



...to carry on the benevolent plans which have been so meritoriously applied to the conversion of our aboriginal neighbors from the degradation and wretchedness of savage life to a participation of the improvements of which the human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state.

— James Madison,
First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1809¹



In 1803, President Thomas Jefferson designed the first official American governmental policy of relocating Indians, one that encouraged them to become farmers and integrate into the United States as citizens. The Jeffersonian approach to Indian-white relations ostensibly planned for assimilation after the Natives voluntarily relocated to the west. Jefferson and his disciples had differing opinions about the Natives but believed they had the same rights to life, liberty, and property as the whites, and that they expected the United States to uphold honorably all treaties and obligations between them. While not the only advocate of the policy named in his honor, he was the first executive given the power and authority by Congress to treat Native Americans as he saw fit.² The president envisioned much of the area west of the Mississippi as a land where the Indians could live completely separated from white society east of the river. During this separation, Indians could then abandon their tribal ways and embrace so-called civilized agriculture. Once Indians conformed to the American ideal, they could ostensibly integrate into American culture. This vision for Missouri, however, completely failed. By 1838, Americans of European descent claimed the entirety of the state. The removal of indigenous peoples from Missouri occurred in a short span of time, fewer than twenty years after statehood. This diaspora is a






During his presidency (1801-1809), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) was instrumental in shaping federal Indian policy. By purchasing Louisiana from France, he also acquired a place to which the United States could move native tribes. Jefferson was also a great advocate of the factory system, and expanded it during his presidency. (Image: Library of Congress)

remarkable, if ignoble, feat considering that more than a dozen tribes comprised of thousands of individuals either hunted or lived in the territory of Missouri. However, continuous violence, the failure to fulfill promises made to the Indians, and the inability to bind the tribes in total economic dependence on the United States all contributed to the failure of Jefferson's vision leading to the eventual triumph of the Jacksonian Ideal of forced removal.

Jefferson believed the Missouri Territory represented an excellent opportunity to solve the "Indian problem." To most Americans, the Natives were a chaotic, barely post-Stone Age people who occupied, but did not own or improve, their land. The Jefferson Ideal envisioned turning a hunter-gatherer people into citizen-farmers by ending savage behavior and peacefully enticing all Eastern tribes to move voluntarily west of the Mississippi. Not only would this transfer end conflict in the Appalachian region and Northwest Territory, it would give the Indians several generations away from encroaching white settlers, to learn, with the help of missionaries, teachers, and cultural agents, the benefits of the American agricultural civilization.³

Jefferson's goal of integration, however, was achievable only if several conditions became reality. The first was to induce all the eastern tribes to move west of the Mississippi River. Second, inter-tribal warfare, as well as raids against white settlements, needed to cease. Third, the Indians must, after moving, remain separated from all white populations while adapting to an agrarian culture. The division transcended mere racism. Jefferson was aware that unscrupulous traders were willing to sell alcohol and firearms to Natives, a volatile combination that often led to tragedy. He also wanted to keep other European powers from weaning the tribes away from American dependency. If Britain or Spain continued to supply and trade with the Natives, the entire plan failed. The Jefferson Ideal was more optimistic than realistic, for there were too many unforeseen variables unfolding to overcome, and too many assumptions about the cooperative nature of humanity. One of the glaring problems was that the majority of the white population never accepted tribes that successfully adopted the mores of the larger American society. Not surprisingly, a culture that casually overlooked the enslavement of Africans did not easily embrace coexistence with others not of European descent. In 1804, however, President Jefferson had reason to believe in his plan's eventual success.

