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

COVER IMAGE

Jefferson Barracks sat on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi River, and looked like this by the time of the Civil War. For more on the role of Jefferson Barracks in creating the US Calvary, see Daniel Gonzales, "Courageous and Faithful: The Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1833-1898."

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CONTENTS

The Confluence is a regional studies journal published by Lindenwood University and dedicated to the diversity of ideas and disciplines of a liberal arts university. It is committed to the intersection of history, art and architecture, design, science, social science, and public policy. Its articles are diverse by design.

the Confluence®

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

An undertaking like *The Confluence* doesn't happen without the help of many people, both within Lindenwood University and beyond. We owe particular thanks to President James Evans, Provost Jann Weitzel, and the Board of Directors at Lindenwood for supporting this venture. We'd like to take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to the following people, institutions, and companies for their contributions to this issue of *The Confluence*; we could not have done it without you.

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FROM THE EDITOR

This issue of *The Confluence* is about turning points—those moments that represent a critical change. In some cases, these are stories of capturing the moment when decisions and actions transformed the region, while others are harbingers of change; they are emblematic of broader changes nationally that played out in St. Louis.

Three of these articles point to sweeping changes in the American West. Andrew Cooperman details the activities of George Rogers Clark and others in the Illinois Country during the American War of Independence culminating with the Battle of Fort San Carlos in St. Louis, suggesting that the victory in this region precluded the British from holding the Mississippi River valley, possibly shaping political realities of the region after the war.

Two more focus on the role of St. Louis in America's Manifest Destiny. Daniel Gonzales describes the critical role of the cavalry at Jefferson Barracks as a key tool in American expansion into the western frontier between the Barracks' founding and the end of the nineteenth century. Washington Irving's account of his brief visit to St. Louis in 1832 points to this expansion as well. He lunched with noted explorer and Indian Commissioner William Clark at his country home, and pointedly asked him about York, the slave Clark took with him to the Pacific as part of the Corps of Discovery. One cannot help but wonder what Clark thought, being challenged about the status of York while surrounded by slaves serving the meal and catering to his visitor's needs. It is, therefore, the only account we have of what Clark thought happened to this fellow explorer. Irving also saw the defeated Black Hawk in prison at Jefferson Barracks, who had defiantly resisted American expansion onto Sauk and Fox land in northwestern Illinois. Black Hawk was exhibited to visitors like a zoo animal while at the Barracks, then sent to Fortress Monroe and toured around eastern cities to convince him that resistance to American expansion was pointless.

In the first of two articles, Quinta Scott examines the natural world of the region and birth of conservation in Missouri. This beautifully illustrated article traces the thinking behind efforts to see the natural world as something worthy of preservation and protection.

Finally, Sarah Siegel's compelling research focuses on a critical period in St. Louis history in the late 1940s and early 1950s and the integration of schools. She examines sources that have received scant attention on the integration of Catholic schools and, in the aftermath of the ruling in 1954, St. Louis Public Schools. By focusing the latter on Jewish students and families at Soldan High School, she offers a unique comparative perspective on this key period. Her paper is the recipient of the Tatom Award, which is given by the St. Louis Metropolitan Research Exchange for the best student paper on a St. Louis topic.

These are compelling articles on timely topics. We hope you enjoy them.

Jeffrey Smith, PhD
Editor

And lastly, Lindenwood is undergoing great change with both President James Evans retiring and Provost Jann Weitzel leaving to become president of Cottey College. Both have been strong supporters of this publication, and I want to thank both for their support over the six years we've published *The Confluence*. We all wish them both the best in their new endeavors; I know Jim will enjoy retirement, and that Jann will make a great contribution leading Cottey.

COURAGEOUS *and Faithful*

The Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks, 1833–1898



BY DANIEL GONZALES

Last Soldier of the Indian Wars at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

Courageous and Faithful: The Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks, 1833–1897

The United States Cavalry was born at Jefferson Barracks, and its purpose was to conquer the western frontier. The men who joined became the vanguard of manifest destiny and were witnesses as Native Americans made their final struggle to preserve their way of life. To understand how the western half of our nation came to be, and a proud and ancient civilization was lost, we must listen to the stories of those who served as United States mounted troops. The men who served combined the lessons of earlier dragoon and mounted ranger regiments with the leadership of strong infantry officers. They came from a variety of backgrounds. Members of the U.S. dragoons were noted as "young men of respectable families," and some of the most influential military figures of the nineteenth century, like Robert E. Lee, Jefferson Davis, John Bell Hood, and Nathan Boone (son of Daniel Boone), were included in their ranks. Most enlisted men, however, came from more humble roots. They were immigrants looking to find a path to the American dream, ex-slaves who quickly discovered that "freedom" did not mean freedom to work and live as equals, and men for whom life had hit them hard and a dangerous job with low pay on the edge of the frontier was the best path forward. For a great number of these men, Jefferson Barracks was the beginning of the journey. It was the site of organization for the first unit of cavalry in the regular army, a mustering point for the first buffalo soldiers, and the cavalry recruit depot for the entire army during much of the Indian Wars. Finally, throughout the nineteenth century, it was Jefferson Barracks that stood at the heart of the network of forts that spanned the ever-growing American frontier.

The Birth of American Cavalry

While short-lived mounted units were used beginning in 1776, it wasn't until 1833 that the first permanent unit of cavalry in the United States Army was established. In the early nineteenth century, the United States Congress pursued policies based on the philosophy of manifest destiny, or the belief in the divine right of the United States to claim land as far west as California. The first unit of permanent cavalry, the United States Dragoons, was established to help accomplish that end.

In the years that followed, Jefferson Barracks was selected as the site of organization for these early units of mounted troops.[1] The site was chosen, as Dragoon Colonel Philip St. George Cooke explained, because it was a central location for the units to be organized "after a uniform system, before it was to be thrown into actual service, operating in detached bodies among widely scattered tribes of Indians."[2] The task assigned to these early cavalrymen was monstrous. They numbered in the hundreds, but were given the mission of patrolling a 1,000 mile frontier from Texas to Minnesota populated with almost 200,000 native people and ever increasing numbers

Jefferson Barracks, c. 1841, from John Casper Wild, *Valley of the Mississippi. (Image: St. Louis County Parks)*



of white settlers.[3] In the 1830s and 40s the contributions of the mounted troops in Oregon, California, Texas, and beyond would expand United States territory by over a third and serve as a guiding force for establishing law and order in that new territory.[4]

The motivation to create the first unit of permanent cavalry came as caravans of traders began moving along the Santa Fe Trail. As they did, increasing conflict developed with native populations. The current military, made up of only infantry and artillery, proved inadequate to patrol the growing frontier. Calls began as early as 1824 for Congress to act to protect United States citizens in the western territories. Many argued that the only way to do this was to authorize a mounted force. They remained unwilling, however, as concern over a standing army and the high cost of maintaining mounted troops remained. In 1832, a Sac and Fox warrior named Black Hawk led a band of warriors to reclaim land he felt was improperly taken from his people in Illinois. The ensuing conflict, known as the Black Hawk War, left Congress with no choice but to act, and in 1833, after a failed experiment with volunteer mounted rangers, it authorized the creation of the U.S. Dragoons. The unit began formation at Jefferson Barracks in August of 1833.[5] Officers were drawn from the regular army and those who had served as mounted rangers.[6] Recruits were drawn from around the country to avoid sectional alliances, and described as "athletic young men of decent character and breeding."[7]

Despite the picturesque location of Jefferson Barracks along a bluff above the Mississippi River, the dragoons were unhappy. Poor quarters and a lack of equipment made many question their decision to join the new unit. Adding to frustrations was the fact that many new recruits had been induced into joining with promises of fine uniforms, ranking commensurate with cadets at West Point, and no menial duties, none of which proved forthcoming. These realities led to mass desertion and disorder. In order to keep the unit from falling apart, harsh penalties were introduced. Deserters could lose their citizenship, receive 50 lashes, or serve out the rest of their enlistment without pay.[8]

This painting was made from a sketch done at Jefferson Barracks in 1832. In that year, Black Hawk and five other Sac and Fox leaders were imprisoned at the post. He was escorted to Jefferson Barracks by Lieutenant Jefferson Davis. While here, they were visited by author Washington Irving, who described them as "a forlorn crew, emaciated and dejected." *(Image: National Gallery of Art)*

The 1st, 2nd, and the short-lived 3rd Dragoons served during the Mexican-American War between 1846 and 1848. This image depicts the second major battle of that war at Resaca De La Palma, a dried-out river bed filled with dense trees. At that battle, the 2nd Dragoons, led by Captain Charles A. May, led a botched charge against Mexican artillery. The unit was redeemed when it was discovered that in the process they had captured the commander of the enemy line, General Rómolo Diaz de la Vega. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

Ultimately, the unit came together, and by 1837 the Commander of the Western Department of the Army, General Edmund Gaines, found them to be "in a state of police and discipline reflecting the highest credit."[9] In the years following the unit's organization, they patrolled the western frontier. Their "pomp and precision" intimidated native tribes, allowing them to defend the west without a single battle with Native Americans until 1846.[10]

With the outbreak of the bloodiest Indian War in United States history, the Seminole War in Florida, and with the U.S. Dragoons fully occupied in the West, a new regiment designated the 2nd Dragoons was created. Authorized by Congress on May 23, 1836, it was led by Colonel David Emanuel Twiggs and Lieutenant Colonel William Selby Harney. The regiment's first five companies were sent directly into conflict in Florida. The second half of the unit reported to Jefferson Barracks for organization and training.[11] 2nd Lieutenant William Gilpin described Jefferson Barracks when he arrived as "the most beautiful and pleasant Army station in the West."[12] In October of 1837, the 2nd Dragoons left Jefferson Barracks and rode 1,200 miles to the heart of the conflict where the training of this new unit would be put to the test.[13]

Almost two decades later, in 1855, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment would be organized at Jefferson Barracks, dubbed "Jeff Davis's Pets" because of the close supervision Secretary of War Jefferson Davis gave the unit. The unit's leadership included some of the finest officers of the time including Robert E. Lee and Albert Sydney Johnston. Training of the unit went smoothly until September of 1855 when an outbreak of cholera struck. Some 22 troopers died and over 400 deserted in fear. Miraculously, the unit was able to regroup, departing the base the following month.

Created to manage the massively expanded frontier following the Mexican War, they spend the years leading up to the Civil War protecting the southern border of Texas from Comanche and Kiowa warriors, who had proven elusive as they were able to cross the border into Mexico to avoid pursuit. When the Civil War broke out, the unit like the nation, was divided. Officers served on both sides, but a majority joined Jefferson Davis in the Confederacy. Sixteen of the officers of the unit became generals during the Civil War, more than any unit before or since has produced in such a short period.[14]

Colonel Henry Dodge served as the first commander of the U.S. Dragoons. It was Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Watts Kearny, however, who led instruction and training of the new unit. Kearny took command as colonel in 1837 when Dodge retired to take on the governorship of Wisconsin Territory. Kearny was described as "at all times courteous, bland, approachable, and just, yet stern, fixed and unwavering when his decisions were once formed." Kearny was a skilled and experienced instructor. In fact, while instructing troops at Jefferson Barracks he was thrown from his horse unfazed. He quickly instructed his troops "obstacle—march" and the line passed around him like water.

Kearny was promoted to general during the Mexican American War and led the Army of the West in California. After contracting malaria in Vera Cruz, General Kearny returned to St. Louis where he died in 1848, just days after the birth of his son, Stephen. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

Fighting in the West

In the middle of the nineteenth century, migration west increased dramatically as transportation options expanded with the discovery of gold and other minable resources.[15] This migration caused an increase in violence between settlers and native tribes living on the plains. The violence reached a fever pitch during the Civil War, as the regular army largely abandoned the frontier. In the decades that followed that bloody conflict, the regular army struggled to quell the unrest caused by a civilization aware that it

1st Dragoon Regiment dress uniform, 1833. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

Robert E. Lee, pictured here in his cavalry uniform, had served at Jefferson Barracks earlier in his career as a lieutenant with the Corps of Engineers in 1837. He described it then as the "dirtiest place I was ever in." It is unclear if his opinion of the region had changed when he returned as lieutenant colonel of the 2nd Cavalry, but given the small number of commissions available in that period he likely saw it as his only opportunity for promotion. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

was facing a fight for survival.[16] Between 1866 and 1890, there were over 400 individual fights between Native American warriors and U.S. troops. Collectively, these battles, skirmishes, and actions have been dubbed the Indian Wars.[17] They included fights with the Comanche in Texas, the Apache in New Mexico, the Sioux in Montana, and numerous other conflicts. Throughout this tumultuous period, the U.S. Army struggled to adapt to Native Americans' unique and effective style of combat, while also struggling against their own shortcomings in manpower and training.[18]

Ultimately, the continuous flood of settlers combined with the Army's constant pursuit to drive Native Americans onto reservations and pacify the West. Serving in a chief role during this struggle were the recruits trained in St. Louis and at Jefferson Barracks. St. Louis became the principal Cavalry Recruit Depot for the entire United States Army in 1870.[19] Then in 1878, the depot was transferred to Jefferson Barracks. Troops who came

Jefferson Barracks, 1883. This view of Jefferson Barracks shows much of what the post looked like while it served as the Cavalry Recruit Depot. It is a steel engraving originally published in the *History of St. Louis City and County* by J. Thomas Scharf. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*





Recruits Leaving Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot, January–December 1886. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

U.S. Army Barracks at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

through the recruit depot to receive initial training and supplies were distributed widely to every cavalry unit in operation across the American West.[20] The number of troops who left Jefferson Barracks each year fluctuated, but they averaged around 1,500 men.[21]

Recruits at Jefferson Barracks were assigned to one of four companies of instruction. Each company shared a barracks, which left the recruit completely without privacy. Upon arrival they would be issued uniforms and some supplies. Much of the recruit's necessities had to be purchased with his first month's pay, which was a paltry $7 a month, half of their normal pay. With the money left over, some would visit local bars or bawdy houses, but others would use it to buy decent food at local groceries or restaurants, as the mess service at the depot was notoriously bad, consisting of salt pork, fried mush, and black coffee.[22] While many aspects of service at the recruit depot could be unpleasant, one recruit explained that "to many of us enlistment was the best break in our lives. We learned to walk gracefully across…the parade field…head up, chest out, stomach in, arms close to the body, and not swinging like pump handles."[23]

The staff of the recruit depot was made up of officers from each active regiment, veteran non-commissioned officers, and a few re-enlisting privates. In the early years staff did little training of recruits, who would stay at the depot for just a few days or a month at the longest. Instead, they would assign them to basic barracks duty and task them with learning army discipline. The need for recruits to be better prepared for service led to changes at Jefferson Barracks in the 1880s, and a new program was instituted where recruits would spend four months at the base learning riding skills, the use of weapons, and basic military doctrine. Frederick C. Kurtz, who enlisted in 1883 and served with the 8th Cavalry, described the training, saying "[we] went through the usual recruiting service of setting-up exercise [calisthenics], manual of arms, and bareback riding around a bull ring conducted by that cock-eyed drill sergeant you all perhaps remember, who used not very polite language whenever one of us accidentally fell off the horse or dropped a gun while drilling."[24]

Once training of the recruits was complete, officers on detached duty at Jefferson Barracks would then escort troops in groups of as few as a dozen to as many as several hundred out to their regular posts across the West.[25]

Jefferson Barracks played an important role in the history of racial relations in the U.S. Army in this period. In 1866, the peacetime expansion of the military, which was necessary to address southern Reconstruction and westward expansion, resulted in the creation of the first African American units in the regular U.S. Army. Two of these were cavalry regiments.[26] With an initial pay of $13 a month, military service, while dangerous and difficult, was one of the best breaks available to newly freed African Americans, who found that freedom did not mean equal opportunity.[27]

Stables at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1890. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

Nicknamed "Buffalo Soldiers" by the Cheyenne and Comanche Indians, these African American regular troops served with distinction across the western frontier. Throughout most of the rest of the nineteenth century, they maintained the highest rates of re-enlistment and the lowest rates of desertion in the United States Army.[28]

While official organization was done elsewhere, both units of African American cavalry would have early ties to Jefferson Barracks. The 9th Cavalry Regiment would make its headquarters in 1870, and the 10th's first recruits would join at the post in 1866. Beginning in 1878 all new recruits for both units would pass through Jefferson Barracks before joining their permanent regiments.[29] African American troops would make up 20 percent of the regular army during the Indian Wars, and they would serve in vital conflicts from the capture of Geronimo to the charge up San Juan Hill.[30]

While serving with distinction, African American troops in the latter part of the nineteenth century faced deeply embedded racial prejudice, but the shortage of troops in the army during this period meant that discrimination in the form of withholding equipment or supplies was rare. Additionally, by the early 1880s, recruit units at Jefferson Barracks were integrated. Whites and blacks trained and lived side by side. At many other posts around the country, troops of varying racial backgrounds served together as well, and for the most part interactions were peaceful. In January of 1888, however, racial tensions exploded at Jefferson Barracks in one of the most serious events of racial violence in the nation.[31] Newspapers of the time called it "A Soldiers' Riot." Problems arose after an African American soldier was seen talking with a young white girl and was thrown in the guardhouse. This angered the other black troops, who then got in a fight with some white recruits. Things escalated into a large brawl involving knives, clubs, and rocks.[32] In 1889, in reaction to these events, recruit units at Jefferson Barracks were re-segregated. Company A and C became white, Company B became Irish, and Company D was designated for African Americans and other races. This condition remained until the Jefferson Barracks Cavalry Recruit Depot closed in 1894.[33]

The Dogs of War: Cavalry at the Turn of the Century

As the nineteenth century came to an end, so did the violent struggle between the United States and native tribes for which the U.S. Cavalry had been created.[34] At Jefferson Barracks, the end of this era brought a real crisis. The barracks buildings were in a state of disrepair from the constant flow of recruits. Poor conditions meant high levels of disease. Finally, the presence of both meant that desertion reached disastrous levels. The calls for change reached a fever pitch.[35]

In 1887, the Surgeon General of the U.S. Army declared Jefferson Barracks "the most un-healthy military post in the country."[36] As the decade went on, local newspapers reported on murders, suicides, desertions, and epidemics.[37]



In January 1889, 2nd Lt. John J. Pershing, who would go on to lead the American Expeditionary Force in France during World War I, was at Jefferson Barracks preparing to lead a group of thirty new recruits to join the 6th Cavalry in Fort Wingate, New Mexico. Pershing would gain the nickname "Blackjack" for his service with another unit of cavalry, the African American 10th Regiment. He would serve with them beginning in 1896, and lead them in the famous charge up San Juan Hill during the Spanish-American War. *(Image: Library of Congress)*

All of this made *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* reporter Frank Woodward curious. What was really happening at the old barracks? In 1889, he launched an investigation by enlisting in the U.S. Cavalry. He spent almost two months at the Recruit Depot before deserting and beginning a series of articles on life at Jefferson Barracks. These exposés would shock the nation with accusations of embezzlement, abuse, false imprisonment, and even murder. In reaction, Secretary of War Redford Proctor ordered a full investigation, the results of which led to better conditions and pay for the entire army. Additionally, over the following years the barracks would be virtually rebuilt.[38]

In 1894, the Cavalry Recruit Depot closed its doors. The 3rd Cavalry, which had begun its life at Jefferson Barracks in 1846 as the Regiment of Mounted Rifles, returned to take over.[39] Commanded by Lieutenant George A. Purington, they would inherit an almost completely



Color Lithograph of Jefferson Barracks by Gast Moeller and Company, c. 1866. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

4th Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, 1902. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

Plan for proposed reconstruction at Jefferson Barracks, 1891. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*



new post. In the years that had passed from the 1889 exposé that shed light on the poor conditions at Jefferson Barracks, new two story barracks, cavalry stables, officers' quarters, and quartermaster quarters were all constructed.

