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Islamization as Part of Globalization: Some Southeast Asian Examples

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Abstract

In both popular and academic imagination, Islamization and globalization are the opposing processes, representing "the clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1993,1996). In Southeast Asia, specifically, globalization is imagined as something distinctly Western and, hence, inherently at odds with Islam, while Islam, meanwhile, is seen as the natural enemy of globalization. This paper instead sees Muslims as active participants in globalization. Further, it explores the concept of "Muslim globalization" to suggest that Islam has long been a globalizing force alongside Western-based capitalism and other forces. It explores this general model by using examples primarily from Southeast Asia.

Introduction

Although academic discourse does not entirely ignore the place of Muslims in globalization (Roy, 2004, Lukens-Bull, 2000; 2005, Samad, 2008; Moghadam, 2008), popular discourse in both the West and (in our opinion, more importantly), in Southeast Asia tends to depict globalization as a process that happens *to* Muslims. In discussing the cultural impacts of the World Capitalist System on local cultures, “Westernization” typically refers to a particular kind of culture change that follows an imagined model of Western life. Westernization is often conflated with modernization, as Daniel Pipes does when he says, “...modernization requires Westernization...” (1983, p. 197). This conflation also happens in Indonesian Islamic discourse. There are those who believe that modernization can only occur by imitating Western, particularly American, cultural practices. In short, some Indonesians, and even some Muslims, seem to agree with Pipes.

To understand the processes of globalization as applied to Islam, Arjun Appadurai’s (1996) concept of the five landscapes of globalization—(1) ethnoscapas, (2) mediascapas, (3) technoscapas, (4) finanscapas, and (5) ideoscapas—provides a useful framework because each landscape is caused by a different kind of movement: Ethnoscapas are caused by the movement of people, whereas mediascapas are caused by the flow of images and other media; technoscapas are created by the movement and sharing of technology, and finanscapas reflect the movement of finances that tie us into a single global economy. Finally, ideoscapas reflect the movement of ideas and ideologies. Appadurai’s focus on five landscapes is a useful corrective to views of globalization that overemphasize only one or two dimensions. Indeed, all five kinds of culture flows exist not only within the Western world but also quite clearly in the “Muslim world.” This paper will explicitly examine Muslim examples of each of these five landscapes in order to illustrate that Islamization is not a *response* to globalization but a part of it. Further, this paper will argue that while it is true that Western-tinted globalization has historical roots in empire building, the same is true of Muslim globalization. Finally, this paper will argue that while Western globalization and Muslim globalization seem to be opposing processes, they are in fact intricately intertwined and enmeshed.

Conceptualizing Globalization

Elsewhere, Lukens-Bull defines “globalization” as a cover term for the processes by which the World Capitalist System becomes articulated with local systems, and as such, globalization may affect technology, economics, politics, culture, and religion. He argues that modernization and Westernization are part and parcel of globalization. Because these processes are integrated, it is common for globalization to seem to be Western in origin (Lukens-Bull, 2000). For Anthony Giddens (1990), globalization is first and foremost economic and only secondarily involves politics (aspects of which are part of Appadurai’s ideoscapas), migration (ethnoscapas), and the dissemination of images (imagoscapas). Giddens sees the primary institutions of late capitalism (the world capitalist economy, the nation-state system, and the international division of labor) as the primary drivers of globalization. Given this, it is easy to see why globalization is imagined as growing out of the West, as these institutions are still largely dominated by Western nations. Popular discourse in Southeast Asia also sees globalization as Western in origin for many of the same reasons.

The work of many scholars illustrates this perception of globalization as deriving from Western practices. Benjamin Barber's *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1995) describes globalization as a cultural steam roller that converts the world into a global paved parking lot full of McDonald's, Hard Rock Cafes, and MTV-pumping discos. He focuses exclusively on the West as the source of globalization. For Barber, it is Western (pop) culture that is being globalized. The only alternatives discussed by Barber are violent attempts to assert local identity. Barber's argument is interesting in regard to the Clash of Civilizations debate. Barber does not deal with either Bernard Lewis (who coined "Clash of Civilizations") or Huntington (who popularized it). Despite this, we find in Barber's work the important corrective that the "clash" is not limited to the perceived efforts of Muslims to "resist" globalization but includes all efforts to oppose global capitalism (by any party) by emphasizing local identity.