The integration was possible, to Jefferson's way of thinking, because he believed the North American Indian was equal in mind and body to the European. As early as 1785, in a letter to Francois-Jean de Chastellux, an officer with the French expeditionary forces fighting against the British, the future president disputed the naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon's assessment of the Indian as an inferior. In an 1802 correspondence to Brother Handsome Lake, a Seneca war chief, Jefferson declared the United States would not force Indians to sell their land, nor allow private citizens to purchase directly from the tribes. This promise became federal law that same year.⁴



When Samuel Lewis published this map as "The Travellers Guide" in 1819, Missouri's application for statehood was still pending before Congress. Two years later, it would be the first state to enter the union that was entirely west of the Mississippi in the Louisiana Purchase. (Image: Cartography Associates)

Jefferson's ideas on white-Indian relations came not only from his own experiences and ideas but also from previous presidential strategies and English and American legislation. Section IX of the Articles of Confederation granted Congress the sole right to manage all dealings, including trade, with the Indians, as long as it did not supersede the rights of the individual states. The Ordinance for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs in 1786 established three Indian districts governed by superintendents responsible for implementing government policy. Article III in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 read,

The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent . . . they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall . . . be made for . . .



Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), influenced at least two generations of naturalists through his writings while the head of the Jardin du Roi (now the Jardin des Plantes) in Paris. He was also a proponent of monogenism, thinking that all races came from a common origin, which influenced some thinkers in their work on Indian relations. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)

preserving peace and friendship with them.⁵

To those who followed the Jefferson ideal, the Indians also had inalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and especially, property.


After the United States adopted the Constitution in 1789, Congress continued the policies begun under the Articles. The only other important legislation dealing with Native Americans in the last decade of the eighteenth century was the Intercourse Act of 1790, which forbade trading with Indians unless a private citizen obtained a trading license, issuable only by the president, Secretary of War, or one of the Indian Affairs superintendents. The statute also prohibited committing crimes against, or trespassing upon, any “friendly” Indians or their property, and more importantly, disallowed any private citizen or state from purchasing land from Natives. Another Intercourse Act in 1802, urged upon Congress by Jefferson and based loosely on King George III of England’s Proclamation of 1763, set the final stage for American-Indian relations until the 1830s. This law established the Mississippi River as the official boundary line between whites and Indians, forbade Americans from hunting or entering the western territory without prior

permission, prohibited white settlement upon Indian lands, and established the death penalty for the killing of an Indian. It also forbade anyone except a duly authorized government agent from forging treaties with the Natives, and it transferred power in dealing with the Indians from Congress to the president, granting the executive branch the sole discretion to deal with indigenous peoples as that office saw fit. While some of the provisions in the act changed after the Louisiana Purchase, the last two points remained in full effect, explaining why presidential policy was so important to Indians.⁶

Legislatively, Jefferson’s proposal for voluntary Indian removal became law in March 1804. The Removal Act divided the Louisiana Territory into two governmental regions: one controlled through New Orleans, the other centered in St. Louis. The Act also confirmed the right of the executive branch to establish trading houses in the territory as well as granting Indian leaders food and protection should they so choose to visit the president. Section 15 of this provision granted the president the ability to negotiate with the Indians for land east of the Mississippi in exchange for land west of the river, provided the tribe remove itself and settle on the new property. In doing so, the tribe placed itself under protection of the United States and therefore could no longer enter into agreements with any other foreign power, state, or individual. The transactions were voluntary; there is no mention of compulsion of any kind. This legislation served as the basis for Indian removal until 1830 when it was replaced, at the behest of President Andrew Jackson, with an act that gave the federal government the legal power to remove to the west those tribes who refused to relocate under the 1804 law.⁷

The Osage was the major tribe in Missouri, and it had a reputation among the Spanish and surrounding Natives as both fearsome warriors and uncooperative neighbors. Despite white fears to the contrary, however, the various Osage tribes proved receptive to American overtures. The estimated non-Indian population living in Missouri in 1804 was 6,500 whites, with a potential 2,000 available for militia duty, as well as 1,380 slaves. There were various estimates as to the number of Osage still residing in Missouri, but it was generally believed to be at least equal to the white population, not including thousands of Natives from other nations within the borders. Americans wanted closer ties with the Osage, not only for the lucrative fur trade but also because both Spain and Great Britain actively sought alliances with them. The threat of European interference from both of those empires was a real and tangible fear that overshadowed the first ten years of Osage-American relations in Missouri.⁸