In 1892, a bandstand was completed.[40] This would prove to be an important site during the tenure of the 3rd Cavalry as its nationally known brass band would play for local crowds there on Saturday afternoons.[41] According to one Tennessee reporter, "these regulars marched with an ease and precision that caught every eye along the route, while the sweetness and novelty of their quicksteps pleased the ear already tired with a surfeit of Sousa music."[42]

With the declaration of war against Spain on April 25, 1898, the United States launched itself onto the world stage in a new way. By the end of the conflict in December of 1898, the United States would be a colonial power, taking possession of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. Fighting would continue however, as Filippinos sought independence from their new colonial masters.[43] This conflict would see service by most regular army cavalry regiments. Additionally, three volunteer cavalry, regiments were formed. Only the 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry or the "Rough Riders," would see combat service.[44]

This conflict would require a mobilization of troops from Jefferson Barracks like it had never seen before. Missouri would recruit more volunteers than almost any other state, the majority of whom would pass through Jefferson Barracks.[45]

With the completion of an electric rail line, large patriotic crowds regularly visited the barracks to celebrate the troops and their overseas mission. The largest of the crowds was estimated to be almost 100,000 people.[46]

Several cavalry units would move in and out of the post in this period, returning from or heading to service in Cuba and the Philippines. The 3rd Cavalry left the post for Cuba when the war broke out, serving honorably at the Battle of Santiago and playing a key role in the capture of San Juan Hill. The 6th Cavalry came to Jefferson Barracks in 1899, but left shortly after for service in the Philippines. Finally, the 5th Cavalry commanded Jefferson Barracks from 1900 to 1902.[47]

Conclusion

Even before the beginning of the Spanish-American War, there were signs that changes were coming for the cavalry service. In 1897, 23 members of the African American 25th Infantry participated in an experiment. They rode bicycles from Fort Mizzoula in Montana to Jefferson Barracks. This trip of 1,900 miles was organized as the Army looked to new technologies to move troops. While many decried the experiment, believing that "transporting soldiers by any means other than the horse ran counter to...the cavalry's feeling that an eternal bond exists between a soldier and his steed," others recognized that industrialization was bringing with it necessary changes in the way war would be waged.[48]

While the horse cavalry would remain in existence until 1944, the ride of the 25th Infantry can be seen as a foreshadowing of the mechanization of the cavalry that would take place as the army entered the twentieth century.

From 1833 until the turn of the century, the story of the United States Cavalry at Jefferson Barracks is the story of the U.S. Cavalry nationally from its establishment until the decline of the horse. It is the story of westward expansion, and of the decline of Indian autonomy. Perhaps most of all it is the story of the men and women who served, coming from all walks of life and dedicating themselves for better or worse to the monumental challenge of living up to the spirit of the American Cavalry, the "Courageous and Faithful."

3rd Calvary at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1896. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

Man on horseback at Jefferson Barracks, c. 1897. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*

ENDNOTES

[1] Mary L. Stubbs and Stanley R. Connor, "Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve," Army Lineage Series: Armor-Cavalry Part I: Regular Army and Army Reserve. Accessed January 26, 2015. http://www.history.army.mil/books/Lineage/arcav/arcav.htm.

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Even the Army embraced the bicycle craze of the 1890s, as seen here with the 25th Infantry experimental bike ride from Fort Missoula to St. Louis, 1897. *(Image: St. Louis County Parks)*



The Missouri Conservation Commission

Part I:
The need for it and the constitutional amendment that established it

BY QUINTA SCOTT

(Editor's Note: This is the first of two articles on the Missouri Conservation Commission. It details the state of conservation in Missouri before 1937, the role Nash Buckingham played in getting the amendment on the 1936 ballot, and how Aldo Leopold's work in the early 1930s influenced the writing of the amendment and the direction of the new commission and its early research. The second article will look at how biologists carried out their research for the new science-based Missouri Conservation Commission.)

Aldo Leopold and Nash Buckingham, the first a pioneer in land management for wildlife from Wisconsin, the second a passionate and popular nature writer and avid duck hunter from Tennessee: both had a hand in pressing Missouri voters to pass the constitutional amendment that established an independent conservation commission. Both were well connected in the nascent field of conservation and land and game management. Leopold supplied the philosophical framework that guided the intent of the constitutional amendment that established the nonpolitical Missouri Conservation Commission as a science-based organization. Buckingham supplied the legwork. Buckingham loved ducks, he loved quail, and he loved shooting. He wrote for *Field and Stream*, *Sports Afield*, *Outdoors*, *American Field*, and others. He had a following among sport hunters and fishers, who were concerned about the decline in small game.

In April 1935, Roland Hoerr, a St. Louis industrialist and president of the Missouri Duck Hunter's Association, wrote Nash Buckingham asking him for "information as to how the sportsmen of Tennessee organized the State in order to put through the Commission bill." Buckingham responded that he and Matt Thomas of Knoxville had organized a statewide federation of sport hunters that helped push the game commission bill through the Tennessee legislature in 1935. Buckingham emphasized that "your bill must be right. The man you select for executive secretary is all important." He offered to help Hoerr organize a federation, but he would have to be replaced by a Missourian. Buckingham traveled statewide, interviewing possible candidates, including E. Sidney Stephens, to head the organization that became the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen. Stephens accepted the job at a meeting of the group in August 1935.[1]

Buckingham and Leopold—along with members of the American Legion, the Isaak Walton League, and dozens of Missouri sports hunters and fishers—gathered signatures for the initiative petition that put the constitutional amendment on the November 1936 ballot. The amendment passed, and the Missouri Conservation Commission opened for business in July 1937.

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area in Callaway County reflects the landscape early settlers found when they came west into central Missouri north of the Missouri River. Prairies, pockmarked with ephemeral wetlands, covered the flat landscape. Where clay underlay a thin layer of loess, it impeded drainage and flatwoods, treed in stumpy oaks anchored in shallow soil, took root. Along the creeks and ephemeral drainages, woodlands grew in loamy soils.

The settlers named the region Nine Mile Prairie. Nine Mile Prairie Township is 47,001 acres, of which 5,858 acres are in public use. Today, the Missouri Department of Conservation manages two refuges on the prairie, the Whetstone Creek Conservation Area, which is open to the public, and the Prairie Fork Conservation Area, which is set aside for research and not open to the public.

The Missouri Department of Conservation manages Whetstone Creek for Bobwhite quail and other small game. The decline of Bobwhite quail and other game in the early twentieth century prompted the establishment of the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen and the passage of the constitutional amendment that created the Missouri Conservation Commission. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

In Missouri, deer, so plentiful in the twenty-first century that they verge on being pests, survived only in the southern Ozark Counties in the 1930s. *(Image: David Stoner, Missouri Department of Conservation)*

The State of Game in 1937: The Need for a Conservation Commission

For more than a century before Missouri passed its constitutional amendment, its citizens broke the prairie and cleared the land for row crops or pasture for livestock, cut the forests for railroad ties or simply let them burn, drained the swamps, and gave no thought to the maintenance of wildlife. By the end of the nineteenth century, hunters had killed or driven the last of the large mammals from the state. During the period of settlement, 1800–1850, large animals—antelope, buffalo, black bears, and panthers—disappeared, killed for their meat or pelts, leaving only a few individuals. Only deer survived, though in reduced numbers. Badgers were gone by 1870, and passenger pigeons were decimated and gone by 1890. Farm game–quail, rabbit, skunk, and dove–thrived, at least for a while, on the newly cleared agricultural lands, but as farmers instituted modern agricultural methods, small game lost habitat. Missourians had yet to take up hunting game for sport, but market hunters had, for cash, not for sport.[2]

Concern over the amount of game market hunters took from Missouri's fields and forests led to the passage of its first statewide game law in 1874. It was titled *An Act for the Preservation of Game, Animals, and Birds*. The law set open and closed seasons for game, including deer, wild turkey, and quail; forbad the netting of quail and prairie chicken, save on a person's own land or by permission of the landowner; forbad the possession, purchase, sale, or transportation of listed species during closed seasons; and charged constables, marshals, market-masters, and police to arrest all violators. The lawmakers made exceptions to the rules: Farmers had permission to shoot any critter they found eating their crops, fruit, or grapes. Any scientist who wished to study a bird's habits or history had permission to kill it and stuff it. Market hunters ignored the law.

In the years following the passage of the 1874 act, market hunting reached its peak. Market hunters transported their kill to city markets on better roads. Their city customers had no idea that Missouri's wild game was disappearing. While Missouri sport hunters did not take up guns in great numbers until about 1920, when they did, they added to the carnage. Game wardens had few funds with which to carry out their duties. Market-masters had a commercial interest in the continued flow of game. Hence, the attitudes of constables, marshals, and police charged with arresting violators reflected that of the rest of the population.[3] As yet, there was no demand for the preservation of game.

Painted Rock Conservation Area, Osage County, Missouri *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Private Game Preserves

As early as 1877, private citizens from Jefferson City leased land at Painted Rock on the Osage River. When the owner of the land wanted to subdivide and sell the land in 1907, a group of hunters organized the Painted Rock Country Club, purchased all 1,086 acres, and opened membership to dignitaries living in the state capitol.[4]

While everyday sport hunters may not have taken up sport hunting en masse until about 1920, wealthy city dwellers set up their own preserves for hunting and fishing. In 1891, alarmed at the decimation of Missouri's deer, Moses Wetmore, president of Liggett and Meyers Tobacco in St. Louis; George McCann, president of Old Coon Tobacco in Springfield; and others formed a corporation, the St. Louis Game Park and Agricultural Company. They bought land in Taney County for a private preserve, a game-park and resort, where they bred deer for sport hunting and food. They also planned to mill timber; grow grain, fruit, and farm produce; raise livestock; and create a zoological preserve. In 1893, they fenced off 500 acres with an eight- to nine-foot deer-proof fence. By 1896, they had amassed 5,000 acres on the west bank of the White River near the tiny village of Mincy, which they stocked with deer—native whitetails, reds, blacktails, and fallows—to which they added Angora goats, elk from Illinois, and dozens of Mongolian pheasants.

The St. Louis Game and Agricultural Company, Taney County. Steep ridges, deep hollows, moderately sloping uplands, cedar glades, oak-hickory-pine forests, creeks, a sinkhole, and three miles of bank on the White River characterized the game park. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

The company built a hunting lodge on a bald overlooking the river, installed deer on another 2,500 acres behind a deer-proof fence, and opened for business in November 1896. At a time when people in the Ozarks used fire indiscriminately to clear pastureland and burn ticks and chiggers, gamekeepers at the park used controlled burns, one hillside at a time when weather conditions were right, to maintain a fire line around the deer enclosure. Both the Painted Rock Country Club and the St. Louis Agricultural Park would be incorporated into the Missouri Department of Conservation's system of refuges in the twentieth century.

Walmsley Law

The work of private sport hunters at Painted Rock and Mincy did nothing to quell the slaughter of wildlife by market hunters, who sold close to four million pounds of game, most of it illegal, in 1904. But by that year, sport hunters outnumbered market hunters and demanded changes in the laws governing hunting and fishing.[5]

In 1905, Missouri passed the Walmsley Law, which continued open and closed seasons to manage hunting, but enforced the law whimsically. At first the legislature gave title to all fish and game to the state, provided for the sale of hunting and fishing licenses, and allocated game wardens $50,000 for a "game protection fund." It looked like a sound, comprehensive law, but two years later the legislature gave title of fish and game back to land owners and cut the appropriation for enforcement to $8,000. Lawmakers gave title to game back to the state in 1909 and established the State Game and Fish Commission, but they took away the annual appropriation for enforcement. From henceforth, only the sale of hunting and fishing licenses would fund the enforcement of game laws.

In 1917, Missouri recognized the need for public recreation and passed the State Park Fund Act, which allocated 5 percent of the funds collected from the sales of licenses to the purchase and maintenance of state parks on land that was well-watered and suitable for wildlife. Big Spring State Park opened in 1924, and eight more followed within a year, bringing 23,244 acres into public ownership. At the end of World War I, the state purchased or leased game farms that would function as refuges. While lawmakers raised the allotment to 25 percent in 1925, the parks and game farms remained underfunded and undeveloped.[6]

Big Spring State Park, Carter County *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Aldo Leopold's *Game Survey of the North Central States*

What happened in Missouri also happened in the surrounding states: game lost out to the "axe, plow, cow, fire, and gun," the tools used to clear the landscape for crops and pasture. Aldo Leopold used these words to describe the disappearance of game from Midwest fields and forests. A pioneer in wildlife conservation, Leopold developed the concept of "wildlife-from-the-land," or land management for game, that would direct the work of Missouri's young Conservation Commission. In 1929 and 1930, he conducted a survey of game in the central and northern Midwest for the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturer's Institute and published it in 1931 under the title *Game Survey of the North Central States*. By the late 1920s, sport hunters, the buyers of guns and ammunition, finally showed genuine alarm over the decimation of game and furbearing animals. Just as Nash Buckingham would enlist their help several years later in getting signatures on the ballot initiative for the Constitutional Amendment that established the Conservation Commission, Leopold enlisted their help with the survey. In Missouri 129 people–members of the Isaak Walton League, game wardens, foresters, sport hunters and anglers, and academics–aided the effort. After he finished his survey, he laid out his theory of land and game management in *Game Management*, published in 1933, in which Leopold proposed that wildlife could be restored through the creative use of the same tools used to destroy it: "axe, plow, cow, fire, and gun."

In his *Game Survey* and *Game Management,* Leopold recommended that nonpartisan conservation commissions be established in the states he studied; that they have members with staggered terms and free of political influence; and that hunters and nonhunters alike—the general public—share in the cost of wildlife, both game and nongame, conservation.[7]

In the midst of the Great Depression, with income to Missouri's Game and Fish Commission declining, with its personnel in constant flux, and with game depleted and little money going into its replenishment, E. Sydney Stephens and the Federation of Missouri Sportsmen wanted to do just that: take conservation out of the hands of politicians. They wrote a constitutional amendment to create a conservation commission to protect and restore the state's fish, wildlife, and forests. Up until then, political appointees had directed Missouri's Game and Fish Commission, the predecessor to the Conservation Commission. Hence, policy and personnel could shift as often as a new administration came into office, every four years. As Leopold noted in his *Game Survey*, Missouri employed the "'game warden' type" of conservation department that relied "on an unstable executive appointed by the governor." Missouri's Game and Fish Commissioner managed six hatcheries and 36 wardens, all reporting to three division chiefs; fourteen state parks, which served as workable game refuges; and fourteen wildlife refuges, which the state leased from farmers. Game and Fish did not coordinate with the state's other conservation activities and exercised no regulatory power. That was the province of the governor.

"The survey is financed by the sporting arms and ammunition industry. The motive hardly requires explanation: success in game restoration means continuance of the industry; failure in game restoration means its shrinkage and ultimate liquidation."

—Aldo Leopold, 1931

Stephens and his group wanted to put conservation and restoration in the hands of professional game managers who would operate under the direction of a nonpartisan commission, in which each of its four members would serve staggered six-year terms. His desire to remove the conservation of Missouri's game from politics extended to the writing of the amendment. Allowing the legislature to write such a law would leave it in the political arena and open to future changes. Allowing the legislature to write the amendment would take its wording out of Stephens' hands. To that end, he established a committee of thirteen directors, one from each congressional district, which drafted the wording of the amendment. Because each member of the new commission would serve a six-year term, appointments would be staggered administration to administration. The amendment would create a science-based agency with authority over Missouri's wildlife, fish, and forests.[8] But few people understood the concept of science-based management of wildlife. Here again, Aldo Leopold fleshed out the idea that landscape could be managed for the benefit of wildlife.

How the state handled wildlife conservation before and after passage of the Walmsley Law hadn't worked. When Leopold performed his December 1929–January 1930 survey of wildlife in Missouri, he found rabbits abundant, even though the rabbit meat industry in Missouri was the largest in the region, but he found quail and prairie chickens declining. He attributed their declines to the plowing of the prairies for wheat and corn.

Bobwhite Quail Covey in Snow *(Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)*

Leopold did not develop his theories in a vacuum. Shortly before he started his survey, Herbert L. Stoddard published his seminal study of Bobwhite quail in the longleaf pine and wiregrass ecosystem of Georgia's Red Hills, recognized as the first field study on land management for wildlife.[9] Stoddard documented the quail's food preferences: weed seeds, grain, and ground cover that farmers despise; fruits, mast, and nuts from trees; legumes; cultivated grains after harvest; and crickets, grasshoppers, beetles, spiders, ants, or whatever insects could be found on the ground or were within jumping distance. Young quail eat mostly insects until they are about three weeks old. During those three weeks they gradually add seeds and grains to their diets until at three weeks they are eating the same foods as their parents. Much of their diet can be found in the cover they depend on, thickets and vine tangles along fences and roadsides.