Even though Barber's and others' focus on the West is understandable, it remains mistaken. While such mistaken views of globalization do remain appropriately broad and clearly indicate the utility of applying Appadurai's schema, problematically, in such Western-centric views of globalization, Muslims are placed in a reactive relationship to the process. Elsewhere, Lukens-Bull has discussed the development of an Islamic modernity (Lukens-Bull, 2001, 2005), in which Muslims actively conceptualize modernity in such a way that it can be perceived as Islamic. In some ways, Islamic globalization does not require such reimaginings; Muslims have been long part of a globalization merely by virtue of participating in trade relationships, building empires, and spreading their faith. In short, globalization is not new, nor is it dependent upon the movement of Western practices, and such misperceptions must be corrected.

The Habermasian view of modernity argues that globalization is a product of the juxtaposition of three events—the Renaissance, the Reformation, and the discovery of the New World (Miller, 1994, p. 61)—all of which co-occurred during the beginning of what Wallerstein (1974) calls the World Capitalist System. Hence, modernization and Westernization are elements of globalization, not separate processes. The Western-based globalization that gets most of the attention has its roots in the colonial and imperialist expansion of European powers. The "othering" of Islam originates in colonialism; as political, economic, and religious "competitors," Muslims were seen as quintessentially threatening to colonial Europeans (Fernea & Malarkey, 1975, p. 184-185; Said, 1978, p. 59-60). Lukens-Bull (2000b) examines the specific ways in which colonial scholarship in Southeast Asia shaped the way Islam in the region was understood into the late 20th century. Said states that Islam became a symbol of terror, devastation, and all that was hated by Europe (1978, p. 59-60). This view of Islam served to legitimize colonial policies (Hussain, et al., 1984, p. 1).

Colonialism was the embryonic form of modern globalization. The Europeans tied together different economies through their conquest and rule of non-European cultures. Crops that were unique to different parts of the world (like corn) became so well-integrated into different economies that, for example, most Madurese are incredulous that their staple dish of mixed rice and corn is a relatively recent development (within the last few hundred years) in their diet. Other foods reflect this sort of historical globalization in their very names: The fact that a major strain of coffee is called Arabica and that the North American English slang for coffee is Java reflects the movement of that crop from the Old World to the New World.

Further, globalizing Islam is also not new (Roy, 2004, p. 29). It is simply part of an ongoing historical process. In fact, Islam is one of two globalizing religions (the other being Christianity). Christianity and Islam differ from other world religions in that their missionary

zeal is driven by the conviction that their message is meant for all of humanity and not just for a “chosen people.” Further, orthodox positions in both religions hold that their respective faiths are the only path to salvation, so there is an imperative to “invite” as much of humanity as possible to paradise by conversting. Not surprisingly, missionizing efforts within both religions are common, and these two religions have expanded further and deeper than any other faith. In a little over seven centuries, Islam has expanded beyond the Arabian Peninsula to the rest of the Middle East as well as Africa, Europe, and Asia. Indeed, missionaries and merchants were more responsible for this expansion than were migrants. Missionization is globalization with a specific religious intent.

Muslim Globalization: Theoretical Significance

In addition to refining our conception of globalization, the concept of Muslim globalization contributes to our understanding of Islam as well. It is critical to consider what ties the “Muslim world” together: What connects Sumatran (or Javanese or Malian) villagers with Rumi and his dervishes as well as with the Royal Saudi family, the Nation of Islam, and even Al-Qaeda? We must consider not only what ties them together but also what distinguishes them from each other. As Roy asserts:

The notion of a single ‘Muslim culture’ cannot survive analysis. If it refers to Islam as a religion, it is redundant. The different Muslim populations have some element in common such as diet and holidays, which are nothing more than the basic tenets of the rituals and beliefs, but in themselves they do not constitute a culture. What is beyond the strict tenets of religious rituals and beliefs refers to specific national ethnic cultures, of which Islam is just a component, even it is indistinguishable. (Roy, 2004, p. 129).

Therefore, it is critical to consider the relationships of Universal Islam, local islams, and received Islam.