After meeting with several key Osage leaders in July 1804, Jefferson promised a trading factory⁹ for the Osage. The factory system began in March 1795 when Congress authorized trading houses to supply the Natives with goods in return for furs. The factories appropriated the Indian trade from the private business sector and ostensibly placed it exclusively in the hands




The Northwest Ordinance is among the most significant documents in American constitutional history, in that it established a model for organizing western territories that became the foundation for western settlement. That settlement also put the United States government in conflict with the tribes already living there. (Image: Library of Congress)

of the government. Designed to secure the friendship and goodwill of the Indians, factories enabled the government to limit Native access to alcohol and some firearms. By law, factory traders provided quality goods to the Indians at cost, a rule not applied to the private businessmen who overcharged the Indians whenever possible. Factories also became bloodless weapons by withholding goods from hostile tribes, thus providing the blueprint for economic sanctions.¹⁰

The executive branch had exclusive power over the factories, empowered to place them anywhere in the United States and hire agents to run them. The agents reported to the Treasury Department, swore oaths of scrupulousness, were required to keep accurate records, and, beginning in 1806, to file quarterly reports. Never designed as a permanent solution, the factory system required periodic approval from Congress to continue operations. The Trading House Act of 1806 authorized the president to establish factories outside the borders of

the United States and directly preceded the establishment of factories in Missouri. To Jefferson, the trading house program was the essential lynchpin for the success of his voluntary Indian removal policy. In a letter to Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison dated February 27, 1803, the president outlined his goals by alluding to the public record, but informing the governor that because this communique “—being unofficial and private, I may with safety give you a more extensive view of our policy respecting the Indians.”¹¹

In this letter, Jefferson explained to Harrison that in order to achieve the goal of “perpetual peace with the Indian,” the United States must pursue friendly relations and do everything legally and morally possible to protect them from injuries inflicted on them by Americans. It was imperative, Jefferson continued, that the Indians become civilized farmers (men) and weavers (women). To become farmers, the government must induce the Indians to leave their vast hunting and gathering territory to accept small



When the Jefferson administration authorized the creation of Fort Osage, Indian Agent William Clark traveled west to meet with the Osage, sign a treaty, and establish the fort. The original fort was Clark's design, pictured here. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)



parcels of private property. The best way to achieve this goal was through trading houses established by men of probity. The goal of these trading houses, he explained, was not profit but rather to ensure Indian reliance on white goods. Either the Natives would use the tools of civilization wisely as farmers or become so indebted by their reliance on American goods that their only recourse would be to sell tribal lands. In this way, tribes either would join the United States as citizens or trade land in the east for land west of the Mississippi River. This policy of indebting the Indians in order to induce them to move, Jefferson asserted, was the humane way of solving the problem of uncivilized Indians within the nation's borders.¹²

Between 1808 and 1822 Missouri had five factories: Fort Osage, Arrow Rock (near the Osage River), Belle Fontaine (near St. Louis), Marais de Cygnes (near Missouri's western border), and Fort Johnson (near Hannibal). The items Indians most desired included blankets, jewelry, rouge (war paint), kitchen utensils, groceries (salt, sugar, flour, raisins, tea, coffee), drugs and medicines, tobacco, pipes, guns, and powder. While the factories offered agricultural supplies, few tribes took advantage of them. The Indians could purchase anything they desired from the factories, with the exception of playing cards and alcohol, by placing an order with the trading agent. To pay for the purchase of desired goods, Indians in Missouri provided all types of furs and pelts.¹³ Natives also produced goods that many Americans desired, such as deer tallow, bear oil, beeswax, feathers, snakeroot, lead, maple sugar, cattle, cotton, corn, feather mats, buffalo horns, deer antlers, and handicrafts. The Osage buffalo

tallow candles, for example, were so popular that even the White House in Washington used them.¹⁴

The first factory in Missouri at Fort Belle Fontaine, or Bellefontaine, located about fifteen miles west of St. Louis, opened in 1805. Fort Belle Fontaine was also the first factory west of the Mississippi River, and the first American fort as well. Designed to serve the needs of the Sac and Fox, Ioway, and Osage tribes, it proved too distant from any of those tribes to conduct regular trade. In addition, raids against each other, as well as white settlements, continued by all three tribes during their treks to and from the factory. To separate the tribes, the War Department authorized the building of two new factories closer to each Native settlement, Fort Madison in Iowa, and Fort Osage in Missouri.¹⁵