He documented their predators: Humans find them tasty. So do hawks, skunks, raccoons, and snakes. Stoddard was fifty years ahead of his time in his use of controlled burns to manage wildlife habitat. Foresters and public agencies in the 1920s and 1930s opposed their use. Stoddard recommended fire to enhance the growth of quail food and recognized that the quail could thrive at the edge of the longleaf pine-wiregrass forest. To maintain the edge, however, fire had to be used to control mid-story underbrush and preserve an understory of the quail's favorite foods, grasses and legumes; to eliminate habitat for quail predators; and to promote places for quail to escape predators.[10]

In his chapter on Bobwhite quail in *Game Survey*, Leopold described the four stages of landscape development that led to the quail's decline in the Midwest. He guessed that during presettlement times, quail lived at the edges of open woodlands that were maintained by frequent fire.

As farmers settled the landscape, they brought "crude agriculture," characterized by "grain fields, civilized seeds, and rail fences," along which weeds and vines grew up. They cut the woods, left "brushy stump lots," and added "Osage orange (*Maclura pomifera*) hedges to the quail environment." In short, they may have changed the environment, but quail could thrive as farmers extended their clearings to the edges of the woods.

Next, farmers replaced the weedy rail fences with wire, cleared the stumps from the brushy woods for pasture, and tore out the Osage orange hedges. Quail lost food and cover. And, hunters began shooting quail instead of trapping them. During the Great Depression of the 1930s, farmers allowed marginal fields to revert to brush, weeds,

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: In Callaway County, where Nathan Boone, son of Daniel, surveyed Boone's Lick Trail in 1815, and his cousin, Samuel Boone, purchased land and settled on the southeastern edge of Nine Mile Prairie in 1818. They arrived as settlers and hunted and trapped the prairies, which they looked upon as wet, marshy, bug infested, and dangerous, worthless for any agricultural activity other than grazing. Instead, they settled in timber along the creeks, where they found wood and water, and they tilled only at the very edges of the prairies. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

and vines. Quail found food and cover, but good roads increased population. Hunters with more leisure time and better guns and ammunition offset the reversion of marginal lands. Finally, hunters realized that quail had become a finite resource and demanded conservation measures and the introduction of pen-raised birds or birds imported from other countries.

In his study of the decline of quail in Missouri, Leopold offered as an example the history of a farm on Nine Mile Prairie, where Boone's Lick Trail marked the northern boundary of the farm. In 1923, the farmer Phil Smith restored a grain farm, using modern agricultural standards. The land was half in timber and had never been grazed. He cleared brush from the fence lines and out of the gullies, which he filled. He cut the Osage hedgerows and converted brushy woodland to pasture, where his livestock could graze. According to modern methods, he rotated his crops to conserve the fertility of the soil, and he loved quail and hunted them. He counted 210 quail on his property in 1923. Within seven years of clearing his land and introducing modern agricultural techniques, ninety quail remained. He thought he had shot too many. Leopold concluded that the very farm improvements had reduced the quail's numbers, because the bird lost food and cover.[11]

In developing his management plan for quail, Leopold focused on open and closed seasons, particularly in Missouri's fledgling system of refuges, located in ten Ozark counties. Even given a ten-mile zone surrounding each refuge, he concluded that none of Missouri's refuges would have enough acreage to sustain healthy populations of quail, particularly for hunting and trapping. Refuges would have to be restocked with quail raised in pens. In determining the allowable kill in refuges, whether public or private, Stoddard had noted that killing 33 percent of the population was safe. The kill rate, which seldom acknowledged the number of birds crippled, could be higher on well-managed lands, but 50 percent was too high. Finally, Leopold encouraged managers and hunters to think of population growth or the productivity of the crop and kill rates in terms of numbers per acre, be it quail, turkey, or deer.[12]

Nine Mile Prairie: Weeds, trees, and vines along a roadside and between cultivated fields, Callaway County, Missouri. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Nine Mile Prairie Farm cultivated to the edge of the road with little cover on the roadside or between fields. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*



Aldo Leopold's Sketch of Improvements to the Smith Farm, Callaway County, Missouri.

Prarie Fork Conservation Area, Callaway County, Missouri *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

The Prairie Fork Conservation Area is no more than a half-mile down the road from the Smith Farm. In 1997, Ted and Pat Jones donated 711 acres of farmland near their home in Williamsburg to the Missouri Department of Conservation. Most of the region around the refuge is devoted to row crops or livestock grazing. The MDC is restoring the fields to prairie, using a combination of applications of herbicides and controlled burns, followed by the planting of native grasses and forbs, food for quail and other small game. The area is not open to public use, but is reserved for education and research into the role of soils and water in conservation.

Fall Turkeys *(Image: Missouri Department of Conservation)*

Management of Turkey and Deer

When Leopold finished examining quail and other small game birds—pheasant, Hungarian partridge, ruffed grouse, and prairie chickens—he turned to big game, including turkey and deer. Northern Missouri had seen its last turkey in 1895. Southern Missouri had the only remaining turkey range in the states he studied. First, he numbered the turkeys found in southern Missouri—4,024 in 1925 and 7,000 in 1927. Then, he outlined a turkey study: trap and band all turkeys found in refuges to determine the best cover for turkeys, the best food at every season, the diseases and parasites that affect turkeys, the predators that kill turkeys or rob their nests, how turkeys avoid predators, the ratio of males to females, and how many males must be around to maintain or increase the population.[13]

Finished with turkeys, Leopold turned to deer. While northern Missouri had seen its last deer in 1884, Missouri counted 564 deer spread out across 24 southern Missouri counties in 1926. Leopold noted that that was an underestimate because Missouri had planted 300 in five state parks since then. Because there were so many unanswered questions about deer management, such as how to gauge the age of a deer, he laid out a similar, if less specific, outline for the study of deer. He addressed many of his recommendations to the northern states around the Great Lakes, where deer were losing winter cover and food as logging companies cut cedar swamps for posts and pulpwood, but where deer formed herds in the winter and searched out cedar plantations for both food and cover. As for Missouri, he noted that the state had a series of game refuges, where hunting seasons could be set.[14]

Leopold's Recommendations for Land and Game Management

Leopold concluded his survey with a series of recommendations for land management: bring as much land as possible into public ownership as funds are available and with attention to game management, forestry, watershed protection, and recreation. (Here, he noted that Missourians offered the most resistance to public ownership of land, even though Missouri had a system of state parks and refuges.) Make game management a public/private effort. Protect private landowners from irresponsible hunters and compensate them for preserving game. Train foresters and game wardens in research, management, and the administration of conservation agencies. Do the research in land management that will make game abundant in the wild. Recognize that everyone, hunters and non-hunters alike, is responsible for conservation. Pay for conservation not only through licenses for sport hunters and fishers, but through taxes on all citizens. Beg for private funds, if necessary, to educate the public and to do the scientific research.[15]

Leopold fleshed out all these recommendations in *Game Management* two years later, in which he defined game management as "the art of producing sustained crops of game for recreational use," game administration as "the art of governing the practice of game management," and game policy as "the plan of administration adopted by government."

He outlined the tools for managing the land for game and game itself: control hunting, historically the first technique of game management, by setting bag limits. Echoing Stoddard's work on quail, managers had to be able to measure the breeding rates for individual species against its kill ratios: How many turkeys or deer could hunters kill or cripple while leaving enough animals in the wild to maintain and increase their populations? Recognize that landowners are also custodians of the state's game and let them be compensated for the game that hunters kill on their lands. Help them understand that game is a crop. Train them to employ the tools they use to raise row crops to cultivate food and cover for wildlife. Cover functions as shelter from the sun, as escape from predators, as nesting places, as material for nesting from the previous year, as a place to loaf, and as food. Modern agriculture destroys cover and food, but doesn't have to if plants that supply game with food and cover are left to grow along fences or between fields.

Smith Farm, 2015. A weed-filled gully runs through a soybean field edged with trees, vines, and grasses along the roadside, all food and cover for quail. This field is at the site of the farm Aldo Leopold used as an illustration in his 1930 *Game Survey*. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Sunflower Winter Food Plot. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Beyond that, create refuges that are closed to hunting. Leopold saw the refuge as a sanctuary, a breeding ground, and a place that creates such an abundance of game that the excess population can flow out and restock its surrounding region. A refuge must be an integral part of its region, and its region must be suitable to individual species the refuge addresses. Leopold separated parks—dedicated to game, natural attractions, and recreation—from refuges, dedicated to restocking species in the surrounding area. In parks, excess population growth of game can lead to incidental restocking, an unintended plus.

Increase game by controlling predators, by providing game with cover, by improving food sources for prey, by understanding alternative food sources for predators, and by using predators to prey on other predators.

Just as game managers had to learn the food preferences of predators, they had to learn food and water preferences of individual species of game. What do turkeys or quail eat at each stage in life? What would they find in each season of the year? What tastes good? What are they accustomed to and how do they find it? Do they need supplemental food in the winter? What kind? Managers had to have a similar understanding about water. Doves and turkeys drink water from running creeks or quiet ponds. So do deer. Quails, partridges, pheasants, and grouse depend on dew. Big game and rodents munch on plants for water, what Leopold called "succulence." Leopold concluded that refuge managers had to supply food plots and ponds to supplement food and water.[16]

Whetstone Creek Conservation Area: Wildlife Pond and Cover. *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

Pittman-Robertson Act of 1937

Even before he completed his *Game Survey*, Leopold attended the Seventeenth American Game Conference in December 1930, where he and others laid out the American Game Policy, an acknowledgment that current conservation efforts were not working anywhere. The policy declared that wildlife management be developed into a profession, that scientifically trained personnel direct wildlife restoration, and that a stable funding mechanism for restoration be developed. Carl Shoemaker, a special investigator for the U.S. Senate Special Committee on Conservation of Wildlife Resources, turned the conservationists' policy proposals into the Pittman-Robertson Wildlife Restoration Act of 1937, which granted funds to state fish and wildlife agencies for restoration projects through the Federal Aid to Wildlife Program. Funding came through user fees on the purchase of firearms, ammunition, and archery equipment. The newly independent Missouri Conservation Commission would use Pittman-Robertson funds to hire scientifically trained personnel—biologists—in its effort to build its wildlife restoration program.[17]

Missouri's Game Survey

The publication of Leopold's game survey in 1931 prompted the states to conduct surveys of their own. In 1934, Dr. Rudolf Bennitt, a biologist at the University of Missouri, and his student, Werner O. Nagel, followed with a more specific *Survey of Resident Game and Furbearers in Missouri.* They identified fewer than 100 ruffed grouse, not more than 2,000 deer, and about 3,500 wild turkeys. In addition, they noted that quail and rabbits were declining along with raccoons, muskrats, and mink. They took no census of fish, but severe drought and wild fires in abused forests, where eroded soils slipped down steep hillsides to muddy streams, led to the decline of the state's fisheries. Bennitt and Nagel's conclusions echoed Leopold's: game restoration and management depended on professional administration, scientific research, trained professional foresters and game managers, and an educated public that understood its role in conservation. This would be the job of a new Conservation Commission. Bennitt and Nagel published their survey in 1937.[18]

Caney Mountain Conservation Area, Ozark County *(Image: Quinta Scott)*

The Missouri Conservation Commission

To head the new Conservation Commission, E. Sydney Stephens tried to lure Aldo Leopold away from Wisconsin. Leopold turned him down and recommended that the state hire Irwin T. Bode, the former head of the Game and Fish Commission in Iowa.[19] When the commission opened its doors, its first employees came from the old Game and Fish Commission. Over the next two years, Bode hired scientifically trained biologists who specialized in game, fish, and forestry. They used Bennitt and Werner's survey as a reference point for their studies of individual species. Pittman-Robertson funds paid their salaries. Included among Bode's young biologists were David L. Spencer and A. Starker Leopold, Aldo's son. In 1939, Bode dispatched Spencer to the old St. Louis Game Park, now under management of the Conservation Commission, where he studied deer. In 1940, the Conservation Commission purchased 5,530 acres in Ozark County for the Caney Mountain Refuge in order to protect the wild turkey. Bode dispatched young Leopold to Caney Mountain to organize the refuge and study turkeys. In 1943 he completed his management plan for Caney Mountain that put into practice the recommendations his father had put forth in *Game Survey* and in *Game Management* a decade earlier.

A. Starker Leopold's study of wild turkey at Caney Mountain was one of ten Pittman-Robertson studies Bode's scientists had carried out by 1943. With Aldo Leopold's work in the 1930s serving as their model, they pursued their work on individual species with urgency. They had a lot to learn about who lived where in Missouri's diverse ecosystems and how to restore those ecosystems for the production of individual species. The second article in this series will cover their work, focusing on A. Starker Leopold's studies at Caney Mountain and David L. Spencer's studies at the St. Louis Game Park.



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
Walkers Ferry
Alton
Wood
Miles
3
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Bellefontaine
MISSOURI RIVER
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
ILLINOIS
Charles
Cahokia
Cahokia R.
To Edwardsville
ST. LOUIS
To Carlyle & Vincennes
Cahokia
Prairie du Pont
Vuide Poche
or
Carondelet

CAHOKIA *and the* TRANS-APPALACHIAN WEST *in the* American Revolution

BY ANDREW COOPERMAN

The American Revolution is typically viewed as primarily an East Coast affair, fought between Americans and their French allies on the one hand, and the British and their German mercenaries on the other. Certainly, the war fought in the East was critical to the creation and survival of the United States. But it was the war fought in the West that was critical to the growth and development of the new republic. In the trans-Appalachian West, Americans fought alongside the Spanish while the British employed warriors from various tribes of First Nations. These armies were much smaller than their eastern counterparts, and so too were the battles that they fought. Nevertheless, in the West as in the East, Americans acting in conjunction with a major European power fought battles that determined the future of the United States and the American people.

One such battle was fought in St. Louis and Cahokia on May 26, 1780, and while the Battle of Fort San Carlos is little known outside this area, it was tremendously important. For it was at Cahokia that George Rogers Clark and his mixed force of Anglo-American frontiersmen and Illinois French destroyed British plans for a sweep through the Mississippi Valley. It was American military control of the trans-Appalachian West, tenuous though it was, combined with the skill and perseverance of American negotiators in Paris, which enabled the newborn United States to set its western border on the Mississippi River instead of the Appalachian Mountains.[1]

Like the battle itself, the importance of the Village of Cahokia to the Patriot cause and the Allied war effort in the West is little known. But it was at Cahokia that Clark negotiated precious months of peace with regional First Nations. It was Cahokia that served as both a shield for defense and a staging area for offense. It was Cahokia that served as the link between the Americans and their Spanish allies. And it was at Cahokia that a trans-Appalachian America was secured.

This 1818 map by John Melish shows St. Louis in the context of Alton, Carondelet, and Cahokia, suggesting the region as Clark knew it. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

Cahokia

Cahokia was founded by the Seminary Priests of the Foreign Mission of Quebec in January of 1699. It was the first permanent French settlement in the Mid-Mississippi Valley, and today it is the oldest town on the Mississippi River. The Seminary Priests came to preach the gospel to the Cahokia and Tamaroa Indians, members of the Illiniwek Confederacy. Over time the priests were joined by fur traders and farmers. Close to the mouths of the Missouri and Illinois rivers, Cahokia was an excellent location for the fur trade, and the fertile valley in which it lay, eventually known as the American Bottoms, made Cahokia ideal for farming. Joining the Illiniwek and the French Canadians were enslaved Africans.[2]

This mixed community suffered a double blow in the mid-1760s. First, as a result of the French and Indian War, France ceded much of her North American empire, including the Illinois Country, in 1763. Cahokia was now a possession of England, the ancient enemy of the Gallic people. England was also a Protestant nation, often hostile to Catholicism and Catholics. The priests sold their property in Cahokia and crossed the Mississippi River to what had become Spanish Upper Louisiana. They were soon followed by many other residents of Cahokia, all seeking refuge in the territory of Catholic Spain.[3]

The second blow came when Pierre Leclede and Auguste Chouteau founded a fur trading post almost directly across the Mississippi River from Cahokia in February of 1764. St. Louis almost immediately ended Cahokia's role in the fur trade. No longer an active Catholic mission or a center of the fur trade, Cahokia became primarily an agricultural community. This was the town that Capt. Joseph Bowman and his 30 mounted "Big Knives" entered on July 6, 1778.

George Rogers Clark & The Western Campaign

Bowman and his men were part of the small army raised by George Rogers Clark in 1778 to fight the British and their Indian allies primarily in the Mississippi, Wabash, and Ohio River Valleys. Their mission was to seize control of strategic locations and thereby thwart raids into Kentucky. Clark firmly believed that the very survival of the Kentucky settlements depended on offensive rather than defensive action. The war had to be taken to the enemy. But the authority and resources to raise such a force and conduct such a campaign required the consent and assistance of Virginia, of which Kentucky was then a county.[4]

Clark left Kentucky in October of 1777 to appeal to Virginia's government to authorize and support his plan. Clark was persuasive in large measure due to his extensive cache of intelligence and his ability to connect Kentucky's interests with those of the rest of Virginia. Clark had sent spies to the Illinois Country to ascertain British strength, French sentiment, Indian intentions, and Spanish

George Rogers Clark (1752–1818) was the second-oldest brother of explorer and Missouri territorial governor William Clark. As a Brigadier General in the Virginia militia, he was the highest-ranking American officer in the Ohio Valley during the War of Independence. Debts he incurred during the war to supply his troops left his personal finances in ruins for the rest of his life. George Catlin painted this miniature portrait on ivory from an earlier portrait. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

sympathies. What they learned and what Clark reported to the Virginia government was encouraging. British strength was based at Detroit, far to the north of Clark's immediate objectives in the Mississippi and Wabash River Valleys. Further, they "had but little expectation of a visit from us. . . ."[5] The Illinois French in those areas were at best lukewarm to the British and would likely support the Patriot cause. The Indians were indeed intent on attacking Kentucky. Lastly, the Spanish in St. Louis appeared sympathetic to the Americans despite Spain's official neutrality.[6]

In addition to presenting actionable intelligence, Clark also described how Virginia's more easterly settlements would be exposed to Indian attacks if the Kentucky settlements were destroyed or abandoned. British-sponsored Indian attacks on Kentucky had increased sharply during 1777, and the Virginia county simply did not have the resources to provide for its own defense. If assistance from Williamsburg was not forthcoming, then these western settlements would either be destroyed or abandoned, leaving more easterly settlements open to attack. It was therefore in Virginia's interests to support her most western county in its hour of need.