Obviously there is some basic set of shared symbols, beliefs, and rituals that are found in the Qur’an and Hadith. These form the foundations of “Universal Islam.” Most discussions about Islamic texts and their relationship to local *islams* seems to suggest a unified position of the texts vis-a-vis popular practice. However, as Messick points out, Islamic texts are polyvocal (1988:637). Even with these “universal” foundations of Islam we find considerable debate and disagreement. Not all Hadith are accepted as sound and even if there is little room for debate on the soundness of Qur’anic verses, there is considerable debate on how to best interpret many passages. Lesser texts, such as works of *tafsir* (interpretation) are much more prone to sharp disagreement on a range of theological and legal questions.

“Received Islam” refers to the Islam that is taught to a particular community. A poignant example of the impact of received Islam is the traditional Javanese practice of female circumcision, in which instead of cutting the girl a ginger root is cut. Although most would argue that the Qur’an neither requires nor recommends female circumcisions, it is not uncommon in the Muslim world. The traditional Javanese version is truly illustrative of received Islam. When a Javanese girl begins menarche, the women in her family teach her how to take care of herself during her monthly cycle. They then symbolically circumcise her by placing a piece of ginger root over her genitals and cutting the root. While it is impossible to reconstruct the process that yielded this practice, two things had to take place (Feillard & Marcoes, 1998). First, someone had to teach the Javanese that female circumcision was a

requirement of Islam. Second, the Javanese had to decide that they did not want to physically cut their girls. The actual reasons are lost to history. However, the Javanese practice bilateral descent (as opposed to the patrilineal descent practiced by the Arabs and of the cultures in which FGM is more common). In general, societies with bilateral descent have greater gender parity than patrilineal societies. In this way, local Islam entered the process. Since substitutional sacrifice (e.g. the ram for Ishmael) is a foundational myth¹ in Islam, substituting ginger root for the girls' flesh is not inconsistent with Islam.

In another Javanese practice, the interaction of local concerns with received and universal Islam is even more clearly illustrated. The Javanese concept of closest kin does not align with the Islamic concept of closest kin (*muhrim*). In both systems, one cannot marry closest kin; however, due to the differences between the Javanese and Islamic concepts of closest kin, Islam permits marriages with of some types of cousins that the Javanese would consider incestuous. This is a serious matter, not least because of the implications for women of interacting with *muhrim* and non-*muhrim* men. Since Javanese culture includes a wider range of family members within the classification of *muhrim* than does Islamic culture (by including cousins among *muhrim* that Islam does not.), questions of marriageability (i.e. Islam allows the marriage of kinds of cousins the Javanese would find incestuous), ritual purification, and modesty. Islam dictates that (1) the touch of non-*muhrim* member of the opposite sex invalidates *wudhu* (ritual purity)—the thinking being that since relations with *muhrim* would be incestuous, there is no need to safeguard against sexual desire and the impurity it brings—and (2) that women should wear hijab in front of men who are not *muhrim*, both of which complicate matters of who, exactly, a woman can and cannot be in contact with. To resolve this potential conflict between Javanese and Islamic interpretations of *muhrim*, pious grandmothers, including the grandmother of Abdurrahman Wahid,² found a way to solve this conundrum. Hadith traditions are clear that children who suckle at the same breast are to be considered siblings and cannot marry. By suckling all their grandchildren, these women aligned the Islamic definition of close kin with the Javanese one, making *muhrim* of the all.

In addition to the process of local populations interacting with the universal dimension of the Islamic texts and symbol systems, there is also considerable interaction between local islams. Indonesians interact with Egyptians through studies in Cairo, and in this way, the local experience of Egypt becomes part of the Indonesian discourse about Islam. Likewise, reading and discussing the writings of such authors as Fazlur Rahman, Hasan Hanafi, and even Sayyid Qutb draw Indonesians into discourses that originated elsewhere.

These examples illustrate clear forms of Muslim globalism; despite its existence, however, Muslim globalism is not as often imagined in the West. Indeed, even the identification of Muslims by Westerners is often fraught with misperception. Olivier Roy argues that Islam is far too often conflated with Arabs, as evidenced by the fact that discussions about Muslim encounters with globalization focus on the Arab Middle East, not with Malaysia or Turkey. (This shows the extent of Western ignorance about Muslims, especially since 60% of Muslims are from South and Southeast Asia). Bernard Lewis's *What Went Wrong?* (2001) and similar books are ostensibly written to deal with issues in Islam, yet they focus entirely on the Middle East (Roy, 2004, p.12). This exclusion of the rest of the world's population of Muslims causes a misrepresentation of Islam as a whole.³ Muslim globalization extends beyond the narrow view of the Middle East, so any attempts to explain global Islam while focusing entirely on the Arab Middle East will never fully encompass the true portrait of Islam in the global context.