The responsibility for implementation of this policy fell to America's most famous explorers. In 1807, Meriwether Lewis became governor of the Louisiana Territory, and William Clark became a brigadier general and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for all tribes west of the Mississippi, with the exception of the Osage. Lewis, however, was little interested in tribal affairs and gladly let Clark deal with the Natives. Thus began Clark's long and illustrious career as America's premier Indian diplomat. Clark's job was not an easy one, for he constantly had to deal with tensions, sometimes even outright violence, between western tribes and newly arrived natives from the east.¹⁶

The purpose of Fort Osage was, like all factories, to cement Native reliance upon the United States. Since the Osage tribes lived exclusively west of the Mississippi, the intention was not to entice them to move but rather to cede



Fort Osage remained an Indian trade factory site until Congress disbanded the factory system in 1822. The original fort in Sibley, Missouri, east of present-day Kansas City, has been recreated by Jackson County Parks. (Image: Jean De Moss)

their claims to land in Missouri so that eastern tribes could settle there. Both Governor Lewis and the Secretary of War also instructed Clark to stop the Osage from conducting raids on whites and other tribes. The new superintendent believed the threat of ending the trade upon which that tribe depended for survival would be sufficient enticement to accomplish this daunting task.¹⁷

William Clark authored more Indian treaties than any other individual in American history. The first one was with the Osage in 1808. With this treaty, the Osage ceded three quarters of the land that comprised Missouri to the United States. As a Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Clark had full authority to conduct negotiations with all Indians in the Louisiana Purchase Territory and forward any agreements reached to Congress for approval. Between 1808 and 1825, he negotiated five more treaties with the Osage in Missouri.¹⁸

When 1808 began, the Osage were at war with the Western Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Sioux, Ioways, and Sacs and Foxes. Clark, charged with maintaining peace in Missouri, moved to St. Louis to end the fighting. The frontier town suited the superintendent well, and he remained a citizen of that city for the rest of his life, even after retiring from government service. For the present, however, he was frustrated with the Osage's unwillingness to end their raids against other tribes. This constant raiding among the Indians sometimes spilled over and involved white settlers, encouraging the first public rumblings against Indian removal from the Missouri Valley. At the urging of Frederick Bates, Secretary of the Louisiana Territory and later second governor of the state of Missouri, the president reluctantly agreed to military retaliation for the first time against the Osage. Governor Lewis, anxious to maintain peace, sent a message to several Osage chiefs informing them that if raids did

not stop, trade between the two nations would cease and their tribe with the declared outside of the United States' protection. Due to the high profitability of the Osage fur trade, the American government until this time had done everything short of military involvement to discourage attacks. With this missive, however, Governor Lewis let the Osage know he was willing to ignore attacks on the Big and Little by the many enemy tribes that surrounded the Osage.¹⁹

To avoid forced military involvement, Superintendent Clark quickly proceeded with his plans to build a factory close to the Osage. A firm Jeffersonian, he believed the quickest and best way to end Native raids was irrevocably to bind them to economic dependence on the federal government. He was also concerned about the influence of the British, whose traders had for years surreptitiously made overtures to the Osage, and the Spanish, who, although their influence had greatly waned, still posed a threat of alliance with Native tribes in the area. In August 1808, Clark, along with a military force under the command of Daniel Boone's son, Nathan, and the man the superintendent chose to run the factory, a fellow believer in the Jeffersonian ideal, George Sibley, arrived at the bluff on the Missouri River described in the Lewis and Clark expedition journals five years earlier.²⁰

While the fort and factory were under construction in September 1808, invitations to trade at the post were sent to Natives from several surrounding tribes, including the Osage, Kansa, Oto, Maha, Pawnee, Sioux, Ioway, and Sac and Fox. At first, only the Osage responded. On September 13, eighty Osage arrived from two villages, and Clark immediately held a council with the Indians, with Pierre Chouteau and his friends Paul Loise and Noel Magrain acting as interpreters. Clark explained to the Osage that due to "theft, murder, and robbery [*sic*] on the