Clark presented his plan to Governor Patrick Henry

on December 10, 1777. Henry approved the plan, as did Virginia's Council, on January 2, 1778, while the General Assembly authorized the creation of a force "to march against and attack any of our western enemies." Clark was commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia regular army (as opposed to militia) and given wide-ranging discretion to conduct the campaign as he saw fit.[7]

Clark's first objective was to actually raise an army. Recruiting was somewhat less than successful, and Clark eventually had to settle for a force of only 175 men instead of the 350 to 500 he had originally envisioned. Clark compensated for this by instilling a bit of military discipline and rigorously training what troops he did have. The small army, referred to as the "Big Knives" by the First Nations and the Illinois French, left Corn Island, future site of Louisville, on June 24, 1778. Its first objective was the de facto capitol of the British Illinois Country: Kaskaskia.

Clark captured Kaskaskia on the evening of July 4, 1778. Lacking a sizable army, Clark used speed, surprise, and psychology to subdue the Illinois French residents of the village. Clark's use of psychology to first instill fear of his men and then support for the Patriot cause was masterful. The residents of Kaskaskia quickly and eagerly joined Clark, Virginia, and the United States, taking a loyalty oath on July 5. With Kaskaskia secure, Clark ordered Capt. Bowman and a company of 30 mounted men to ride north and take control of Prairie du Rocher, St. Philippe, and Cahokia.[8]

Bowman and his men, joined by local Illinois French, rode out of Kaskaskia on July 5. Both Prairie du Rocher and St. Philippe fell quickly. Like Clark, Bowman used speed and surprise to good effect. But he also had several residents of Kaskaskia to vouch for his good intentions and the Patriot cause. The residents of both Prairie du Rocher and St. Philippe surrendered quickly and as Bowman wrote, "were willing to comply with any terms I should propose."[9]

So it was that the Americans rode into Cahokia on July 6. According to Bowman, "We rode up to the commander's house and demanded a surrender. He accordingly surrendered himself, likewise all the inhabitants of the place." But whereas the residents of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and St. Philippe had surrendered immediately and unconditionally, the people of Cahokia were a bit more difficult for the Big Knives to bend to their will. Bowman continues: "I then demanded of them to take the oath of fidelity to the states, otherwise I should treat them as enemies. They told me they would give me an answer next morning." Adding to Bowman's worries that first night, "there was a man in the town who would call in one hundred and fifty Indians to his assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole of the night. . . ." Fortunately, Bowman and his men "took possession of a strong stone house, well fortified for war," and thus had a secure place to lay upon their arms.[10]

The next morning, the villagers agreed to take the oath of allegiance to Virginia and the United States, having made their point by waiting some 12 hours to do so. Even so, according to Clark, "some Individuals said that the Town was given up too tamely. . . ."[11] This was the first, but by no means the last, time that the people of Cahokia demonstrated an independent streak.

As commanding officer in Cahokia, Bowman was responsible for both military and civilian affairs. His first priority was to provide for the defense of the village. The old ramshackle French fort that once stood where Village Hall is today had been quickly replaced by the British in 1765 by the stone rectory which stood in what is now called the Cahokia Wedge. Like his British predecessors, Bowman decided to use this "strong stone house" as a fort. Repairs were made, and the building was christened Fort Bowman, the Revolution's westernmost American fort. In addition, the local militia was mustered into American service.[12] Having settled military matters, Bowman turned to civil affairs. He organized a local court, and he was elected its first president. This court met in the home of Francois Saucier; the building was later purchased by St. Clair County to serve as the first county courthouse in the first county of what became the State of Illinois. The building still stands, and it is open to the public as the Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Site.[13]

Most of the Illinois French had indeed swung to the Patriot cause. Now Clark had to come to terms with the various First Nations of the Mid-Mississippi Valley and surrounding areas. Many of these tribes began to gather at Cahokia to treat with Clark and his Big Knives. A conference between Clark and the Indians at Cahokia was organized in August. The location of these discussions was more than likely near Fort Bowman. Indeed, we know that many Indians were camped at the eastern end of the Cahokia Wedge before and during their meetings with Clark.[14]

Regardless of the exact location, the "amazing number" of assembled Indians significantly outnumbered Clark and his small force.[15] Clark once again used psychology to compensate for a lack of troops. The American commander stressed that he was seeking neither peace nor war, but instead desired to know which of the two the Indians intended. He emphasized that he respected them as men and as warriors, and as such expected them to speak truthfully and live by whichever decision they made. But he also emphasized that the British had misled the Indians regarding both the Americans' and London's true intentions. Clark maintained that Americans only wanted the freedom to govern themselves, while the British were using the various tribes to fight their war for them. Clark's credibility was supported by the Spanish. "The friendly correspondence between the Spaniards and ourselves was also much to our advantage, since everything the Indians heard from them was favorable to us," Clark wrote in his memoir.[16]

This combination of bluff, bravado, respect, appeal to self interest, and Spanish support worked. Despite a failed attempt by some Indians to kidnap him, Clark's conference was a great success. During the five weeks he spent at Cahokia, the American commander negotiated peace with



The Revolutionary War in the trans-Appalachian West was marked by skirmishes between smaller forces and Native Americans whom the British convinced to side with them against the Americans, as this map suggests. *(Image: Albert Bushnell,* The American Nation, *vol. 14, 1906)*

at least ten of the First Nations that were represented there. These peace agreements neutralized a large number of potential British recruits.[17] The local Illinois French largely supported the Patriot cause, and now many Indians swore peace and neutrality. Clark's success with these two groups was mirrored by his success with a third important player in the Mid-Mississippi Valley: Spain.

Spanish-American Contacts & Relations

Clark's intelligence from St. Louis proved accurate. Local Spanish officials were indeed sympathetic to Clark and his army. "Our friends, the Spanyards, [did] everything in their power to convince me of their friendship," Clark wrote to a friend.[18] This was especially true of the Spanish Lt. Gov. Fernando de Leyba. Immediately following Bowman's successful occupation of Cahokia, de Leyba sent him a message of congratulations and welcome. He also wrote a similar letter to Clark in Kaskaskia. Clark responded to de Leyba with a July 13 letter in which he expressed his thanks and hope for continued friendship between Americans and Spaniards: "Dear Sir, I received your letter of the 8th Instant and with pleasure read the contints wherein you expressed the deepest sentiments of your real Friendship to me and the American Cause a Friendship that is valuable to us. We have already

Clark was known as the "Hannibal of the West" by the end of the Revolutionary War, and he remained a heroic figure, as is seen by his commemoration on this stamp marking the 150th anniversary of his victory at Vincennes. *(Image: U.S. Bureau of Engraving and Printing)*

In this 1804 scene of St. Louis as it appeared from Illinois, Fort San Carlos can be seen in the center. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

experienced it and hope to Merit a Continuation thereof." He was especially grateful for de Leyba's "treatment to Captain Bowman and Speaches to the Savages in favour of us."[19]

These letters were the beginning of an important working relationship between the Americans and Spanish in the Mid-Mississippi Valley. This relationship was described in an April 23, 1779, letter from de Leyba to Patrick Henry: "From the time that my friend Colonel Clark arrived in this place, fraternal harmony has reigned between the people from the United States and the vassals of his Catholic Majesty."[20] And as Clark wrote in his memoir, "Friendly correspondence which at once commenced between the Spanish officers and ourselves added much to the general tranquility and happiness."[21] This friendship was especially true of Clark and de Leyba themselves. Clark was a frequent guest of de Leyba in St. Louis, and a close working relationship between the two was forged by these visits and a continuous correspondence.

Spanish friendship though was also very much based on Spanish interests. Even before Clark and his army arrived in the Illinois Country, the Spanish were considering their options vis-à-vis the British Empire. The British had held Gibraltar since 1713, and they had taken Majorca in the Mediterranean and Florida in North America as a result of the late French and Indian War. Spanish calculations in the Mississippi Valley were but one part of a much larger Spanish strategy. The goal of that strategy was to return those lost lands to Spain and to expand Spain's position in the Mississippi Valley.[22] During the late 1770s and early 1780s, this goal meshed reasonably well with the American goal of independence. Bernardo de Galvez, Spanish Governor of Louisiana, instructed de Leyba to assist Clark as much as possible, but in secret. He also allowed Oliver Pollock, purchasing agent for both the Continental Congress and Virginia in New Orleans, to conduct his operations in Spanish territory freely. Of course, neither act was in keeping with Spain's official position of neutrality.[23]

Clark's ultimate goal was to take Detroit. It was the most important British post in the West, and it served as a garrison town, supply depot, and meeting place for British officers and their Indian allies. Clark believed that if he could take Detroit, he could largely neutralize British efforts in the western theater of the war. However, Clark's plans for a strike at Detroit were subordinated to the need to expel the British from Fort Sackville, which the British had retaken in December of 1778. Clark's expedition to Vincennes included many Cahokia residents who were eager to remove the British from Fort Sackville, and thus remove a major threat to their community.

Once Vincennes was back in American hands, Clark again planned an expedition against Detroit. As he did before his move into the Illinois Country, Clark sought to gather intelligence on the lands he intended to enter. To that end, he ordered Capt. Godefroy Linctot to take his company of Cahokia volunteers north and scout the Illinois River Valley and beyond. In a June 1779 letter to Linctot, Clark ordered him "to take Charge of a Volunteer Company raised at Cahos and march by way of the Illinois River to the British post Called Ome (on the Miami River) which I make no doubt but that you can easily get possession of by which Means you probably may be safe while you have an opportunity of treating with the Indians in that Quarter. . . ."[24] Unfortunately for Clark, the British were planning offensive operations of their own.

Battle of Ft. San Carlos

Spain's entry into the war in 1779 added another factor to British strategic planning in the trans-Appalachian West. While still a major European power, Spain's resources in this particular theater of the war were quite limited. Very few troops from the Louisiana Regiment were stationed in Upper Louisiana, leaving defense primarily to local militia, and the Spanish fort at the mouth of the Missouri River was literally falling down.

Further, the Spanish had been assisting Clark and his men since their arrival in 1778, but the official peace between Great Britain and Spain had limited the British response. Now, with war officially declared, the British could reduce if not eliminate Spanish assistance to the rebels, as well as force open the rich fur trade of the Missouri River Valley, long closed to British traders by Spanish regulations.[25] The attack on St. Louis and Cahokia was thus part of a multipronged offensive planned to sweep through the Mississippi Valley. The timing could not have been better for the British or worse for the Allies. The British had spent considerable time courting various First Nations, and as a result they could recruit hundreds of warriors to their colors. Conversely, Spanish and American forces in the Mississippi Valley were weak and spread thinly among various forts and settlements. Further, Clark was preoccupied with building Fort Jefferson. Located on the Mississippi River south of the Ohio, Clark planned to concentrate what troops he did have at the new post once it was complete. Both Spanish forces in St. Louis and American forces in Cahokia would have to rely on local Illinois French militia to flesh out their thin ranks.[26]

Further, the "Hard Winter" of 1779–1780 was the most severe in years. Ice and snow covered much of the country from the Great Lakes to Virginia. Game became scarce, livestock died, and food stores dwindled. Both civilians and soldiers suffered during these bitterly cold months. The only benefit of this severe weather was that it curtailed the military activities of the British and their Indian allies.[27]

But while the British were relatively quiet in the West, they were shifting their primary focus of the war in the East to the southern states, including Virginia. This meant that the Old Dominion had even fewer resources to send west as it faced British troops in the east. In New Orleans, Oliver Pollock had gone bankrupt trying to supply Clark, and he could no longer support the small American force in the Mississippi Valley. Clark's army was cold and short of supplies, and desertion was becoming a problem.[28]

Unhappily for the British, these advantages were negated by one major disadvantage: the loss of the element of surprise. Word of the impending attack reached St. Louis and Cahokia long before the British attack force arrived. This gave the Allies time to prepare their defenses. Col. John Montgomery, American military commander in the Illinois Country, responded to the situation as best he could. In a May 15, 1780, letter to Clark, Montgomery stated that "the Bad nues . . . Compelled Me to March with out loss of Time to the asistance of the inhabetents of Kaho. . . ." Luckily for Montgomery, his small force included many "inhabetents of Kaho [w]ho have Digtinguished them Selves More like Vetrons than ondesiplened men and are Redy to turn out to a man to Go Any Where the[y] are Requested."[29] Despite the skill and reliability of his Cahokia militia, if Montgomery stood a chance of successfully defending the village he would have to be reinforced before the hammer fell. Some help did come in early May when Capt. John Rogers arrived with a company of mounted Virginians. Rogers and his men made repairs to Fort Bowman and "Put it in Some Poster of Defence."[30]

Col. John Montgomery (c. 1750–1794) served with George Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country in the War of American Independence. Montgomery came by his revolutionary credentials honestly; he was one of the 13 signers of the Fincastle Resolutions, in which the elected representatives of Fincastle County, Virginia Colony, told Virginia's delegation to the First Continental Congress of their support of breaking with the British Crown in January 1775. *(Image: Nashville CivicScope)*

As the situation worsened, Cahokia appealed to Clark, now a full colonel, for assistance. The Board of Magistrates sent Charles Gratiot, a Swiss-born Cahokia resident and prominent merchant, to present Clark with a letter dated April 11 in which the magistrates explained the village's desperate situation: "We are on the eve of being attacked in our village by considerable parties of savages and will not be able to work at the cultivation of our fields, if we do not have prompt succor. . . ." Their letter also reflected the "Hard Winter" as they went on to write, "but what afflicts us the most is this, that in case you send us many men, we should not have the provisions which would be necessary for them. . . ."[31] One the signatories of this letter was Pierre Martin, whose house still stands in Prairie du Pont just south of Cahokia. In a May 11, 1780, letter to Oliver Pollock, Clark reflected on the gravity of the situation: "The Illenois Settlement are much threatened by the British Gentlemen at Detroit. . . ."[32]

On May 15, Montgomery and Rogers crossed the

Mississippi from Cahokia to St. Louis to confer with de Leyba on how to respond to the threat with a combined and coherent strategy. Perhaps reflecting Clark's tactical thinking, Montgomery suggested that the Allies strike first. De Leyba agreed, promising Spanish support for such a campaign. However, the American delay in obtaining boats and provisions for the expedition resulted in the attack on St. Louis and Cahokia occurring before Montgomery was able to move.[33]

The British force that attacked Cahokia and St. Louis on May 26, 1780, was composed primarily of warriors from various First Nations and commanded by Emmanuel Hesse. In a February 17, 1780, letter to his superiors, Michilimackinac Lt. Gov. Patrick Sinclair described Hesse as "a Trader and a man of character (formerly in the 60th Regt). . . ."[34] Thus Hesse was familiar with Britain's Indian allies and frontier warfare, and he was deemed reliable. The Indians he commanded largely came from the Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Winnebago, and Ojibwe nations. Hesse and his force left Michilimackinac on March 10 and moved south to Prairie du Chien. There Hesse recruited more men. On May 2, Hesse and his force of approximately 1,000 left Prairie du Chien and headed south toward St. Louis and Cahokia.[35]

Both Montgomery and de Leyba sent dispatches to Clark requesting that he leave Fort Jefferson and march north to aid in the defense of Cahokia and St. Louis. Clark arrived in Cahokia on May 25, and he immediately crossed the Mississippi River to confer with de Leyba in St. Louis. Afterwards, he returned to Cahokia to supervise its defense against approximately 300 warriors led by Jean Marie Ducharme.[36]

There is precious little in the primary sources which describes the fighting at Cahokia. One such document is a letter from Montgomery to the Honorable Board of Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts dated February 22, 1783. In it, Montgomery gives a brief description of events:

> In the Spring of 1780, we were threatened with an Invasion. Genl: Clark [promoted in 1781] being informed of it Hurreyed his departure with a small body of troops to the Falls of the mouth of the Ohio, when he received other expresses from the Spanish Comm'dts and myself, luckily joined me at Cohos, time enough to save the country from Impending ruin, as the Enimy appeared in great force within twenty-four hours after his arrival. Finding that they were likely to be disappointed in their Design, they retired after doing some mischief on the Span'h shore, . . .[37]

In a September 1780 letter, the Cahokians themselves described how the Indians' "slack manner of making war" resulted in little "carnage in our country."[38]

While Clark's force and the residents of Cahokia did not suffer the losses that St. Louis did, there were losses nonetheless. According to a July 8, 1780, letter by Sinclair, "The Rebels lost an officer and three men killed at the Cahokias & five Prisoners."[39] With the fighting at Cahokia and St. Louis over, the Indian force retreated north. The Mississippi Valley component of the British offensive collapsed. Soon, the entire offensive ground to a halt. Once it had, Clark again turned his attention to Detroit. Included in his calculations was the possible inclusion of Spanish troops in such a campaign.