Olivier Roy coined the term “global Muslim” but defined the term narrowly and restricted the term to Muslims who had migrated to the West (and other non-Muslim countries). For these Muslims, Roy argues there is a need to “stress their belonging to a universal *ummah*, whether in a purely quietist way or through political action” (Roy, 2004, p. ix). Roy argues that in the context of diaspora, Muslims must seek a way to reunite the *ummah* and “delink Islam from any given culture in favor of a transnational and universal set of specific patterns (beliefs, rituals, diet, prescriptions and so on)” (Roy, 2004, p. 120).

Ethnoscapes

Roy’s concept of global Islam is too dependent on the Muslim diaspora. To be sure, the diaspora is a significant component of Muslim globalization, but the movement of people is only one of the five movements that are part of globalization. Further, it should be remembered that Appadurai’s five landscapes are not independent and that each of the movements influence the other. For example, the movement of certain technologies like print, cassette tapes, and most recently, the internet facilitate the movement of both media and ideas. Also the transfer of transportation technology increases the movement of people.

In Appadurai’s model, the movement of people creates ethnoscapes. In the contemporary world, this is often thought of in terms of migration and travel. When an Indonesian scholar pursues a graduate degree in Australia, the United States, or even Iran, the movement of that individual creates relationships and connections across the globe. The interactions that the Indonesian scholar has with fellow students and professors contribute to a global perspective for all involved. When more permanent migration occurs, it creates within the new nation a population that has concerns outside that country.

In Islamic globalization, in addition to the historical movement of merchants and missionaries, warriors, and kings, there is also the movement of pilgrims (Roy, 2004, p.109). The hajj has long reflected a movement of people central to Islamic globalization. It brings Muslims from all over the world to a single place. For example, this global aspect of the hajj compelled Malcolm X to abandon his anti-white racism; seeing Muslims of varied skin tones worship together did not fit with the Nation of Islam teaching that whites were devils (X with Haley, 1965). Historically, the hajj has had even a stronger global impact. Not only does the modern hajj include much larger numbers of pilgrims, whose trips are facilitated by air travel, it also allows for journeys of only a few weeks (as opposed to years). In the age of sail and land travel, it was common for a haji to spend a number of years in Mecca studying.

In the 19th century, the heads of many Sufi orders were Southeast Asians (Snouck Hurgronje, 1931, p. 276-9; Dhofier, 1982, p. 89). This created global networks of scholars. Roy argues that this “community of the learned” existed across linguistic and ethnic divides. Not only did this network of scholars use a common language (Arabic), the schools in which they studied and taught were remarkably comparable. However, pre-modern globalization, whether Muslim or Western (where a similar “community of the learned” existed), was confined to the intellectual elite. However, contemporary globalization is more of a mass phenomenon (Roy, 2004, p. 109). In the modern era, for example, an impressive global network of Muslims was created through the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan. Even the terror network today associated with Al-Qaeda was a global network, born in Afghanistan. Young men from all over the world were able to meet, form bonds, and create global networks. Roy avers that support of the Mujahiddin by the Saudis was an attempt to redefine fundamentalism

more along the lines of the Wahhabi pattern instead of the heretofore dominant Iranian model (2004: 291).

One consequence of Muslim migration has to do with citizenship and statelessness. When it comes to legality, citizenship is defined more by ethnic origin than by the practice of Islam, since it is possible for anyone to convert to Islam at any time. For this reason, Muslim migrants may become stateless persons due to their movement. Kuwait effectively demonstrates the potential for statelessness due to its exclusionary politics for immigration. Kuwaiti immigration policy exists as a defense mechanism with the goal of protecting the status of Kuwaiti natives since ". . . the larger the presence of non-Kuwaiti migrants, the more threatened the position of the Kuwaitis . . ." (1997, p. 7). In fact, the main delineator of legal citizenship, the Nationality Law of 1959, is consistently revised to be more and more exclusionary in order to protect existing social structures (1997, p. 48). As Roy writes, "A child born in Kuwait to a Palestinian father and a Kuwaiti mother has no citizenship" (2004, p. 105). Muslim statelessness thus has less to do with practicing Islam and more to do with the vested social interests and complex political practices in the areas to which Muslims have migrated.