George Sibley (1782-1863) served as factor at the Indian trade factory embedded in Fort Osage from its founding in 1808 until Congress disbanded the factory system in 1822. It was the only trade factory that showed a profit on every report to Washington. (Image: Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)

Citizens of the U.S. in this Territory ... I shall propose a line to be run between the U.S. and the Osage hunting lands ...” This line, the superintendent explained, would begin at the fort and run south to the Arkansas River, and all land south of the Missouri River and east of this line would be “given up by the Osage to the U.S. forever.”²¹

The Osage agreed, and everyone met again on September 14 to sign the treaty Clark had written overnight. The superintendent carefully read the provisions of the treaty to the gathered Osage, after which Clark and Sibley, both anxious to preserve the honor and good faith of the United States, independently wrote that the Natives eagerly signed. The twelve articles contained the following provisions: The fort would provide protection to the Osage who dwelt near it, and the factory would provide goods as long as the Natives conducted themselves in a friendly, peaceable, and honest manner toward the citizens of the United States and their allies. No other tribe could trade at the factory unless they had “smoked the Pipe of Peace” with the Osage.²² Furthermore, the United States agreed to furnish the tribe with a blacksmith and mill, pay the tribes a lump sum for the land as well as a yearly indemnity, minus compensation for any thefts or raid damages caused by members of the tribes, and assume liability for all legal claims made against the Natives.²³

With his work completed, Clark headed back to St. Louis, leaving the yet-to-be completed fort under command of Captain Eli Clemson and the factory under sole responsibility of George Sibley. However, this first version signed at the fort was never ratified. Several Osage chiefs, including the dominant war chief, Big Soldier, were absent in September. Clark arranged for a meeting with the remaining Osage leaders and presented them with a similar treaty signed at the fort. Because they had never



Besides founding St. Louis with his stepfather, Pierre Laclède, Auguste Chouteau (1749-1829) was among the prominent citizens of St. Louis in the early nineteenth century. He was a dominant figure in the lucrative St. Louis fur trade, so he knew a great deal about the tribes on the lower Missouri River. He was a key source of such information for William Clark and Meriwether Lewis before leaving on their trek in 1804 as well. (Image: Henry Hyde and Howard Conard, *Encyclopedea of the History of St. Louis*, 1899; Mary Ambler Archives, Lindenwood University)

been defeated in battle, many of the remaining Osage were reluctant. It took a year and the threat of a trade embargo to convince the remaining chiefs to sign. The main difference between the two versions was the addition of a few more miles to the Osage territory around the fort, and the removal of a special, and illegal, land grant for himself that Pierre Chouteau had included when transcribing the original treaty. Congress ratified the second treaty in 1810, and with it the American government purchased, at about ten cents an acre, fifty thousand square miles of land that included three-quarters of Missouri and the northern half of Arkansas. The only land the Osage still retained exclusively for themselves in Missouri was a band fifty

miles wide running vertically along the western border from the Missouri River to the Arkansas border.²⁴

President Jefferson, finishing his last remaining months in office, believed his plan for voluntary Indian removal was unfolding successfully, and his successor, James Madison, was content to continue his predecessor's policy. The white population west of the Mississippi River grew fast. In 1810 there were 20,845 American citizens, concentrated mainly around New Orleans and St. Louis. In Missouri, Clark's expectations of a cessation of intertribal fighting did not take place. While the Osage had agreed to give up settling the eastern portion of the region, they still claimed hunting rights in the Ozarks, and bands of hunters often could not resist raiding the settlements of relocated eastern tribes. Some of the immigrant tribes conducted raids of their own. In 1810, for example, a band of Potawatomis killed four Americans near Boone's Lick, Missouri. At Fort Osage, close to five thousand Indians gathered to live and trade, and as tribes historically hostile to the Big and Little arrived, tensions flared. A tribe of one thousand Kansa Indians proved so violent and insolent that Sibley barred them from the factory. Others who had "smoked the Pipe of Peace" with the Osage and thus were allowed to trade included Otoes, Mahas, Pawnees, Missouriias, Sioux, Ioways, and even Sacs and Foxes. Not all of the Osage were happy living among so many former enemies, however, and in 1811 many of them moved south to live along the Marias des Cygnes River. During this same year, Clark allowed the Osage to attack Ioway tribes who harassed white settlers north of the Missouri River. Even the peaceful Shawnee living along the Mississippi River were beginning to be viewed with suspicion, especially when it became known that Tecumseh, a war chief allied with the British in the Ohio Valley, had visited the settlements attempting to recruit warriors. The Missouri Shawnee rejected the overtures, however, preferring to live in peace with their white neighbors.²⁵