Spanish-American Combined Operations

After successfully defending Cahokia, Clark returned to Fort Jefferson. Before leaving, he issued orders to Montgomery to counterattack the Indians who had just attacked Cahokia. Specifically, Montgomery was to pursue the retreating Indians, degrade that force when and where possible, and destroy the primary Sauk and Fox towns. Montgomery's force of approximately 350 men contained Cahokia militia as well as 100 Spanish troops, making this an Allied offensive. The resulting Rock River Expedition illustrated that Spanish and American commanders could cooperate on offensive as well as on defensive operations.[40]

Describing the expedition in a September 21, 1780, letter to Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a former French officer who claimed to act on behalf of the King of France, the "Inhabitants of Cahokia" recounted the beginning of the campaign: "Oh, Colonel Clark, affecting always to desire our public welfare and under pretext of avenging us, soon formed with us conjointly with the Spaniards a party of more than three hundred men to go and attack in their own village the savages who had come to our homes to harass us, and after substituting Colonel Montgomery to command in his place, he soon left us."[41]

Montgomery wrote that after receiving his instructions from Clark, he "immediately proceeded to the Business I was order'd and march'd three hundred and fifty men to the Lake open on the Illinois River, and from thence to the Rock River, Destroying the Towns and crops proposed, the Enimy not daring to fight. . . ."[42]

While Montgomery seemed satisfied with the campaign's outcome, the Cahokians' experience in the Rock River Expedition must have left something to be desired. In the same letter to Mottin de la Balme quoted above, the "Inhabitants of Cahokia" described in detail the shortcomings of the Anglo-American forces: "It is then, well to explain to you, sir, that the Virginians, who never employed any principle of economy, have been the cause by their lack of management and bad conduct, of the non-success of the expedition and that our glorious projects have failed through their fault: for the savages abandoned their nearest villages, where we have been, and we were forced to stop and not push on further, since we had almost no more provisions, powder, balls, which the Virginians had undertaken to furnish us."[43] This letter again illustrates the independence of thought and opinion that characterized the residents of Cahokia.

But the unsatisfactory experience with the Rock River campaign, organized and commanded by Americans, did

not deter Cahokians from cooperating with their neighbors to the west. Spanish troops and Cahokia militia cooperated in patrolling the areas north of Cahokia and St. Louis. In August 1780, these patrols repulsed an Indian probe into their area of operations.[44]

Cahokians also joined an expedition led by Mottin de la Balme. The goal of his expedition north was to attack Detroit. If Clark and his Virginians could not achieve this, then perhaps this representative of the former mother country could. Mottin de la Balme and his mixed force of Illinois French and Indians got as far as the headwaters of the Maumee River where the Frenchman and most of his troops were killed by Miami warriors. Before his death, Mottin de la Balme had detached a small force of Cahokia French to attack the British post at St. Joseph, modern-day Niles, Michigan. Their attack was successful, and the post was destroyed. But the Cahokians themselves were then attacked by a party of British traders and Potawatomi. Only three of them returned home.[45] This defeat moved the residents of Cahokia to strike at St. Joseph once again. However, the new expedition would include their allies from across the river.

In St. Louis, Lt. Gov. Francisco Cruzat, who had replaced the deceased de Leyba in September 1780, authorized a Spanish expedition against St. Joseph. He appointed Capt. Eugenio Pierra (Eugene Pourré) to organize and command this campaign. Pierra raised a mixed force of 65 Spanish militia, 60 Indians, and 20 Cahokia French. Pierra and his men left St. Louis on January 2, 1781, and arrived at St. Joseph on the 12th. Only a few British traders and Indians were present, and the Spanish-led force had no difficulty taking the post. Pierra and his men wasted little time in destroying St. Joseph and returning to St. Louis.[46] Ominously for the future of Spanish-American relations, Pierra raised the Spanish flag over the post and claimed the region for Spain.

Conclusion

Pierra's action at St. Joseph foreshadowed over a century of Spanish-American rivalry that stretched from the Mississippi Valley to South America.[47] However, Spanish-American cooperation during the Revolutionary War, especially at the Battle of Fort San Carlos, secured the Northwest Territory and a Mississippi River boundary for the new nation when peace finally came in 1783.

Clark's successful campaign in the trans-Appalachian West was in large part made possible by Spanish assistance and cooperation. Like the French in the East, the Spanish in the West were of critical importance in securing American victory. Spanish supplies, Spanish troops, and Spanish diplomatic support with the Indians not only enabled Clark and his small army to successfully occupy and defend the old French villages of Cahokia, Vincennes, and Kaskaskia, but also to use them as staging areas to strike at the British and their First Nation allies further north.

Of particular importance to Clark was the financing of his army and its operations. This was largely done by Oliver Pollock in New Orleans. Pollock used his personal wealth as collateral for purchases of Spanish goods made by Virginia and the United States. But it was Pollock's personal connections to Spanish officials, including governors, which made these purchases possible. In an April 22, 1788, letter to Pollock, William Heth stated: "There is no circumstance of which I am more convinced than that the conquest of the Illinois country could not have been maintained by Virginia and that consequently that it would not now form part of the United States if it had not been for your assistance and very liberal advances."[48] Heth was one of three commissioners appointed to sort out the debts owed to New Orleans merchants contracted by Pollock on behalf of Virginia and Congress. Pollock's personal wealth and connections served Clark and the Patriot cause in the West extremely well.

The role of Cahokia and its people in the western theater of the Revolutionary War was also important. Cahokia was the site of Clark's Indian conference that bought precious months of peace which enabled the Americans to secure their position in the Illinois County. The village's location near St. Louis enabled American commanders to maintain regular contact with their Spanish allies. Officers stationed at Fort Bowman in Cahokia were often in St. Louis conferring with their Spanish counterparts. Cahokia's location also made it an ideal spot from which to launch operations to the north, and to act as a shield for the villages further south. The people of Cahokia themselves gave valuable service to the Patriot cause and the Allied war effort by fighting in several engagements and under a variety of commanders: the American Clark, the Frenchman Mottin de la Balme, and the Spaniard Pierra.

It was also at Cahokia, and St. Louis, that the Americans, Spanish, and the Illinois French broke the grand British offensive of 1780. The Battle of Fort San Carlos left British operations in the West in shambles. The war wound down and ended before another attempt could be made to drive the Americans and the Spanish from the Mississippi Valley. This in turn left Virginia and the United States in possession of the lands between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. Though their actual control of these lands was tenuous, Clark's western campaign and his defense of Cahokia on May 26, 1780, gave the United States the ability to successfully press its claims to this territory during peace negotiations with the British. Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison testified to this in a July 2, 1783, letter to Clark: "[M]y thanks and those of my Council for the very great and singular services you have rendered your Country, in wresting so great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British Enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and carrying on successful war in the heart of their country."[49] Thus, in conjunction with his Spanish allies and with the aid of the village and people of Cahokia, George Rogers Clark and his army of "Big Knives" secured an America not bound to the Atlantic seaboard.

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Gateway Liberalism:

Catholic and Jewish Responses to Racially Transitioning Neighborhoods and Schools In St. Louis's West End, 1945–1960

SARAH SIEGEL



Joseph Ritter (1892–1967) had already taken action to desegregate Catholic schools before he arrived in St. Louis as archbishop in 1947. As the new Bishop of Indianapolis in 1938, Ritter ordered that parochial schools no longer be segregated, which met with opposition and protests from groups as varied as the Ku Klux Klan and some clergy. *(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)*

Within the span of one year, two civil rights decisions, one religious and one secular, signaled momentous shifts in the racial and religious demographics of St. Louis's schools and neighborhoods. In the summer of 1947, St. Louis's newly arrived Cardinal Joseph Ritter announced that the city and county's Catholic high schools would desegregate.[1] A few months later, in January 1948, the United States Supreme Court ruled racially restrictive housing covenants illegal in the St. Louis–based *Shelley v. Kraemer* case. For decades, racial covenants had forced a growing black population to remain in overcrowded, segregated neighborhoods, and as a result of the case, blacks gradually moved into previously all-white neighborhoods across the city and north county.

These two decisions, imposed upon St. Louisans by authority figures, sparked rapid and intense demographic change in schools and neighborhoods. The area most affected by housing desegregation was the West End neighborhood, a working- and middle-class community located on the northwestern border of the city. In the decade following these two decisions, the West End specifically and St. Louis as a whole rose to be a model of progressive race relations that quickly faltered. Buoyed by an initially lauded school desegregation process, West End activists worked hard to stabilize their neighborhood's interracial composition by publicizing the neighborhood as a model of an integrated, desirable, middle-class community.

As the decisions of 1947–1948 signaled clear change in the city's population patterns, a broad range of St. Louisans exhibited optimism regarding the future of race relations in the city. This confidence was especially apparent in the way the city's press portrayed St. Louis's response to the *Brown v. Board* public school desegregation case. When the *Brown* decision was announced in May 1954, local news articles distanced the city from the turmoil the case caused in the South. On the day of the court's announcement, the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* foresaw that the decision "will cause the most radical upheaval in the South since reconstruction days," yet a day later, the city's NAACP branch also correctly predicted "that no difficulty will be experienced because of integrated education [in St. Louis]. … All people have a profound respect for the laws of the land."[2] Even though the *Brown* case deemed Missouri's school segregation laws illegal alongside those of the South, the city reported the decision as if residents were northern onlookers. In fact, St. Louis's newspapers usually took a nonchalant tone regarding the city's school desegregation to highlight its lack of controversy. The press also declined to give much publicity to anti-integration protest, choosing instead to focus on the logistics of the desegregation plan.[3] The *Post-Dispatch*, the *Globe-Democrat*, and the black-owned *Argus* described the three desegregation phases planned by the school board, announced each stage of implementation, and reported the number black students who transferred to each previously all-white school. They provided quotes from school administrators who praised students for adapting quickly to their new peers.[4] Overall, Missouri's desegregation process received surprisingly little attention from the press, and St. Louisans prided themselves on their peaceful, law-abiding citizenry that seemed, for the most part, accepting of progressive change.

Certainly, some ardent and vocal segregationists expressed their anger at desegregation. Most notably, an organization called the National Citizens Protective Association organized briefly to express opposition to the desegregation plan. Many others surely expressed disapproval of segregation privately, and a minority of parents instructed their children not to associate with black classmates socially, telling their children to "just act like [the black students] are not there."[5] But public school desegregation plans in St. Louis were implemented without violence or widespread opposition and with the support of a variety of community institutions, especially civil rights, interfaith, and neighborhood organizations.[6] In some cases, parents organized to ease their children's schools' integration. They expressed their enthusiasm that desegregation strengthened the city's commitment to equality and democracy, and their views were accepted as mainstream.[7] At the time it was implemented in 1954–1955, civil rights groups and liberal whites largely hailed the integration process as a victory. Indeed, the St. Louis

Board of Education had completed its desegregation plan on schedule by September 1955, just over a year after the *Brown* decision and two years before the federally forced desegregation of Central High in Little Rock, Arkansas. City leaders, school officials, residents, and news outlets touted St. Louis as a law-abiding community willing to actively facilitate, or at least passively accept, integration.

Despite this tranquil picture, the recently desegregated schools and racially transitioning neighborhoods in St. Louis fell prey to re-segregation within only a few years, and this racial and economic segregation has persisted to the present day. There were instances in the late fifties and early sixties of the school board allowing white students to attend white schools outside of their neighborhood districts through loopholes and busing, but overall re-segregation occurred due to racial change within city and county neighborhoods. Less than ten years after this purported triumph of school integration and racial progressivism, school and neighborhood desegregation had all but disappeared, and St. Louis became yet another example of the devastating shortcomings of liberal racial policies.

Why did a city that acted so confidently to end legalized school segregation overwhelmingly fail to sustain integrated urban schools and neighborhoods? The answer lies in the contradictions of liberalism, both in St. Louis and throughout the country. Historian Robert Self defines liberalism with four factors: a general commitment to New Deal welfare institutions, the economic promotion of the middle class, equality of opportunity for all races, and individualism.[8] As Self has explained, a central pitfall of liberalism in the mid-twentieth century was that when white liberals' commitment to racial equality clashed with their commitment to expanded opportunity for the middle class, they almost always favored benefiting the middle class to the detriment of black economic, political, and housing opportunities. White liberals' desire to live and own property in upwardly mobile communities ultimately trumped visions of interracial neighborhoods. Self provides a crucial explanation for where goals of liberalism fall apart, but it is necessary to analyze local cases to understand why this breakdown of liberal ideology occurred and what its consequences were.

Two distinct but related types of liberalism were present in St. Louis, though both failed to create a coherent vision of an urban community that was both integrated and economically prosperous. A small but vocal cohort of active liberals understood that maintaining an integrated urban neighborhood would require individuals to make housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated community. They understood that pursuing economic advancement and racial integration simultaneously would require a personal commitment. They joined interracial neighborhood organizations with the goal of fostering an integrated, economically stable neighborhood. As large numbers of their neighbors disinvested in the city and moved to the suburbs, however, active liberals realized that their agenda would be incredibly difficult to implement. Organizations that promoted neighborhood advancement experienced interracial disagreements, inhibiting their moral authority. Further, active white liberals never had a critical mass to influence demographic patterns. Despite a more realistic understanding of what it would take to craft an integrated neighborhood, active liberals were unable to sustain an interracial community.

In addition to a small number of active liberals, the majority of whites in the West End were what can be called passive liberals: they believed in both economic opportunity and racial equality, but were unwilling to take any actions that would risk their financial security. To be a passive liberal does not mean that these individuals were unwilling to act; in fact, these individuals were quick to leave the neighborhood when they sensed the possibility of economic decline. These individuals assumed that an influx of black residents would decrease property values, and they chose to leave the West End (sometimes even before blacks started moving into the neighborhood) rather than risk living in a declining community. Passive liberals could feel secure that their race-based decisions were not racist because they espoused the rhetoric of racial equality. The term "passive" therefore refers to the nature of their commitment to liberalism: they believed that individuals should not be responsible for personally participating in residential desegregation. Passive liberalism could only improve race relations when a community would endorse policies that were becoming mainstream, as was the case in St. Louis's public school desegregation.[9] Passive liberalism failed to produce improvements for blacks when whites perceived personal financial or social risks, seen in whites' housing choices in the late 1940s through the 1950s. While this passive liberalism may seem innocuous on its surface, it had pernicious consequences that have maintained economic and racial segregation into the twenty-first century. Most insidious, as passive liberalism became the mainstream in the West End, individuals could espouse liberal rhetoric while justifying race-based decisions about where to live and with whom to socialize.

To better understand racially transitioning neighborhoods, urban scholars have examined the religious influences within cities, which in many cases had profound effects on urban policy and neighborhood demographics. Attention to religious population patterns is especially important in heavily Catholic St Louis and in the West End, which had a large Jewish population. Even though the character of liberalism was different for Catholics and Jews, the effects of liberalism were similar on each group's housing choices. As evidenced by Cardinal Ritter's decision to desegregate parochial schools, Catholic leadership in St. Louis proved much more actively liberal than the general population. Parishioners therefore often felt caught between their religious devotion to the Catholic hierarchy and their social anxiety about living in close proximity to blacks. This tension between mandates from Catholic religious leaders and discomfort with integrated communities translated into a grudging acceptance of passive liberalism. It led to the existence of integrated institutions and a simultaneous exodus into racially homogenous suburbs.[10] Even though Jewish laypeople were more likely than Catholics to espouse liberal rhetoric,

BLUE CROSS Enrollment March 1-18

The "Y" Journ

Vol. 27—No. 26 Y.M.H.A.-Y.W.H.A.—ST. LOUIS, MO.

Diane Joyce of TV to Open Nu-Teens' Program

Diane Joyce of KSD-TV, also nown as Janet Dailey on KXLW, teacher at Beaumont High chool, will formally "cut the ipe" on the Nu-Teens Committee rst activity—a "He-She-Bang" ening, at Teen Haven, Sunday ght, March 4, from 7:30 to 10 m. The affair is open to teen-ers from 13-16 and will feature ree original comedy skits by embers of the committee, which chairmanned by Ruth Waldman d Roberta Harris. Admission is ly 20c with proceeds going to J. A.

The Nu-Teens Committee is a oup of younger teenagers who ll sponsor programs at Teen ven on alternating Wednesday d Sunday nights, or twice a onth. The schedule for these will posted in the lobby. Watch for —and be sure to come, stag or g, to the "He-She-Bang" ening.

uniors Preparing or Annual Purim arnival, March 24

"One World" Is Novel Program to Be Offered Here

Today's news is being made in all parts of the world. An explosion occurs in Korea and our entire lives are changed here in America. To meet the need of people to know what is happening elsewhere, and how it affects them, a new program is beginning, entitled, "ONE WORLD." Twice each month, a citizen of a foreign country will speak on life in his native land. There will also be short films about the country on the program.

The first program, on Monday, March 12, at 8:30 p. m., will present Dr. Chatterjee of India. Dr. Chatterjee is a medical student at Washington U., and has spoken on life in this country before numerous community groups. After his talk, there will be a question and discussion period. All programs in the series will be free of charge and open to the public.

Future programs will deal with Brazil and the Philippines. Programs will be held the second and fourth Mondays of each month.

Arthur Cohn, Chairman Western States Chapter Of Jewish Center Workers

In the course of the annual meeting of the West Central States Chapter of the National Association of Jewish Center Workers held recently in Chicago, the following were elected as officers of the Chapter for the coming year:

Arthur Cohn, Assistant Executive Director, Y. M.-Y. W. H. A., chairman; William Kahn, Director, Intermediate Division, Council House, Vice-Chairman, and Chairman, Program Committee; Rose

SPEAKS SUNDAY

MAX LERNER

Large Crowd Lauds Jewish Music Festival

An audience estimated at 300 celebrated Jewish music at a Jewish Music Festival held Tuesday, February 20. This, in spite of a severe rain and windstorm, speaks

Soloists for the program were Alvin Rudnitsky, assistant concert master of the St. Louis Symphony well for interest in Jewish music. Orchestra., who played the Baal Shem Suite by Bloch, and Eleanor Lyons, who sang a series of Hebrew and Jewish folk songs.

The evening was introduced by Mrs. Joseph Kingsley from the Board of Jewish Education, who opened the Festival on behalf of the Jewish Cultural Committee and allied organizations sponsoring the event. In addition to the above mentioned soloists, the following participated Dora Menkin,

Max Lerner Concl Forum Season Wi Democracy And T

Three Doubles Handball Titles Decided Here

The Class A handball tournament came to a dramatic close last Sundy when the team of Al Goldstein and Paul Mayorwitz won from Herb Shieber and Carl Winstein. It was a heart-breaker for the losing duo because they were coming strong toward the end. The champs took the first game 21 to 10, but they faltered in the second, dropping it by the same score.

It was a nip and tuck during the rubber contests until the score reached 19 to 17 in favor of Goldstein-Mayorwitz. Then it happened. Herb Shieber reached for one and pulled a muscle. The pain was too much and continued play might prove harmful. Very reluctantly, upon advice of the chairman of the tournament, the game and title was awarded to Goldstein-Mayorwitz.