Temporary migration for the purpose of education is also part of this process. For example, Al Azhar University, the oldest Islamic educational institution, is a hub for Muslims to participate in the globalization of Islam. Because Al Azhar's student base draws upon Muslims from around the world, there is a melding of various ideologies from differing cultural contexts, which allows for the creation of new discourses. For instance, Indonesian students studying at Al Azhar participate in creating a global Islamic identity, as they bring to the school the Indonesian discourse about Islam. Additionally, the local Egyptian experience becomes part of their perspective of Islam. This is brought back to the Indonesian context when they finish their studies. Indonesian Muslims also imagine a global community of Muslims, and based on that image engage with Islamic humanitarian groups. Such migration is responsible for the existence of many international partnerships. For instance, the International Islamic Council for Da'wah and Relief is based out of Cairo, Egypt, yet works with over one hundred different Islamic Aid groups across international borders, including Morocco, Indonesia, Sudan, and many others.

Technoscapes

Some modernization theorists define modernization as the scientific technology to daily practices (Ward & Rustow, 1964; Inkeles & Smith, 1974). This definition seems to have stuck; often in Indonesian discourse, "modern" means little more than the use of technology. The Indonesian Islamic community has freely borrowed scientific technology including automobiles, airplanes, and even loud speakers for sermons. Some scholars suggest that the use and reproduction of scientific technology leads to the rationalization of other aspects of society, including economics, political organization, family, culture, and religion (Waardenberg 1996:317). In other words, the use of scientific technology necessarily changes a culture. This hypothesis has been an important component for both Islamic discourse and Western scholarship about it and is best expressed by Daniel Pipes:

To escape anomy (sic), Muslims have but one choice, for modernization requires Westernization Islam does not offer an alternative way to modernize Secularism cannot be avoided. Modern science and technology require an

absorption of the thought processes which accompany them; so too, with political institutions. Because content must be emulated no less than form, the predominance of Western civilization must be acknowledged so as to be able to learn from it. European language and Western educational institutions cannot be avoided, even if the latter do encourage freethinking and easy living. Only when Muslims explicitly accept the Western model will they be in a position to technicalize and then to develop. (1983, p. 197-198)

While Pipes' cultural chauvinism is extraordinary, he does raise an important question: Can Muslims adopt the technology of the West and still hold fast to the teachings of the Prophet? Or are the values of the West (and Westernization itself) inseparable from Western technology (and modernization)? In short, does technology necessarily change culture, and does it necessarily change it in a certain direction? These questions may not have definitive answers, nor may there be uniquely Muslim technoscapes, but technoscapes are interesting aspects of Muslim dimension of globalization, nonetheless. The introduction of faster ships, and later planes, have facilitated the hajj and made for more and more pilgrims. Likewise, cassette tapes, DVDs, CDs, PA systems, computers, and cell phones are technologies from the West that have facilitated the movement of ideas in the global Islamic context. Even digital technologies have helped create new ways to interact in Islam across national contexts. Eickelman and Anderson state:

What is happening with Islam on the Internet is a forging of at least three sets of related links. One set links individual Muslims via the medium of the Internet . . . in social networks of communication What emerges with the Internet is thus a sphere of intermediate people, new interpreters, drawn from these realms, and linking them in a new social, public space of alternative voices and authorities (Eickelman & Anderson, 2003, p. 56).

A prime example of this is social networking websites such as Facebook, which speed the rate at which social connections can be made. For example, when the first author posted to his Facebook account that he was going to Cairo and wanted to meet with Indonesian students at Al-Azhar, it took less than 12 hours for the introductions to be made. The internet has become particularly important in Arab countries because traditional broadcast media remain under direct government supervision (and sometimes but not always government owned) (Hafez, 2001, p. 29)

