Pullinger 2007).
[14] Against this background, some important concepts and approaches have been presented. For example, the "Do Not Harm" approach that strives to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian and development assistance under conditions of conflict; the concept of human security; the "global system reform" movement that infuses concerns with development and conflict nexus in all North-South relations of trade, investment, and consumption (Uvin 2002).
[15] As Kline points out, R2P raises serious challenges for relief agencies and humanitarian organizations concerned that their humanitarian work will become even more associated with military actions (Kline 2006).
[16] In a more concrete manner, the concept of HRBA to development (including the fight against poverty) is contained in five legal principles, namely: 1) application of the international human rights framework; 2) empowerment of rights holders; 3) participation in one's own development (as of right and not just as best

practice); 4) non-discrimination and prioritization of vulnerable groups; as well as 5) accountability of duty-bearers to rights-holders (for process and impact). See IHRN 2008.

[17] Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

[18] NATO Brief 2003. „Interview. Lieutenant-General Götz Gliemeroth: kommandierender General ISAF, "Issue 4. < http://152.152.96.1/docu/review/2003/issue4/german/interview.html>.

[19] As planned, some 352,000 (ANA) will be ready to defend the country the day most US army leaves. Still, troop quality is poor due to the large quotas to fill and time pressure for training. Moreover, ANA has troubles with the problems of Taliban infiltration, drug use and desertion (Baker 2011: 28).

[20] As of March 2010, there were 112,092 Department of Defense (DOD) contractors in Afghanistan, compared to approximately 79,100 uniformed personnel. In other words, contractors made up 59% of DOD's workforce in Afghanistan. The DOD established an office to oversee them. See Schwartz 2010 and Anne Flaherty 2009. "In Afghanistan, US military's 'Help Wanted' sign," *Associated Press (AP)*, March 23.

[21] Statement made by the US Ambassador Karl Eikenberry. See "ISAF: NATO forces in Afghanistan: US and Afghan Leaders visit PRT Panjshir," by Air Force Capt. Stacie N. Shafran and Army Sgt. Sean Finch Provincial Reconstruction Team Panjshir Public Affairs Office, June 15, 2009, <http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=89929864839>

[22] Soldiers are trained to act in a kinetic environment (that is Army code for a place where the likelihood of attack is great and that the military force will be called upon to employ weapons and tactics to defeat an armed enemy). Non-kinetic operations are those tasks that soldiers are asked to do that involve anything other than combat related tasks. The distribution of humanitarian aid, mentoring local officials to plan and build local infrastructure and governance capacity, and assisting in facilitating development work are all non-kinetic tasks for military forces working in a PRT setting. See Irvine 2011: 54.

[23] The COIN doctrine introduced by the former ISAF commander Stanley McChrystal has considerably changed the earlier counter-terrorism strategy of training soldiers as storm troopers to find, fix and finish the enemy.

[24] "They (the people) are sitting on the fence, waiting to see which side is stronger." (Lieutenant Reed Peeples, Dog Company, cited in Klein 2010a: 20).

[25] "You cannot reach the Pashtun people with such programs presented (Monday 'Mother Teresa' and Tuesday 'Rambo'!" Information gained via an email correspondence with the president of a German NGO "German Aid for Afghan Children" Dr. med. Reinhard Eroes, on Sept. 6, 2010. See also Jalali 2007: 37.

[26] Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

[27] Cited in VENRO 2009. See also Bundesregierung 2010 and 2011.

[28] A deadly coalition airstrike near the city of Kunduz in northern Afghanistan has killed civilians (with an overall death toll estimated as high as 70). According to NATO, the airstrike targeted militants who had stolen two fuel tankers the day before. It said that most of those killed were Taliban. On the other side, Afghan authorities said that civilians who had flocked to collect free fuel at the behest of insurgents died among them. Despite the vague details, it was supposed to be the deadliest attacks on civilians, since the introduction of strict counterinsurgency rules to minimize civilian deaths. The attack has prompted deep military consequences as well as political ramifications in Germany. Oberst Klein who commanded the airstrike resigned and has been accused of violating norms of international criminal law. The Federal Court later has decided not to pursue further judicial procedures against Oberst Klein, issued on April 16, 2010. See Generalanstalt des Bundesgerichtshof 2010; Pietsch 2012: 116-117.

[29] Information obtained through a background information interview with two officers of the Federal Ministry of the Defense (BMVg) on March 6, 2012.

[30] In times of unrest and protests, where anti-Americanism resentments re-emerge (for example, following the accidental burning Korans in February 2012), these NGOs prove to be in a safer situation than their counterparts and IOs who work with governmental agencies. See newsletter from a German NGO "Kinderhilfe-Afghanistan", issued on Feb. 25, 2012.

[31] Lesson Learned by US PRT, as reported by US DoS, Afghanistan Desk, August 2007.

[32] The military emphasizes national security, public order, stability and force protection – all of which are enhanced by assertively addressing and reducing the sources of threat. On the other hand, civilian assistance providers equate security with ensuring that the belligerents do not perceive them as a threat (Dziedzic/Seidl 2005).

[33] These militias have been accused of rape, murder, extortion, armed land grabs and human rights violations. Cited in Baker 2011: 32.

[34] "… the externality of the aid enterprise and the baggage that comes with it - values, lifestyle, attitude, and behavior of aid workers - challenge the purported universality of humanitarian action. The coherence agenda, exemplified both by the integration of humanitarian and human rights concerns within the UNAMA and by the pressures on NGOs to be part of the Coalition's 'combat team,' colors the operating environment of the aid community. And the heavy toll inflicted by insurgents and criminal elements on the security of aid workers, both Afghan and international, cuts across the three other themes and deeply affects staff morale and the ability to address critical humanitarian need" (Donini 2006: 2-3).

[35] These mechanisms may include well managed relationship with relevant actors, an agreement between these actors on the operational objectives, a systematic and structured approach to the assessment of all lines of operations, a reinforced link between planning and assessment, and adapted staff skills (Marklund 2011). A comprehensive strategy should couple the deployment of more PRTs by NATO with determined action against those causes of insecurity (Jacobsen 2005; Biddle 2010; Kissinger 2010).

[36] The development and educational work of a German NGO „ German Aid for Afghan Children" in the east of Afghanistan proves to be successful, as it has gained full support from the local population, where for example two girl schools have been established even during the Taliban regime. Information acquired through a speech given by Reinhard Eroes, president of this NGO, Sept. 2, 2010, Akademie Franz-Hitze-Haus, Muenster, Germany. Details see www.aid-for-afghan-children.com

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