Despite occasional horse and property theft, Indian attacks on whites in Missouri before the War of 1812 were rare. In 1806, two Kickapoo were hanged in St. Louis for killing an American near the Osage River. While a third Indian was implicated, President Jefferson's policies forbade the execution of more than two Natives for the killing of one white. In 1809, President Monroe pardoned two Sac Indians on the recommendation of William Clark in return for a promise by the tribe for better behavior in the future. Whites who killed Indians did not face indictment, although Clark often paid the injured tribe an indemnity against any future retaliation. Unless it affected trade or white settlements, the government ignored Indian-on-Indian violence in the territory except when the Natives themselves sought legal aid. This supplication for white justice happened nine times before Missouri statehood, and, in two cases in 1806, resulted in execution. This lack of concern by the majority of whites only encouraged intertribal violence. As the white population continued to grow and expand, however, they invariably became the target for more and more raids.²⁶

By 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal of peaceful, voluntary

removal from the east to the west, where the Indians would become farmers, still seemed a viable goal. Already, several tribes had relocated to Missouri, which now was home not only to the Osage, but also the Kaskaskia (an Illini tribe), Ioway, Delaware, Shawnee, Sac, Fox, Miami, Kickapoo, Wea, and even some Cherokee along the southern border. Trade at Fort Osage was brisk and relatively free of problems. Although there were white settlers in the territory, there were not enough to cause many clashes with the relocated and resident Natives. There were, however, storm clouds gathering on the horizon. British traders, indifferent to Jefferson's plans, countered much of the factory's influence. Jay's Treaty of 1794 allowed British traders to ply their goods on American soil as long as they obeyed federal law. The British often hinted, or even told the Natives, that the United States wanted to take all of their lands. In addition, they often supplied superior goods, were willing to extend credit, and would trade whiskey. The latter two were not allowed in the American system.²⁷

Although government factories were essential to indebted the Indians, private traders, once they obtained a license, could also trade with the Natives. The competition created a problem because the factories were necessary to the Jefferson ideal to "civilize" the Natives, while private traders were only interested in profit. In Missouri, the dominant traders were Auguste and Pierre Chouteau, Manuel Lisa, Joseph Robidoux (founder of St. Joseph), and John Jacob Astor, who was quickly growing in influence and wealth. These private traders, especially Astor, were a greater threat to the Jeffersonian factory system than the British. When Congress finally ended the factory system in 1822, it also destroyed any hope of achieving the Jeffersonian ideal.²⁸

By 1811, the British military also posed a threat to Jefferson's plans. The failure by the United States economically or militarily to enforce peace gave many tribes the false idea that the English would support traditional Native existence. As Great Britain attempted to draw different tribes across the Ohio Valley and Old Northwest into an alliance against the United States, Superintendent Clark and others were acutely aware of the danger of something similar happening in Missouri. Clark sent George Sibley to the Platte River area to convince the Natives, especially the Pawnee, to continue their friendly relations with the United States. Although the Western Shawnee had rejected Tecumseh's overtures, the superintendent seriously considered "dispersing" the tribe across the territory just in case. The Osage seemed content with their American alliance, but the tribe was notorious for ignoring promises of peaceful cohabitation. The proximity of the Sac and Fox tribes posed an immediate threat to St. Louis. Not only were their settlements near, but many of the Natives had never forgiven the United States for the Treaty of 1804. If war came with Britain, Clark was certain many Sacs and Foxes would ally with America's enemy.²⁹