Financescapes

Financescapes, or the movement of wealth, were primary driving forces for European colonialism. The movement of crops and other trade goods created a global economy that in time transcended specific political empires. However, if we consider history carefully, we will see that Islamic globalization was already at work at the time of European colonialism and was even a catalyst for Western globalization. We must ask, why it was, in 1492, that Isabella and Ferdinand, fresh from a war of reconquest, funded a seemingly crackpot explorer who wanted to find a Western route to India and China. The answer is rather simple: Because Europeans knew of these lands and knew of their rich trade goods, they explicitly wanted to find another route to Asia. The route they knew, the Silk Road (from Istanbul to India through the Malay Archipelago and on to China) was controlled by a well-developed trade network of Islamic states. (In fact, the history of Southeast Asian conversion to Islam is the story of kings

choosing to create political and economic alliances with Muslims.⁴ For example the king of Malacca found that conversion to Islam gave him powerful allies in his competition with Buddhist Siam to the north and Hindu Majapahit to the south (Lukens-Bull, 2006, p. 391-392). This created a “world economic system,” which is an interconnected set of local economies not tied by empire or political rule.) In any event, European powers wanted access to the trade goods of India and China without necessarily having to go through the Muslim-controlled Eastern route. Spain, in particular, having just either forcibly converted or expelled Muslims, was most interested in circumventing trade relationships with the Muslim economic network. The resulting expansion of the West created an alternative economic network which came to dominate the global economy. Western dominance in the global economy must not be interpreted to mean that Muslim economic networks completely disappeared, however. Today, OPEC is one example of a Muslim economic network; nine of the twelve member nations of OPEC are Muslim. The presence of a minority of non-Muslims nations does not significantly diminish the fact that major Muslim powers are joined in economic cooperation.

Contemporary aspects of financescapes include multi-national Shariah banks as well as financial contributions from wealthy Muslim states like Saudi Arabia and Iran to developing Muslim countries. For example, Iran has a scholarship program for Indonesian students pursuing their educations in Iran that each year brings about 700 Indonesian high school and college graduates to Iran to pursue their education as far as they would like, up through a Ph.D. Saudi Arabia also funds madrasas and colleges in Indonesia. Both of these trends have obvious feedback to ideoscapes. There are Saudi funded universities in Indonesia as well as mosques. Zachary Abuza (2003) even explores the financial networks of terror organizations and traces the flow of funds from Al-Qaeda to Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.

Because of the specific requirements for banking under Sharia, there is a particular Muslim form of financescapes. Sharia law seeks to prevent unethical economic activity by incorporating the rules and beliefs of the Muslim religion involving ethics, morality, and behavior in banking (DiVanna, 2006, p. 3; Abdul-Rahman, 2010, p. 64). Sharia banks typically must have a Sharia board governing the bank (DiVanna, 2006, p. 5). Such banks are becoming increasingly influential. Southeast Asia is one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and Islamic banks have been showing increasing interest and establishing institutions, especially in Afghanistan and India, and there are already banks established in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In short, Islamic banking in Southeast Asia presents great promise for rapid globalization of Sharia ethics in banks (Khan & Bhatti, 2008, p. 716). Sometimes the spread of Sharia banking has a “missionary” feel to it. For example, the Saudi royal family has fronted Sharia banks in Sudan (Khan and Bhatti, 2008:720). In Indonesia, Sharia banking came, in part, from the pressure of organizations like Nahdlatul Ulama which did not wish to require it to be required but for Muslims to have that option (cf. Lukens-Bull, 2005:34-36, Hefner, 1996). Again, since missionizing is a globalizing force, the missionary spread of Sharia banking demonstrates some of the mechanisms of Islamic globalization.

Migration has also lead to the spread of Islamic banking. In 2002, interest began to be shown in Sharia banking in the UK due to the 1.8 million Muslims living there, and in 2004, the first Sharia-approved bank in the UK, the Islamic Bank of Britain, was established. To allow this, Britain had to change its banking laws through the Financial Services Authority, among other agencies (DiVanna, 2006, p. 71-72). In Australia, Islamic banking is gradually increasing its number of institutions. The Muslim Community Cooperative Australia has been creating financial opportunities, including banking, investments, and real estate, since 1989 and

currently has over 8,000 customers. Even the National Australia Bank is incorporating Islamic sectors in its institution. (Khan & Bhatti, 2008, p. 721). Likewise, in North America, where there are estimated to be over 10 million Muslims, there are many Islamic financial industries that have integrated the Sharia Laws. Many of these engage in establishing and financing funds, autos, business, real estate, home mortgages, establishing funds, and medical clinics (Khan & Bhatti, 2008, p. 722). Not only has Islamic banking and financing been spreading worldwide, but many Western financing ideas have been integrated in to the Islamic sphere, providing yet another example of the two-way influence of the Western and Islamic communities on each other. In recent years, Islamic security firms, insurance companies, and financial service providers are entering the marketplace (DiVanna, 2006. p. 6).