Steve Sudzinski and Marshall Dennison were a bit hard-pressed in taking the Class B crown from Sig Goffstein and Bernard Yevelson. The champs took the first game 21-16. In the second contest, they had to show some rare skill in winning 21-20.

In the Class C tournament, Bob Portnoy and Maury Fox had easy sailing. They drubbed the team of Al Bierman and Steve Redler 21-6 and 21-8.

The YMHA/YWHA sponsored a Liberal Forum in the 1940s and 1950s that featured a number of speakers who were prominent nationally. Among those was Max Lerner (1902–1992), a Russian immigrant who became a popular journalist, editor, and scholar. By the time he spoke at the Liberal Forum in St. Louis, he was well known for advocating rights for African-Americans, as well as supporting internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. *(Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*

most Jews' commitments to racial equality and integration were also passive—they were ultimately unwilling to take any action that posed economic or social risk in order to cultivate a desirable, integrated urban neighborhood.[11] For Jews in the West End, the problem with liberalism was a gap between rhetoric and action. Passive liberals accepted desegregated institutions but proved unwilling to commit to active pursuance of an integrated, desirable neighborhood.

St. Louisans' understanding of the necessity and inevitability of school integration opened unique opportunities for residents to lead integration, and many of these efforts had religious influences. Despite efforts by some religious and secular leaders, though, St. Louis missed its opportunity for a truly integrated city because a majority of passively liberal residents and religious leaders could not reconcile their theoretical commitment to racial equality with personal choices regarding where to live and educate their children. Highlighting Catholic and Jewish experiences with school and neighborhood desegregation demonstrates these complex dynamics. Regardless of who spearheaded campaigns to promote integration—

Temple Israel was among the religious institutions at the "Holy Corners" area in the Central West End at the intersection of Kingshighway and McPherson, and it was the synagogue for the large Jewish population in the West End. *(Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*

institutionally based Catholic leaders, individual liberal Jewish leaders, or secular interracial neighborhood organizations—the results were similar: between 1945 and 1960, most whites moved out of neighborhoods that began integrating after 1948.

St. Louis's West End neighborhood typifies the city's racial transition and failed efforts to create stable, middle-class, integrated urban spaces. The West End is located north of Forest Park, extending west to the city limits, east to Kingshighway Boulevard, one of the city's central arteries, and north approximately to Natural Bridge Road. The West End bordered African American residential enclaves, making it a logical place for blacks to move after the *Shelley v. Kraemer* decision. The neighborhood's Windemere Place was the first block of the city to desegregate in the wake of the court decision.[12] Individuals who lived in the West End in the first half of the twentieth century remember it fondly. Harvey Brown, a Jewish West End resident from 1937–1950, explained, "it was a wonderful place to grow up, and we had everything we needed. . . . [W]e had so many places to go to play."[13]

The West End was home to two Catholic parishes that flourished during the early twentieth century: St. Rose of Lima and St. Mark. Adjacent to the neighborhood lies the Cathedral Basilica of St. Louis, the spiritual center of the archdiocese of St. Louis. A variety of Jewish congregations also inhabited the neighborhood through the first half of the century. Most of these synagogues had relocated to the West End from locations in or near downtown, following a population shift as the Jewish community grew, prospered economically, and moved west. Even though racial transition was occurring by the early fifties, the West End still boasted at least fourteen separate Jewish congregations in 1954.[14] While many Catholic children attended parochial schools, most Jews sent their children to public school. Soldan High School (for a brief period known as Soldan-Blewett), located on Union Boulevard in the heart of the West End, housed a large Jewish student body from its construction in 1909 until after World War II and was a source of pride for the neighborhood. In fact, Jewish alumnae and their families continue to refer to the school and the prominent place it once had for their community. Analyzing Catholic, Jewish, and secular responses to school and neighborhood integration demonstrates the ineffectiveness of St. Louis's liberalism.

There is a very strong Catholic influence on the St. Louis region. St. Louis today has a higher proportion of Catholics attending parochial schools than any diocese in the country.[15] As Cardinal Joseph Ritter's 1947 school desegregation indicated, the liberal Catholic impulse to embrace integrated schools and neighborhoods was rooted in Catholic leadership and institutions. While some Catholic St. Louisians supported school and neighborhood integration, a large portion resented incoming blacks. Clergy, recognizing that fixed parish boundaries would suffer great population losses if white Catholics abandoned their parishes, worked to convince white Catholics to remain in their parishes and also sometimes to convert

blacks to Catholicism. These efforts, both to keep white Catholics in the city and to convert blacks, were largely unsuccessful. The post–World War II years witnessed a substantial decline of the Catholic population in St. Louis city, and many urban parishes—including those in and near the West End—had to be closed or consolidated in the late twentieth century due to a decreasing Catholic population.

By the early twentieth century, the vast majority of the Catholic population in St. Louis was white. Black Catholics, whose population had French Creole roots, worshiped in the segregated St. Elizabeth Parish, and many sent their children to St. Joseph's Colored High School. However, Cardinal Ritter's 1947 announcement that all Catholic high schools would desegregate was a reaction to the inadequate resources at St. Joseph's. His actively liberal proclamation provoked a variety of responses from both Catholics and non-Catholics, and correspondence poured into the Archdiocese from St. Louis, across the country, and places as remote as Mexico and Bangalore. The vast majority of the letters—402 out of 479—expressed approval of Cardinal Ritter's actions.[16] They applauded his courageous declaration and implored him not to let segregationists change his mind. One approving citizen wrote, "it is difficult to see how the Church's mission to men of all races and nationalities can be fulfilled in the United States without some bold action such as your own."[17]

Those who disapproved also sent emotional letters. They cited many reasons—personal, economic, political, and racial—for disapproving of the Cardinal's actions. They expressed outrage that stemmed from fears of miscegenation, worry that black people had bad odor, frustration that the money white Catholics donated to the Archdiocese was being used to help undeserving blacks, and a belief that Cardinal Ritter's unilateral action was reminiscent of Hitler's totalitarianism. Some stated that they refused to send their children to integrated institutions and intended to transfer their children to other schools, with one individual stating, "all I can say is thank God for our Public Schools."[18] Still others referred to the city's southern connections, explaining to the Cardinal that "St. Louis has always been a pro-Southern city, and I think we have handled the racial problem to our advantage, so why should the Catholic Church be the first to initiate such a drastic flaw?"[19] One woman even claimed she no longer

St. Mark's Church quickly became a large and prominent Catholic congregation by the start of the twentieth century. This building at Page and Academy avenues, designed by the prominent architectural firm of Barnett, Haynes, and Barnett, was completed in 1902. The school was nearby. *(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)*

Completed in 1909, Soldan High School originally educated a wealthy and predominantly Jewish student body until the 1950s. It was named for Frank Louis Soldan, superintendent of St. Louis Public Schools who had died the previous year. It is one of several in St. Louis designed by William B. Ittner, who designed schools in new ways starting in the early twentieth century with increased attention to the needs of students and new learning theory. Today, it is the Soldan International Studies High School.

wanted to be Catholic.[20] The reasoning in the disapproving letters ranged from desires to maintain the status quo to overt racial hatred.

It is impossible to tell whether the majority of St. Louis's Catholic population approved or disapproved of Catholic school integration solely by analyzing letters sent to Cardinal Ritter. Comparing the number of supportive and opposing letters sent does little good because many people who personally disapproved of the Cardinal's actions were probably unwilling to voice their dissenting opinions directly to the Cardinal. What is clear, though, is that many Catholics in St. Louis were deeply disconcerted by the contradictions between their personal racial views and their Cardinal's liberalism. Other pieces of evidence from the months and years after Cardinal Ritter's announcement provide clues to how the community adjusted to integrated Catholic schools, as well as to increasing numbers of blacks in previously all-white neighborhoods. For the most part Catholic St. Louisans, like the majority of the city, acted as passive liberals who accepted the reality of desegregated institutions due to Cardinal Ritter's liberal activism, but were also unwilling to risk the respectability of their city to fight for segregated schools and neighborhoods.

Even if a significant number of Catholics disliked Cardinal Ritter's racial policies, most limited their complaints to friends and family. Dan Kelley, a West End resident who was ten years old at the time of the integration, explained that his parents were very upset with the Cardinal's decision, though they, like most Catholics, did not engage in any protest against the decision. Kelley recalled, "people talked about it at church" and worried that "everything was going to go to hell in a hand basket." In the end, though, he explained that while many disagreed with the decision, "they accommodated it."[21] This passive acceptance of Catholic school desegregation and the Cardinal's liberal race policies opened an opportunity for Catholic leaders to be optimistic about the possibility of fostering interracial parishes. However, the ambivalent nature of the Catholic community's commitment to integration ultimately did very little to sustain integration in the West End.

The most salient example of short-lived but direct opposition to Cardinal Ritter's school integration was a

St. Elizabeth's was an African-American Catholic Church in the 1940s; most of its parishioners sent their children to the segregated St. Joseph's Colored High School. In the undated first communion photo from St. Elizabeth's, note the white nun on the left. *(Images: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)*

group of over eight hundred Catholics who formed an organization to block Catholic school desegregation. The Catholic Parents Association of St. Louis and St. Louis County threatened to sue the Cardinal for forcing integration. Just weeks after its creation, the group reluctantly disbanded after Cardinal Ritter announced that anyone opposing the integration would be excommunicated. During the emotionally charged final meeting of the Catholic Parents Association, group leader John Barrett pleaded with the crowd to rescind its legal threats against the Cardinal and disband the group. On the verge of tears and "in a state of near collapse," he announced, "the only alternative we can now have to disbanding this group is to turn on our Archbishop and our faith. I am not going to do that. We cannot scandalize our Catholic religion and oppose our Archbishop without getting into sin. The only way we could carry on after this, is to throw up our Catholic religion."[22] Barrett "wept openly" as he put forth a motion to disband the group. The motion was met with loud booing from the crowd, and one man even grabbed the microphone and shouted that Catholic parents should transfer their children to public schools in protest. Even though the meeting was emotional and chaotic, only fifty people voted against disbanding the group. After announcing that the motion to disband had passed, "Barrett was so overcome that he blindly left the platform and, hardly able to walk, [had to be] escorted to his car."[23]

Though several individuals voiced their continued dissatisfaction with Catholic school integration, the Catholic Parents Association was defunct. This event indicates two important points. First, when forced to choose, St. Louis Catholics who opposed school integration chose their religious views over their racial views. Second, and equally important, while these Catholics ceased fighting school integration, they did not have to accept an integrated community. As became apparent through housing choices, Catholics often moved out of parishes that were integrating. The short-lived existence of the Catholic Parents Association, while ultimately unsuccessful in their goal of blocking Catholic school integration, certainly demonstrated that many St. Louis Catholics were unwilling to support Cardinal Ritter's liberal race policies.

While the Catholic Parents Association was the most vocal instance of opposition to integrated Catholic schools, some parents did indeed remove students from Catholic schools that enrolled black students. For example, the all-girls Rosati-Kain High School, which drew a significant number of students from West End parishes, enrolled five black students for the 1947–1948 school year.[24] As a result, "about thirty girls who had previously registered, on learning of the acceptance of five colored girls, sought entrance to other Catholic High Schools, and a few to Public High Schools."[25] In subsequent years, black enrollment increased to over one hundred pupils, about 20 percent of the school population by 1954.[26] While some parents chose to actively resist integration through school choice, the majority kept their children in Catholic schools.



SPECIAL NOTICE!

You are cordially invited to attend a

General Protest Meeting on

Sunday, Sept. 14, 1947

at 8 P. M.

at Electrical Workers Hall

Boyle and Gibson Aves.

At this meeting we expect to have an answer from Archbishop Ritter regarding the negro attending the Catholic Schools.

It is the Duty of Every Catholic in St. Louis and Vicinity to attend this meeting.

Signed Committee

JOHN P. BARRETT, Chairman WILLIAM RONE, Co-Chairman

GORDON BORROW, Treasurer

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Not all Catholics supported Ritter's efforts to end segregation in parochial schools, as this handbill from 1947 suggests. *(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)*

Even though most St. Louis Catholics were willing to tolerate desegregated religious education, the same could not be said for integrated neighborhoods. Archdiocese concerns and parish population patterns in the racially transitioning West End show clearly that the vast majority of white Catholics were unwilling to live in integrated city neighborhoods; by the late 1960s, St. Rose Parish in the West End only served about two hundred Catholics.[27] In a letter to parish priests, Cardinal Ritter specifically asked if priests would volunteer to be assigned to a racially transitioning parish, saying, "I realize this is an unusual request, but these are unusual times."[28] Clearly, leaders of Catholic institutions understood the necessity of making special efforts to foster stable, integrated neighborhoods that would be acceptable to both blacks and whites.

The history of the West End's St. Rose of Lima Parish, established in 1884 and closed in 1992, shows how racial demographics affected Catholics in this north city neighborhood. The parish flourished in the first half of the twentieth century. It shifted from a small rural community outside the city limits to serving an increasingly urban population, boasting a handsome building dedicated in

On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans at the university. *(Image: Washington University Special Collections)*

1910, a variety of church clubs, and several Catholic institutions, including a maternity hospital and a girls' technical school. The parish also ran St. Rose of Lima School, with an enrollment of over four hundred students.[29]

In recounting the history of St. Rose of Lima from 1934–1984, the parish history explains: "To tell the story of St. Rose Parish… is to tell the story of a neighborhood because Catholic parishes are based in neighborhoods. … [I]n many parishes the people who celebrate the centennial are grandchildren of the men and women who celebrated the golden jubilee. At St. Rose's, however, that is not the case. There are . . . few such people tied to those earlier ones."[30] The history chronicles the racial transition of the West End parish. As a small number of black Catholics moved into the West End, they experienced a moderate degree of discrimination, but the St. Rose of Lima Parish history asserts that many white parishioners were welcoming. St. Rose School activities were open to students regardless of race. One parishioner, Mrs. Anson, "took it as her personal ministry to welcome Black women and make them part of any activity."[31] The first years of integration, both according to the parish history as well as St. Rose student Dan Kelley, passed relatively uneventfully. Kelley remembers that African American students started attending St. Rose Parish elementary school without incident in the late forties, saying "they just started to show up, and it just wasn't a big issue."[32] The parish history says that racial transition increased sharply as federal urban renewal projects demolished hundreds of residences in traditionally black neighborhoods. Many of these new West End residents rented apartments from large, subdivided houses in the neighborhood. St. Rose's Father Clohessy made some efforts to convert blacks, but his proselytizing produced few converts. By 1962, only 14 of St. Rose School's 450 children were white, and many of the new black students were not Catholic.[33]

Even though the official history of St. Rose highlights the positive aspects of the parish's racial history, the account also reveals white Catholics' struggles to reconcile the church's call to integrate and personal discomfort with racial mixing. Even Father Clohssey demonstrated ambivalence in the face of the changing character of the parish. The history explains that he was "uncomfortable with all the changes" occurring in the parish in the late 1950s and early 1960s.[34] The history repeatedly mentions parishioners' worries about the neighborhood's racial change, heavily implying that an influx of blacks was a main reason whites were moving out of the neighborhood. Despite the commitment of Catholic institutions and some parishioners to integrated neighborhoods and schools, in the space of about ten years, the West End's Catholic and non-Catholic population shifted from all-white to temporarily integrated to almost exclusively black.

By 1963, St. Rose's new pastor understood he was the leader of a black parish, so in 1964, St. Rose hosted a meeting of priests to "study the problems of a Black parish."[35] St. Rose Parish, though, could not maintain a sustainable number of black parishioners; by 1967, the parish only had about two hundred members.[36] In 1992, St. Rose and five other north city parishes combined due to low population. Despite Cardinal Ritter's commitment to integrated education, by the 1960s parishes in the West End were focused on maintaining black, not interracial, parishes. The history of St. Rose Parish reveals that attempts in the fifties to foster an interracial parish as well as an integrated neighborhood were ultimately unsuccessful. As was typical for St. Louis race relations, parishioners limited overt opposition to Cardinal Ritter's desegregation, but their residential patterns simultaneously shifted to sustain segregated living patterns. Liberal church leaders were unable to use their moral authority to overcome parishioners' deep-seated fears—racial, economic, and social—of living among blacks. Because most St. Louis Catholics were committed to their faith, not to actively pursuing racial equality, church leadership could not compel Catholic residents to continue living in the area and welcome blacks into their neighborhood.

Jews also migrated out of the city in the decades following World War II—and they often did so earlier than Catholics—but their reasoning diverged in important ways. Unlike Catholic parishes that are geographically bounded, synagogues are free to uproot and move in response to population shifts. As a result, most Jewish institutions in St. Louis actively sought to move locations in anticipation of population shifts, and almost every West End Jewish congregation moved outside the city limits by the 1960s. Some Jews, often affiliated with Jewish organizations, tried to maintain their neighborhoods and convince other whites to remain. They allied with civil rights organizations and created community groups to address the challenges of stabilizing neighborhoods undergoing racial transition. Despite their efforts, though, these actively liberal Jews could not stem the flow of their peers into the county, and by about 1960 the neighborhood that had once been the center of the St. Louis Jewish community was almost exclusively black.

While St. Louis's Jewish community has always been small in comparison with the total population (about 6

In the 1940s, Soldan High School included a sizable Jewish population integrated into the student body, such as this group at the 1949 graduation party. *(Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*

percent of the city's population in the early 1900s), Jews still profoundly influenced the city and the West End neighborhood in particular. Historian Walter Ehrlich chronicles St. Louis's Jewish population in his two-volume work, *Zion in the Valley*. The first documentation of Jews in the city dates to the early 1800s, and a handful of Jewish institutions arose throughout the mid-1800s. Increased Jewish immigration from Europe to St. Louis mirrored national immigration patterns of the turn of the twentieth century. By 1900, the majority of St. Louis Jews had settled in the "Ghetto," located north of downtown and west to Ninth Street. As the population grew, the city's Jewish area expanded west toward Jefferson Avenue.[37] While most Jews were concentrated in this space, the area was also home to a variety of working-class newcomers, including blacks migrating from the South as well as Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants, many of whom were Catholic.[38] By the 1920s, the upwardly mobile Jewish population had shifted further west from the Mississippi River, settling in the West End, and most synagogues transferred to new West End locations to better serve their congregants. For the next thirty years, the Jewish community flourished in the West End.