From 1803 to 1811, the Jeffersonian ideal seemed the perfect solution to American-Native relations. The

War of 1812 and its aftermath across the Mississippi River basin, however, ended for many the optimistic hope for peaceful coexistence. Even nature itself seemed intent on proclaiming the coming change. On December

16, 1811, and again on February 7, 1812, earthquakes devastated lands along the New Madrid fault line. The powerful shocks were felt as far away as Quebec and New York and caused the Mississippi River to briefly flow


A number of artists traveled from St. Louis westward and portrayed native tribes, but Europeans were fascinated by them as well. They were portrayed here in a French newspaper in 1827. (Image: State Historical Society of Missouri)





Manuel Lisa's home in St. Louis was also home for his fur-trading business, competing with the Chouteaus. Lisa had families in both St. Louis and among the Osage. (Image: Library of Congress)

backwards. The quakes seemed to mark a watershed for Indian-white relations in Missouri, heralding the end of semi-equanimity and marking the beginning of dominance by those of European descent.³⁰ In the years following that catastrophic event, the Jefferson ideal of voluntary assimilation rapidly fell apart. The end of the War of 1812 forever ended any British interest in allying with the Indians of the plains; thus, the United States no longer had to compete for cooperation, leaving the Natives little recourse but to accept whatever deal was proposed to them by the whites. The rapid influx of white settlers in the decades after the war quickly overwhelmed the relatively small number of Natives in the Missouri territory. Indian raids were now met with swift and terrible retribution. The disintegration of the relatively benevolent government trade monopoly into the hands of private individuals with almost no interest in the welfare of the Natives quickly destroyed any remaining dignity or culture they might have had left. While Jefferson may or may not have believed in his own plan or whether it was simply the most expedient way to clear tribes from east of the Mississippi is unclear. What is certain is that his immediate successors formulated no better or even a different plan. The result was that within a few short decades, all remaining Indians in Missouri were expelled, forced to move even further westward by a society that defined the words "benevolent plans meritoriously applied" differently from the previous generation.



St. Louis was a remarkably diverse place in some ways in the early nineteenth century. Although founded by French nationals in 1764, it was held by the Spanish until the start of the nineteenth century, then became part of the United States in 1804. Manuel Lisa (1772-1820) ranked as one of St. Louis' prominent Spanish fur traders. (Image: Missouri History Museum)