Ideoscapes

It almost seems unnecessary to state that Muslim globalization involves the movement of ideas, beliefs, and values. On one level, it means little more than saying that Islam moved out of the Arabian Peninsula. The peaceful spread of Islam to Southeast Asia is a clearer example of the global movement of ideas. Conversion did not mark the end of the global movement of ideas among Muslims but rather the beginning. The fact that the works of Muslim intellectuals are translated out of their native languages into other Muslim vernaculars is part of the ongoing movement of ideas.

Roy's (2004) work on global Islam fails to acknowledge the fact that most Muslims do not live in diaspora and yet are still a part of globalization and global Islam. His work does not give us much sense of how Muslims in Indonesia, or Morocco, or Mali, or any Muslim-majority country for that matter, engage global Islam. In contemporary Southeast Asia, traditional Islamic schools called *pesantren* are restructuring their curricula to engage in global processes. This includes adopting a government-recognized curriculum that includes globally recognized subjects such as math, biology, and chemistry. Starting in the 1970s, these new curricula became an important part of the *pesantren* community's strategy for negotiating modernity. These changes have shaped both daily life as well as a general sense of what kind of education a *pesantren* should provide. It is common for parents to seek schools that give their children the necessary skills and knowledge to do well in the modern job market as well as the moral and religious training to be good Muslims and upstanding citizens. Contemporary *pesantren* at this level aspire to deliver both the pre-20th century *pesantren* curriculum and the newer government curriculum with the hope of graduating alumni who have the religious knowledge and morality of a religious leader as well as the basic education needed to pursue further education at the college level (Lukens-Bull, 2000, 2005).

Some have argued that the globalization of Islamic thought coming out of the Middle East is "Wahhabi colonialism." Roy argues that the long struggle of "true fundamentalists (the Wahhabis, for instance)" to separate local ethnic culture from Islam is an effort to make Islam a truly global religion that is the same everywhere. He argues:

Fundamentalism is both a product and an agent of [globalization] because it acknowledges without nostalgia the loss of pristine cultures and sees as positive the opportunity to build a universal religious identity, delinked from any specific culture, including the Western one perceived as corrupt and decadent—a constant topic of fundamentalist literature. But maybe this last twist is the real victory of [Westernization] (2004, p. 25)

Indeed, Olivier Roy suggests that the *ummah* of the neo-fundamentalist is imagined “beyond ethnicity, race, language and culture . . .” (2004, p. 272).

Mediascapes

In regard to the globalizing impact of Western media, the example I know best comes from Indonesia. In the early 1990s, the U.S. required Indonesia to import American films and television shows in order to continue to export textiles to the U.S. This policy stymied the Indonesian film industry. The number of Indonesian films was reduced from more than ninety per year to less than twenty-five per year, and most of those films were imitations of the American sex comedy (Barber, 1995, p. 91). This requirement also raised concerns about the American movie industry’s purported intention of destroying Islam and corrupting the values of Islamic societies such as Indonesia. Many Indonesians were concerned with the portrayal of scantily clad women (having bare shoulders and knees). Such concerns persist even though Appadurai asserts, “The United States is no longer the puppeteer of a world system of images but is only one node of a complex transnational construction of imaginary landscapes” (1996, p. 31). The Indonesian film industry has since recovered and now produces a wide range of films. Among these are horror films, historical adventures, and a new meta-genre: the Islamic film. I call this a meta-genre because Islamic films can be romances, historical adventures, or any other sort of film. Islamic themes even show up in sex comedies such as the *Kawin Kontrak* franchise, which deals with the idea of short term, or *muta’* marriages.

Another Islamic film, *Mengaku Raul Sesat*,⁵ deals with the issue of false prophets at a time when Indonesian society was embroiled in debates about Ahmadiyya, a transnational religious movement which self-identifies as a sect of Islam. The plot of *Mengaku Rasul: Sesat* is simple enough: girl catches guy with another girl and runs off to join an unusual boarding school, becomes drawn into a radical and errant sect of Muslims and becomes the love interest of the guru, is chased by the boy and eventually marries and murders the guru. Key features of the story include apparent miracles, claims to be a new prophet, and ultimately the revelation that the guru is in fact a pair of corrupt, manipulative, and violent con men. The film was released during the height of debates about the status of the Ahmadiyya community. While not directly addressing the issue of Ahmadiyya, the film seeks to establish attitudes toward the very idea of recently proclaimed prophets, and in so doing represents a local response to one aspect of Islamic global ethnoscaping.