A variety of West End institutions served the Jewish population. As most Jewish children attended public schools, Soldan High School became a source of pride for the Jewish community and hosted liberal interfaith and interracial events. For example, in 1941 the school held a Youth and Democracy Rally, which Catholics, Protestants, Jews, blacks, and whites attended.[39] While Jews were never the majority religion in either the West End or at Soldan, the school still offered a full program of Jewish classes, as well as an active Hebrew Club.[40] Jewish Soldan graduates of the 1940s discuss their alma mater very fondly. Anabelle Chapel remembered, "Soldan I really loved. Those were some of the finest days of my youth. It was a very good school."[41] Similarly, Harvey Brown, who graduated from Soldan in 1944, recalled that "Soldan was a great city school."[42] Several alumni who graduated in the 1940s particularly remember the school's outstanding English department. From both a social and academic perspective, Soldan graduates from the 1940s

On May 4, 1949, students at Washington University in St. Louis held a rally to gain admission for African-Americans at the university. *(Image: Washington University Special Collections)*

were extremely complimentary of their school.

In addition to over a dozen houses of worship, the Young Men's/Women's Hebrew Association (YMHA) was another important institution for the West End Jewish community. Established in the late 1800s as a men's literary club, the organization expanded in the first half of the twentieth century to become one of the most important Jewish community institutions in the city. The YMHA bounced from location to location in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Under the leadership of executive director Gilbert Harris, the YMHA purchased land to construct a Jewish community center that opened in 1927 on the corner of Union and Enright, about two blocks from Soldan and in the heart of the West End. For three decades, this location provided a wide range of services to both Jewish and non-Jewish community members. The YMHA's newsletter boasted about expanded facilities and opportunities available to members, including a library, game room, auditorium, swimming pool, handball courts, gym, billiard hall, and roof garden.[43] Among various athletic teams, social clubs, and educational programs, the YMHA's Liberal Forums stood out as a highlight of

A native St. Louisan, Gilbert Harris (seated second from left) returned to the city in 1922 to become executive director of the YMHA/YWMA in St. Louis after working for the National Jewish Welfare Board in New York. The YMHA/YWHA building at Union and Enright, built in 1927, was among his fundraising accomplishments. *(Image: Gilbert Harris Collection, St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*

The Young Men's Hebrew Association (YMHA) was a key part of the Jewish cultural life by the 1940s. The first YMHA was founded in Baltimore in 1854 to assist Jewish immigrants; a branch opened in St. Louis in 1880. An affiliated arm of it, the Young Women's Hebrew Association (YWHA), was founded in 1888 in New York; the first independent YWHA chapter appeared in 1902. Later in the twentieth century, they evolved into today's Jewish Community Center (JCC), offering an array of activities and classes, as this catalogue from 1947–1948 suggests. The YMHA/YWHA was at Union and Enright in the West End when the cover photo was taken. *(Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*



YMHA activities. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Liberal Forum sponsored talks by prominent figures, including Eleanor Roosevelt, Clarence Darrow, and Walter White.[44] YMHA regulars remember Harris's prominent presence at the YMHA. Hans Mayer, who moved to St. Louis as a child, explained that Harris was a "highly visible" director who always made sure to be present when children left for and returned from summer camp.[45]

Soldan High School's experience with school desegregation demonstrated the limited extent of what the West End's Jewish and secular passive liberalism could achieve. Even though Catholic schools integrated in 1947, it was not until the 1954 *Brown v. Board* decision that public schools in St. Louis adopted a desegregation plan. Because by this time the city's Catholic schools had desegregated, the passive liberal majority understood the inevitability of desegregation and therefore supported its implementation. Again, unlike in communities across the South, St. Louis's integration plan was carried out on time and with little controversy. Some St. Louis schools, especially those in mostly white south city, would not experience a significant influx of black students in the early years of desegregated education. The heavily Jewish Soldan High School, on the other hand, absorbed more blacks than any other high school in the city.[46] All accounts of integration at Soldan in 1955 indicate overwhelming success in both planning and implementation. In anticipation of the integration, Soldan held a meeting at which parents could ask questions and make suggestions about easing the transition, and there is no record of dissent at this meeting.[47] Soldan's new principal, Stanley Hill, connected the process of integration to the reputation of the West End, stating that "the good name of the neighborhood as well as the city was at stake in avoiding incidents such as those in Baltimore and Washington."[48] To prepare for the new students, transferees met with faculty advisors and registered for classes the week before integration took place. The first integrated meeting of the Soldan-Blewett Parents' Association had about two hundred attendees, many of whom were black.[49]

On February 1, 1955, the day St. Louis high schools integrated, Soldan absorbed 375 black students, increasing the school's enrollment to 1,350. Speaking three days after integration occurred in city high schools, Superintendent Hickey announced, "I cannot speak highly enough of the manner in which our high school boys and girls of both races have accepted this step. . . . [T]he striking thing to me is the positive, rather passive, acceptance of the change by the student groups."[50] The black press's evaluation of Soldan's integration was very similar to that of other city newspapers, explaining, "observation of passing in the corridors and classroom sessions gave no indication that anything out of the ordinary had occurred."[51] Soldan's students took pride in the orderly and civilized manner of their school's integration. In both 1955 and 1956, students dedicated their yearbook to their school administrators and commended the manner in which integration occurred. The yearbook editors claimed, "[T]his new administration has handled the job of integration with skill and intelligence and has made Soldan-Blewett the best integrated school in St. Louis."[52] An analysis of yearbook photographs reveals that black students participated actively in Soldan's clubs and sports.[53]

Jake Leventhal and Linda Kraus, two Jewish students who attended Soldan when it desegregated, have similar memories of the first year of integration. Neither has recollections of race-based incidents, and Leventhal called the integration process "seamless." Kraus continued her participation in integrated extra-curricular activities, including the yearbook, newspaper, and cheerleading, and she believed that the integration went as well as it could. Neither remembers the school explicitly preparing students for the integration, other than assigning students to new advisors to make sure that each class had a mix of black and white students. As an athlete, Leventhal remembers Vice Principal Otto Rost visiting his integrated football team during a summer practice and specifically instructing the players to "be mixed up" racially the next time he came to check on them. Leventhal discussed his time at the integrated Soldan fondly, explaining that the school's athletic teams served as a role model for interracial cooperation for the entire school.[54]

Ha Ivria was the Hebrew Cultural Center at Soldan High School. When this picture for the Soldan yearbook appeared, Ha Ivria had some 40 members. *(Image: St. Louis Jewish Community Archives)*



By all accounts the integration had been implemented successfully, as evidenced by an almost complete lack of controversy, as well as outward community enthusiasm. The initial success of Soldan's integration was due to passive liberalism: West End residents understood that segregated education was no longer socially acceptable, so the community rallied behind a smooth school integration in the wake of *Brown.* The amount of public support given to the desegregation process made St. Louisans optimistic that their racial liberalism would foster a progressive and democratic city. Citizens believed that St. Louis was in a prime position to handle interracial urban education without violence or controversy, and the confident tone of the black press was similar to that of other newspapers. In an article published a few days after the high schools' integration, an *Argus* article asserted, "[T]he cooperation of all concerned up to this point is assurance enough that St. Louis is foremost among American cities willing to advance democracy in deeds."[55] A large and widely publicized segment of the city welcomed integrated schooling due to liberalism's commitment to racial equality.

It took only a few years, however, for attentive citizens to realize how fleeting this success was, and when faced with the reality that integration might require difficult personal decisions about where to live and educate their children, passive liberals turned their backs on integration. In a 1959 statement to the Urban League Board of Directors, St. Louis branch executive director Leo Bohanon proclaimed, "[A]bout two years ago the first complaints alleging a breakdown in school desegregation came to the attention of the Urban League. Charges were made that the school administration was permitting Clark grade and Soldan High schools to become all Negro schools in pupils and teachers." He goes on to state, "[T]here is a growing feeling that both the public school administration and the Board of Education have adopted a laissez faire attitude toward public school integration, ~~which borders on indifference~~" [strikethrough original].[56] He also provided a list of accusations, which included busing white students to white schools and overcrowding at predominantly black schools. Clearly, the Urban League and other civil rights organizations believed passivity and indifference were unacceptable.

Further, African American City Alderman William Lacy Clay (who would later represent St. Louis in the United States House of Representatives) charged that "the St. Louis Board of Education and the Department of Instruction have been guilty of either a premeditated and intentional program to cause and allow the increase of segregation in the schools or at the very least have adopted policies that have been conducive to the re-segregation of the school system."[57] He noted that Soldan was 99 percent black, while the neighborhood was 50 percent white; this meant that 1,700 white students who should have been attending Soldan were being educated in white public schools.[58] Jake Leventhal explained that one year after he graduated from Soldan, his parents moved out of the city despite the financial hardship this imposed because his sister had been the only white student in her elementary school class.[59]

To understand why and how St. Louis school integration failed, it is necessary to analyze conversations surrounding residential choices. West End residents, both those merely looking for an attractive place to live as well as individuals who touted themselves as racially liberal, were ultimately unwilling to collectively invest in the continued integration and middle-class status of the West End. By analyzing housing choices and changes in Jewish institutions' locations, the limits of St. Louis's passive and active liberalism become apparent. Despite the fact that city residents were mostly in agreement regarding the need to end formal segregation, citizens were largely unwilling to sustain this commitment to desegregation through housing choices.

While Gilbert Harris was proud of the ways the YMHA building on Union Boulevard served the West End community, Harris's goal, like those of the West End's synagogues, was for Jewish institutions to follow

Ritter issued this statement to support the announced desegregation of St. Louis Public Schools in the aftermath of the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision in 1954. Ritter instructed that "This letter to be read at all Masses on Sunday, June 27, 1954." *(Image: Archdiocese of St. Louis Archives)*



re: Supreme Court ruling re segregation in schools

RGIFI

The Archdiocese of St. Louis

Office of the Archbishop

4431 LINDELL BOULEVARD

ST. LOUIS 8, MO.

June 22, 1954

TO THE CLERGY, RELIGIOUS AND LAITY OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAINT LOUIS

Dearly Beloved:

The announcement by the St. Louis Board of Education of the end of segregation in the public schools beginning this Fall deserves the commendation and wholehearted support of all our people. Encouraged by your cooperation with us in the successful integration of the races in our schools, I am confident of your continued moral leadership and influence with your fellow citizens in effecting harmoniously this assimilation in the public school system.

In carrying out locally the decision of the Supreme Court, I would like to reiterate the statement made when that decision was published:

"It timely reaffirms before the whole world those basic principles on which, under God, our Nation was founded--the dignity of all human beings without exception.

The decision will go a long way in making our educational system conform with the position of Christianity itself. Besides closing the gap between what we as individuals believe and what we have had to tolerate in practice, the Supreme Court decision should strengthen us and unite us morally as a nation.

A Catholic experiences joy when the Church solemnly declares some great truth contained in the Christian deposit of faith. So, too, beset on all sides by the Communist attack on human values, it is heartening for us as Americans to hear the highest authority in the land restate those principles which are our Constitutional heritage."

Sincerely yours in Christ,

+Joseph E. Ritter

Most Reverend Joseph E. Ritter

Archbishop of Saint Louis

N.B. This letter to be read at all the Masses on Sunday, June 27, 1954.

Jewish population trends, not to shape them. The YMHA's commitment to following Jewish population patterns led to complex and contradictory statements and policies regarding Jews' residential choices and their role in fostering integrated neighborhoods. As it became apparent by the late forties that Jews were increasingly choosing to live west of the city limits, by 1950 Harris advocated heavily for the YMHA to move out of the city, despite the fact that a significant number of Jews remained in the West End into the mid-1950s. Therefore, Jewish institutions' movement out of the city cannot simply be attributed to attractions of suburban living; predictions of future population trends were based on racialized assumptions that upwardly mobile Jews would not live among blacks.

A 1947 YMHA program needs survey provides insight into both the state of the West End neighborhood and the Jewish community's future in it, and its recommendations reveal deep problems with passive liberalism. In 1947, the survey stated, about one-half of St. Louis's Jewish population resided outside city limits, with a high concentration in University City, a municipality directly bordering the West End. With this information, the authors believed that the city's Jewish population would soon be concentrated west of the city limits. Taking this impending population shift into account, the report predicted that the Union Boulevard YMHA building would only continue to be an adequate location for another ten to fifteen years, as long as satellite programs were created to reach Jews outside the city.

While this report provided a large amount of demographic information about the region's Jewish population, its references to neighboring black populations provide a fascinating window into Jews' feelings about the possibility of integrated neighborhoods. Published before the *Shelley v. Kraemer* decision, this report indicates that Jewish institutional leaders assumed blacks would eventually move into the West End. Even before the demise of racially restrictive housing covenants, the report correctly predicted that blacks would soon reside in areas of the West End that were primarily comprised of rental properties. Though the report does not explicitly label this impending trend as negative, the writers were uneasy about the effects blacks would have in the West End. The fact that blacks were the only non-Jewish group referenced in the report indicates that the authors drew a direct connection between migration of blacks into the West End and the neighborhood's decline in Jewish population. This connection was a thinly veiled admission that, regardless of widespread support for the ideal of integration, the authors assumed most Jews did not want to live in a racially integrated neighborhood. The report stated that when blacks began to move into the West End, "Union Avenue from Delmar to Page will probably remain a [Jewish] civic center area for a period of about 15 years."[60] The report had racial overtones without making any explicit race-based recommendations. When blacks, as predicted, did begin migrating into the West End, the YMHA's, as well as the Jewish community's, responses were simultaneously welcoming and wary. Some Jews actively welcomed the transitioning neighborhood's interracial character, and the YMHA provided a number of interracial programs, indicating the institution's acceptance of blacks in the neighborhood. However, even as Jews accepted the concept of integration, most did not believe it was their personal responsibility to foster integration through housing choices.

YMHA Executive Director Gilbert Harris's statements regarding neighborhood racial transition were dizzyingly contradictory, and these inconsistencies demonstrated the genuine ambivalence he and many other passively liberal residents likely felt regarding how to interpret changes in the West End and Jewish institutions' role in shaping those changes. "Our Neighborhood," a speech Harris delivered seven years after the program needs survey recommended moving the YMHA to the suburbs, clearly illustrated his confusion. In one section of the speech, he stated:

> The [West End] which once was an area of home owners . . . is now characterized as a neighborhood of transients and lower economic groups. I make this statement objectively and without any lament for the good old days. Every American city and every American neighborhood seems to go through its years of youth, maturity and decline. . . . Today there are some communities that are concerned with the conservation process of neighborhoods and are doing something about it, and hopefully in the future more neighborhoods will continue to be zealous to maintain their character. In giving these facts I do not speak disparagingly of any people. All peoples need housing and we know that as their economic status improves, their social acceptability advances too.[61]

Several key paradoxes were present in Harris's thinking, and these complexities reveal the limitations of passive liberals' thought and action on race issues. First, Harris simultaneously identified with the West End but also showed willingness to abandon the neighborhood for the sake of economic opportunity in the suburbs. Second, he provided only lukewarm evaluations of efforts to conserve the character of transitioning neighborhoods, despite the fact that the YMHA sometimes served as a meeting place for the religious and secular organizations that championed integration. Third, he portrayed neighborhood change as inevitable, again, despite the fact that the YMHA hosted organizations firmly committed to halting neighborhood deterioration through maintenance of integration. Harris seemed in favor of neighborhood conservation efforts in theory, but as a Jewish community leader, he was unwilling to participate in them actively or to make the YMHA building a symbol of Jewish commitment to West End neighborhood integration.

Later in this same speech, he made the following comments:

> Those of us who live in our neighborhood like it and want to improve it in whatever way we can. Unfortunately, there are not enough people who are

> energetic enough to do the job. . . . They were full of venom about having to leave the neighborhood and to suffer financial losses in selling their homes, and were very cynical about the newcomers. … As one who has lived most of his life in the general neighborhood, and who looks forward to many more years there, I am anxious to see the neighborhood maintain itself. It has many advantages—cultural, spiritual, and geographic. I know there are those who share the same point of view and with their help we hope that our neighborhood will continue to be a fine and interesting place in which to live.[62]

Here again, Harris' contradictions were glaring. He concurrently assumed that whites would abandon the neighborhood, expressed whites' anger at the declining status of the neighborhood, and also stated that he intended to continue living in the West End. The very belief that property values would fall simply due to blacks' presence in a neighborhood shows whites' racial fears. Because the fear of declined economic status was tied to integrated neighborhoods, financial interest easily trumped passive liberal ideology. While it is unclear whether Harris was conscious of all these contradictions, their presence in a public speech indicated that Harris himself wrestled with his understanding of changes in the West End. There were certainly racist qualities to his statements, yet his ideas do not seem hateful. Rather, he was demonstrating a genuine attempt to process the rapid societal changes occurring around him, attempts that West End residents were likely also grappling with.

In a speech a few months later, Harris made a fascinating comment about the importance of neighborhood institutions, saying, "institutions uphold property values. Would Union Boulevard have remained the street it is today, with the various institutions located in that area, or would it have held up better with residences?"[63] He attributed the West End's success to the existence of institutions (religious as well as secular), yet he advocated for pulling the YMHA out of the West End for the sake of Jewish progress in the suburbs.[64] The decision to move the YMHA into West County mirrored the decisions of synagogues. Congregation B'Nai Amoona, for example, began searching for a new location almost immediately after purchasing a property in the West End.[65] For Harris, like most liberal Jews, opportunity for economic upward mobility in the suburbs or fears of declining financially trumped opportunities to maintain the status of a cherished neighborhood. If Gilbert Harris was an accurate representation of liberal Jews' conflicted feelings on integration and neighborhood change, it is no surprise that efforts to maintain neighborhood integration failed miserably. Liberal individuals were unable to see the racist assumptions underlying the belief that integration would necessarily lead to decreased property values, so St. Louisans' liberal ideology could not be a vehicle for realizing integration in the West End.