ENDNOTES

- ¹ James Madison, *James Madison, Writings*, Jack N. Rakove, ed. (New York: The Library of America, 1999), 681.
- ² Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The American Indian and the United States: A Documentary History, volume III* (New York: Random House, 1973), 2140, 2141, 2148.
- ³ Willard Hughes Rollings, *Unaffected by the Gospel: Osage Resistance to the Christian Invasion (1673–1906): A Cultural Victory* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 35; Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Indian in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 165-66.
- ⁴ *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, volume 8, 25 February to 31 October, 1785*, eds. Julian P. Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Elizabeth L. Hutter (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 184-86; Amy H. Sturgis, *Presidents from Washington through Monroe, 1789-1825* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2002), 108-9, 111.
- ⁵ Washburn, *American Indian and the United States*, 2140, 2141, 2148.
- ⁶ *Ibid.*, 2151-63.
- ⁷ U.S. Congress, *An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and Providing for the Temporary Government Thereof (a)* (Eighth Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 47, 1804).
- ⁸ William E. Parrish, Charles T. Jones, Jr., and Lawrence O. Christensen, *Missouri: The Heart of the Nation* (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1980), 14; John Joseph Mathews, *The Osages: Children of the Middle Waters* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 402-3; Kristie C. Wolferman, *The Osage in Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 60; Indian Claims Commission, *Osage Indians V: Commission Findings on the Osage Indians* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 116, 120-21; Louis F. Burns, *A History of the Osage People* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004), 133-34, 144; Fred W. Voget, *Osage Indians I* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1974), 72.
- ⁹ The factory system, created in 1796, granted the executive branch full control to interact economically, militarily, and legally with all Natives. The word “factory” was used to describe the government-owned and -controlled trading posts. These factories were not places of manufacturing, but outposts around which Indians, not white settlers, could live, trade, and interact with one another and government officials.
- ¹⁰ Ora Brooks Peake, *A History of the United States Indian Factory System, 1795-1822* (Denver: Sage Books, 1954), 1-3, 45.
- ¹¹ *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, volume X*, Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed. (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), 369; Peake, *History of the United States Indian Factory System*, 2; Washburn, *American Indian and the United States*, 2164.
- ¹² *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, v. X*, 368-73.
- ¹³ This list included deer, muskrat, beaver, bear, buffalo, mink, otter, raccoon, bobcat, panther, elk, wolf, fox, porcupine, groundhog, wild hog, and rabbit, all native to the Missouri territory.
- ¹⁴ Peake, *History of the United States Indian Factory System*, 11, 56-65, 68, 132-34.
- ¹⁵ Jay H. Buckley, *William Clark: Indian Diplomat* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 72-73.
- ¹⁶ Buckley, *William Clark*, 66, 69-70, 72, 113; John Upton Terrell, *The Six Turnings: Major Changes in the American West, 1806-1834* (Glendale, Calif.: The Arthur H. Clark Company, 1968), 50; *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIV, 1806-1814*, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), 108-9.
- ¹⁷ Indian Claims Commission, *Osage Indians V*, 114-16, 135, 137; Mathews, *Osages*, 389.
- ¹⁸ Burns, *History of the Osage People*, 167-68, 370.
- ¹⁹ Wolferman, *Osage in Missouri*, 62-64; Burns, *History of the Osage People*, 145.
- ²⁰ Burns, *History of the Osage People*, 145; Landon Y. Jones, *William Clark and the Shaping of the West* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 165-66; William Clark,

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- Westward With Dragoons: The Journal of William Clark On His Expedition to Establish Fort Osage, August 25 to September 22, 1808*, Kate L. Gregg, ed. (Fulton, Mo.: The Ovid Bell Press, Inc., 1937), 13; Buckley, *William Clark*, 73; George Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World: The Fort Osage Journals and Letters of George Sibley, 1808-1811*, Jeffrey E. Smith, ed. (St. Charles: Lindenwood University Press, 2003), 12, 58, 73, 77.
- ²¹ Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World*, 77-79; Clark, *Westward With Dragoons*, 38-39.
- ²² Clark, *Westward With Dragoons*, 64-68.
- ²³ Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World*, 80-81; Clark, *Westward With Dragoons*, 64-68; Buckley, *William Clark*, 75-76.
- ²⁴ Indian Claims Commission, *Osage Indians V*, 152, 154; Buckley, *William Clark*, 75-78; Jones, *William Clark and Shaping the West*, 168-69, 176; *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIV*, Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. and comp. (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1948), 224-25; William Clark, *Dear Brother; Letters of William Clark to Jonathan Clark*, James J. Holmberg, ed. (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002), 154, 157.
- ²⁵ Greg Olsen, *The Ioway in Missouri* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 41, 45; Jones, *William Clark and Shaping the West*, 189-90, 196-97; Mathews, *Osages*, 394; Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World*, 85, 88, 142-43, 154-55, 159, 170; Wolferman, *Osage in Missouri*, 83-84; Stephen Warren, *The Shawnee and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 79-80; Clark, *Dear Brother*, 259.
- ²⁶ Harriet C. Frazier, *Death Sentences in Missouri, 1803-2005* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2006), 11-12.
- ²⁷ Wolferman, *Osage in Missouri*, 3, 76; Buckley, *William Clark*, 103.
- ²⁸ Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World*, 511, 161, 120, 133, 174-75.
- ²⁹ Mathews, *Osages*, 401-3; Clark, *Dear Brother*, 259.
- ³⁰ Stephen Aron, *American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 148-50; Jones, *William Clark and Shaping the West*, 201; Buckley, *William Clark*, 125.