Films and television programs, often in the form of bootleg DVDs from other Muslim countries, are also popular. For example, the hilarious *Upin and Ipin Ramadan Specials* which follow a group of Malaysian village pre-schoolers as the title characters experience their first (and later, their second) Ramadan in which they keep the complete fast. The main point of the two sets of specials (from consecutive years) is to teach children about Ramadan. This is a common feature of these “imports”—that Islamic values are taught. However, *Upin and Ipin* also highlight dimensions of Malay customs that make sense to Indonesian but not to Pakistanis or Saudis. The cartoon was created in the context of globalization; it shows the Muslim boys’ friendship with an Indian boy and a Chinese girl, who represent different ethnoscaping. Once created, the movie itself was globalized. Beyond being a popular bootleg in Indonesia, it is part of the Disney Channel Asia line-up.

There are obviously many other dimensions of Muslim mediascapes that limitations of time and space do not me to explore at this time. These include print Islam, cassette recorded

sermons, television preachers, as well as religious DVDs and DVD designed to create sympathy for Muslim brothers who are facing the battlefield, like *Batupun Berteriak* (Even the Stones Cry Out) about the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Baghdad Sniper series, which are only one of a whole “genre” of documentaries meant to show the atrocities of the US occupation of Iraq.

Conclusion

By applying Appadurai's five landscapes of globalization to Muslims, this paper has demonstrated some of the ways in which Muslim globalization works. Muslim globalization began the moment Islam spread to non-Arabs. As a missionizing religion, Islam not only sees itself as relevant to all humans, it ties together people from all over the world who may come from what are otherwise very diverse cultures. Historically, the missionary activities of Islam were inseparable from trade and statecraft. Whether by conquest or treaty, there was a transnational economic system dominated by Muslims that spread across most of the Old World. Once this system was established throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, Muslim globalization occurred through interconnections between local communities (through the movement of scholars and pilgrims), a process which itself shows the extent to which Muslim ethnoscaples, financescapes, and ideoscapes are interrelated. The movement of media, whether it be books, cassettes, or movies, is also part of Muslim globalization. Sometimes media is created in response to globalization and then is itself globalized.

This paper itself is in fact the product of Muslim processes of globalization. It was presented at the 2009 conference “The Implementation of Qur’anic Values and the Challenges of Globalization,” sponsored by the Center for the Study of Contemporary Indonesian Islam and Society, in Jambi, Indonesia. The organizers wanted an international conference, and so they invited a Syrian scholar and me. The prestige of running a truly international conference was important to the organizers and the attendees (even to the extent that inviting an American scholar living in Indonesia to attend the conference was not good enough; they wanted to fly “international scholars” in directly from the United States). In contrast to the idea that Muslims are somehow afraid of globalization, the desire for an international conference shows a desire to actively engage the very globalizing that Muslims are said to resist. This paper has argued that instead of thinking of Islam as *opposed to* globalization, it must be conceived of as part of it. However, Muslim globalization represents a very different dimension of globalization than that which is typically represented by global capitalism and efforts to spread Jeffersonian democracy.

¹ The anthropological usage of the term “myth” simply means “sacred story.”

² Abdurrahman Wahid was a popular ulama, the former head of Nahdatul Ulama, and the fourth President of Indonesia. His family graveyard has long been a pilgrimage site, but with his burial there, the monthly average number of pilgrims rose from 2000 to 5000.

³ Ironically, this conflation of Islam and Arab does pick up on the globalizing attempts of the Saudi-based Wahhabi movement. Neo-fundamentalist Muslims argue for the globalization of “Arab” style dress and customs in favor of local interpretations of Islam. Even if fundamentalists do not argue for the imitation of contemporary Arabs, at the very least they argue for the imitation of imagined 7th century Arabs.

⁴ This is not to deny the spiritual dimension of conversion, but simply to highlight the fact that these conversions created a network of kingdoms stretching over a large portion of the world.

⁵ I am indebted to Sharon W. Davis for her assistance with the summary and analysis of this film.

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