Even though some St. Louis Jewish leaders were in the vanguard of advocating for integrated schools and neighborhoods, their active liberalism could not convince passively liberal counterparts to remain in an integrating community. These actively liberal Jews, like counterparts in other cities, believed their decisions on where to live and educate their children could play a role in creating stable, desirable, and integrated urban neighborhoods. To achieve a desirable integrated neighborhood, community activists would have to work against ambivalence regarding individuals' personal roles in maintaining the integrated, middle-class character of the West End. It would only be possible to sustain integration through explicit claims that the West End could maintain its desirable character, convincing white residents they should not sell their properties.

During the brief time that St. Louis's public school desegregation generally and Soldan's integration specifically seemed to be working as planned, religious and secular organizations committed themselves to making the West End a model of a successful, integrated, and stable middle-class neighborhood. The Jewish Community Relations Council (JCRC) was in the vanguard of these efforts. Through the leadership of St. Louis branch Executive Director Myron Schwartz, the JCRC provided active leadership in a variety of neighborhood improvement efforts and collaborated frequently with the Urban League as well as various neighborhood-based organizations. Schwartz corresponded frequently with other cities' JCRC leaders to understand how other city neighborhoods were dealing with neighborhood racial transition. JCRC leaders across the urban North understood neighborhood change as a democratic issue. A draft of a JCRC guide for changing neighborhoods explained, "[T]he contradictions between our democratic principles and our actual practices cannot help but arouse suspicion, cynicism and distrust, both among our own citizens and our watchful allies."[66] Clearly, a cohort of Jewish leaders understood that vocalizing integrationist rhetoric amidst a mass exodus into the suburbs would not promote racial equality. Maintaining integrated neighborhoods would require active decisions by Jews to remain rooted in urban neighborhoods in the face of speculation and panic.

However, as historian Lila Berman has indicated and the St. Louis experience demonstrated, most urban Jews were unwilling to base housing decisions on the possibility of maintaining integration. Even the national JCRC report's recommendations did not include calls to sustain residences in transitioning neighborhoods; instead, it suggested what Berman termed "remote urbanism": population studies, education, and political activism to increase access to non-discriminatory housing, allowing Jews to devote charitable funds to urban areas while simultaneously moving out of them.[67] Remote urbanism, though, was an acceptance of passive liberalism, because it allowed people to believe they could support urban issues while concurrently disinvesting in cities by moving to the suburbs. The JCRC report therefore fell into the trap it cautioned leaders to avoid: the report wanted to support urban neighborhoods through rhetoric and charity, but it

did not call for Jews to make their housing choices based on an ideal of integrated communities. Most passive liberal Jews believed they could further racial equality verbally and politically while making personal choices to move into racially homogenous suburbs. Myron Schwartz, the St. Louis JCRC branch, and other neighborhood organizations attempted a more active role in maintaining integrated living space through alliances with local organizations, but these efforts proved unsustainable because most white West End residents were unwilling to let a desire for neighborhood integration dictate personal choices of where to live. Therefore, many attempts to be actively liberal quickly became passive, as Jewish organizations were largely unwilling to ask Jews to make housing choices based on a commitment to racial equality.

Starting in 1953, two interracial and actively liberal West End organizations, first the Union Boulevard Association (UBA) and later the West End Community Conference (WECC), attempted to craft a stable, middle-class, desirable, and integrated neighborhood. Their efforts and shortcomings demonstrate difficulties active liberals confronted in the face of a passively liberal majority. That year, the UBA conducted a small survey of thirty-seven West End residents to understand how people perceived changes within the neighborhood. Many white respondents believed that they lived in an ideal location, but they also cited racially coded reasons for wanting to move out, including "crowding, dirt, [and] noise," as well as some explicit discomfort with proximity to blacks.[68]

The most creative UBA campaign involved decreasing blight in the blocks surrounding Soldan High School. To stabilize areas of the neighborhood that were deteriorating and maintain property values, a group of residents requested urban renewal funding from the city government to study zoning violations and build parks and playgrounds. The press lauded these efforts, claiming, "Residents of the Soldan-Blewett High School neighborhood set a fine example with their proposal to organize a conservation and improvement program before it is too late. . . . Here is planning at its best—city planning with a strong base of neighborhood interest and initiative."[69] In order to receive federal funding, West End residents had to request that areas of their neighborhood be labeled "blighted," so that they would be eligible for urban renewal money. Though federal urban renewal programs—both nationally and in St. Louis—were largely vilified by the mid-1960s because they were often used to fund entrepreneurs' interests over those of residents, this instance of West End community members requesting funding shows that in urban renewal's early stages, St. Louis residents were sometimes able to have an impact on where and how federal funding was spent. Despite these innovative, citizen-led efforts, the UBA had little lasting impact on the West End. In fact, labeling sections of the West End as blighted may have backfired because many residents likely felt uneasy about living in spaces marked as deteriorating. The UBA's experimentation showed that some West End residents were willing to work creatively to maintain the status of their neighborhood.

While the UBA clearly wanted to improve the neighborhood, it was the West End Community Conference that more directly attempted to stave off white flight. Formed in 1955, the WECC's explicit goal was to keep the West End a high quality, integrated neighborhood. A flier advertising an April 1955 meeting explained, "[M]any of us feel that this is a good neighborhood to live in and want to see it preserved and improved. That's why over a hundred of us met recently to found . . . The West End Community Conference."[70] By 1957, the WECC, which served a 150-block area that was home to 25,000 residents, boasted 800 members. A 1957 *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* article detailing WECC work explained that the its strategy for maintaining integration revolved around stabilizing real estate prices by maintaining physical neighborhood space and convincing residents to remain in the neighborhood. The article attributed WECC successes to the presence of liberal residents, claiming that "a vital factor . . . was the presence in the area of an extraordinary number of people of broadly liberal bent, accustomed to leadership, unafraid of responsibility and fully aware of how much might depend on the example they set."[71] West End resident Mrs. Carl Meyers typified this liberal commitment to remaining in the neighborhood. She explained, "[W]e deliberately chose to live here . . . we like it simply because it isn't homogeneous. In our block there is a professor at Washington University, another man rich enough to have a chauffeur, and a laborer. We're interested in people, and in finding the answer to the question: Can people really change things, or does nature take its course?"[72] Clearly, a vocal, though probably small, group of actively liberal residents was willing to base their housing choices on maintaining an integrated neighborhood.

The WECC enjoyed a positive reputation for its first five years of existence. In reference to the WECC, a black newspaper article stated, "[H]ere is a particular section of a great city that has been justly held up as an example of what can be done under our American democracy."[73] However, this idealistic view of the neighborhood was incredibly tenuous, and a scandal within WECC leadership illustrated the fragility of white racial liberalism in St. Louis. In 1960, the WECC suddenly lost its positive reputation as a liberal interracial organization due to an incident involving a board member. Landlord and WECC Vice-Chairman William Baggerman evicted a husband and wife from his building upon learning that they were an interracial couple. Baggerman claimed he evicted the couple because they had "acted in bad faith by concealing the fact of [the] wife's race, [while] Negro members of the WECC said Baggerman's actions were motivated by racial prejudice."[74] This incident exposed serious latent tensions within the organization and undermined the interracial harmony on which the WECC was predicated. In response to this controversy, the WECC board voted on whether to "pass judgment on William Baggerman's behavior," and it was the first time in WECC history that a vote was split down racial lines.[75] Only one black woman voted with the conference's white members, stating she wanted

to keep lines of communication open, while a single white member, a Washington University dean, voted with the conference's African American leaders to condemn Baggerman's actions.

WECC members' reactions to this controversy reveal how quickly active liberal viewpoints cracked under pressure. One frustrated white member exclaimed, "[W]hy do you always want to rush things. You are trying to go too fast. If you would just slow down maybe we would work something out"; a black member responded, "[W]e are not that kind of organization. This should never have come up."[76] This interchange demonstrates a glaring miscommunication between white and black WECC members. White members embraced liberal race relations when they provided a noncontroversial way to deal with inevitable school and neighborhood integration that did not require personal or economic sacrifice. When tested by a controversy, though, white liberals retreated to passivity, preferring not to "rush things." This dialogue shows that above all, white liberals in the West End, whether passive or active, wanted to avoid upheaval. Here lies the ultimate problem with liberalism in St. Louis: even if a number of actively liberal individuals were willing to make their housing choices based on a desire to foster an integrated neighborhood, they could not accept that the process of maintaining integration would sometimes be contentious and uncomfortable. If the most actively liberal white community members were asking blacks to "just slow down," it is no wonder that integration efforts quickly faltered.

Media response to this incident was strong, indicating how much stock community members had placed in the WECC, and they quickly highlighted the limits of white West Enders' liberalism. One article explained that the incident may be "the real test of whether the West End Community Conference is a genuine democratic outgrowth in our American way, or is only a façade for pretentious half-believers."[77] The *Argus*, St. Louis's black newspaper, echoed these questions of whites' sincerity, stating that "the majority of the whites, we are sure, felt snug and secure in the feeling that 'we are among the enlightened liberals of this day.'"[78] To both black and white residents, this incident revealed the tenuous nature of interracial alliances in the West End, as well as the inability of liberalism to maintain commitments to integration amidst a contentious atmosphere.

Although the controversy did not cause the WECC to disband, it was a crippling blow—a number of frustrated members (mostly black) resigned, and records of WECC activities after the scandal are infrequent. It is crucial to note how quick newspapers were to highlight whites' wavering commitment to full integration and liberalism, in contrast to the notable lack of controversy in accounts of the 1955 public school desegregation. By 1960, then, both blacks and whites were skeptical of white liberal commitments to racial equality. If the WECC could be debilitated by one controversy, it is unsurprising that efforts to maintain the interracial demographics of the neighborhood failed. Because racial liberalism could so quickly unravel, it was only natural that West End residents who were not politically active would be unwilling to maintain integration through housing choices that came with economic and social status risks. The WECC controversy exemplified the fragility of St. Louis's liberal commitment to an interracial society.

The West End's current segregation and decreased economic status was largely due to the weaknesses of American liberalism. In St. Louis, as well as throughout the country, liberals were unable to sustain combining the ideals of racial equality and middle-class economic opportunity, and fleeting attempts to do so floundered at the first signs of interracial contention. The methods of the West End Community Conference demonstrated that active liberals knew how to simultaneously promote integration and middle class neighborhood status. However, the organization's history showed West Enders' inability to fully commit to these methods, because passive liberalism allowed people to espouse racially progressive rhetoric while making housing decisions based on racial fears. Fleeting successes like the smooth school integration could not convince white liberals that it was worth working through racial tension to create an integrated and economically upwardly mobile urban neighborhood. Instead, liberals used the excuse of pursuing economic opportunity to abandon commitments to racial equality and integration. Ultimately, white liberals in St. Louis believed that a future of integrated neighborhoods, while a commendable ideal, was not the best avenue to pursue the economic and social status they desired.

Congratulations

to

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Jacqueline Tatom, an architect, urban designer, and teacher whose work explored the metropolitan landscapes of St. Louis and its environs.

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The Award is presented biannually, and published in *The Confluence*. This year, Sarah Siegel is the Tatom Award recipient; the article appears in this issue of *The Confluence*.

ENDNOTES

[1] In 1877, the city of St. Louis separated from St. Louis County, making it one of the only cities in the United States that is not also part of a county. The distinction between city and county looms large in St. Louis's history. In the twentieth century, St. Louis County (especially West County) became increasingly white and affluent, whereas St. Louis City (in particularly, North City, including the West End) became increasingly black and poor.

[2] "Court Bars School Segregation: Pupils Here to go to Schools Nearest their Homes," *St. Louis Post Dispatch,* May 17, 1954, and "Officials Here Go Forward with Plans to Halt Separation," *St. Louis Post Dispatch,* May 18, 1954.

[3] Bonita H. Valien, *The St. Louis Story: A Study of Desegregation* (New York: Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1956), 41.

[4] "First Classes on Integrated Basis Meet in High Schools," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, February 3, 1955.

[5] Valien, *The St. Louis Story*, 31.

[6] The Young Men's/Women's Hebrew Association, for example, hosted meetings to discuss integration and allowed integrated sports teams to practice at the organization's facilities.

[7] "Parents Can Help School Integration, Hickey Declares," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* April 26, 1955, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder "Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952-1976," Jewish Archives of St. Louis.

[8] Robert Self, *American Babylon: Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 13–14.

[9] Cardinal Ritter's Catholic school desegregation and the *Brown v. Board* decision made it clear to the majority of St. Louisans that legalized school desegregation was a thing of the past.

[10] In *Parish Boundaries,* historian John McGreevy argues that the fixed nature of Catholic Parish boundaries meant that Catholics were slower to move out of integrating neighborhoods. However, in the St. Louis case, even though Catholic parishioners passively accepted desegregation, they simultaneously chose to abandon their urban parishes for racially homogenous suburban spaces.

[11] Historians Lila Berman and Cheryl Greenberg both write on urban Jews' beliefs and actions regarding race relations. Greenberg argues that Jews were only willing to support civil rights policies if they did not negatively influence the Jewish community. She employs the "not in my back yard" framework to explain that while Jews, as a largely liberal group, supported the concept of racial equality, they were unwilling to take action for racial equality by allowing or encouraging racial integration of heavily Jewish neighborhoods. Berman has also produced insightful work to trace how urban Jews reacted to and shaped neighborhood racial transition. In an article about Jews in Detroit, Berman posits that Jews, in comparison to non-Jewish liberals, remained relatively committed to urban issues, both during and after the time most Jews lived within Detroit's city limits. She distinguishes between two types of Jewish urbanism: local urbanism when Jews lived in city neighborhoods, and remote urbanism after they moved to the suburbs. In St. Louis, though, Jews' commitment to any kind of urbanism is less apparent; rather, Jewish housing decisions were based on negotiating competing liberal ideologies of promoting racial equality and opportunities for economic and social upward mobility.

[12] "St. Rose Parish, St. Louis, MO 1934–1985, Then and Now," St. Rose of Lima Parish Histories, RG04B84, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[13] Harvey Brown, Interview with Author, May 12, 2014.

[14] "Letter to Myron Schwartz October 18, 1954," Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder "Neighborhood Councils, St. Louis, 1952-1975," Jewish Archives of St. Louis.

[15] "History of Catholic Education in the Archdiocese," http://archstl.org/education/page/history-catholic-education-archdiocese

[16] Letters of Approval and Dissent, 10 February, 1948, Cardinal Joseph Elmer Ritter Papers (RG 01 F 15.16), Box A 58, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[17] Letter To Cardinal Ritter, 22 September, 1947, Cardinal Joseph Elmer Ritter Papers (RG 01 F 15.16), Box A 58, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[18] Letter to Cardinal Ritter, 23 September, 1947, Cardinal Joseph Elmer Ritter Papers (RG 01 F 15.16), Box A 58, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[19] Letter to Cardinal Ritter, 11 August, 1947, Cardinal Joseph Elmer Ritter Papers (RG 01 F 15.16), Box A 58, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[20] Letter to Cardinal Ritter, 22 September, 1947, Cardinal Joseph Elmer Ritter Papers (RG 01 F 15.16), Box A 58, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[21] Dan Kelley, Interview with Author, July 22, 2014.

[22] "Catholic Group Drops Fight on School Issue–Votes to Disband at Meeting Marked By Boos and 'No,'" *St. Louis Star Times*, October 6, 1947.

[23] Ibid.

[24] M. Alvera Fallinger, "The History and Development of Rosati-Kain High School Saint Louis, Missouri" (MA Thesis, St. Louis University, 1949).

[25] *Rosati-Kain Chronicles*, September 2, 1947, Archives of the School Sisters of Notre Dame, Central Pacific Province.

[26] Ibid.

[27] "St. Rose Parish, St. Louis, MO 1934–1985, Then and Now."

[28] "Letter To Priests, February 24, 1966," Cardinal Ritter Papers, RG1F6, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.

[29] "History of St. Rose's Church, 1910" and "Fifty Golden Years, 1934," St. Rose of Lima Parish Histories, RG04B84, Archives of the Archdiocese of St. Louis, MO 63119.
[30] "St. Rose Parish, St. Louis, MO 1934–1985, Then and Now."
[31] Ibid.
[32] Dan Kelley, Interview with Author, July 22, 2014.
[33] "St. Rose Parish, St. Louis, MO 1934–1985, Then and Now."
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Walter Ehrlich, *Zion in the Valley, The Jewish Community of St. Louis* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2002), 29.
[38] Ibid.
[39] "Address delivered at Youth and Democracy Rally, Soldan High School," February 19, 1941, Alfred Fleishman Collection, Box 9 Folder 37, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[40] Rosalind Mael Bronsen, *B'Nai Amoona For All Generations* (St. Louis: Congregation B'Nai Amoona, 1985), 142. Also see Soldan High School Yearbooks, St. Louis.
[41] Anabelle Chapel, Interview with Author, May 13, 2014.
[42] Harvey Brown, Interview with Author, May 12, 2014.
[43] "'Y' Journal Dedication Issue, c. 1927," Jewish Community Centers Association Papers, Box 3 Folder 1, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[44] *Y Journal*, 1949–54.
[45] Hans Mayer, Interview with Author, July 8, 2014.
[46] "First Classes on Integrated Basis Meet in High Schools," *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, February 3, 1955.
[47] Gilbert Harris, "Our Neighborhood," January 21, 1955, Gilbert Harris Papers, Box 3 Folder 5, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[48] "Message to Union Boulevard Members," December 14, 1954, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Series 2, Box 8A, Folder 5, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[49] "Parents Can Help School Integration, Hickey Declares," *St. Louis Globe-Democrat,* April 26, 1955, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder "Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976," Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[50] "First Classes on Integrated Basis Meet in High Schools," *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, February 3, 1955.
[51] "Integration of Schools in Second Phase," *St. Louis Argus*, February 4, 1955.
[52] Soldan High School Yearbook, 1955.
[53] Soldan High School Yearbooks, 1955–1958.
[54] Linda Kraus, Interview with Author, July 14, 2014, and Jake Leventhal, Interview with Author, July 10, 2014.
[55] "A Natural Day," *St. Louis Argus*, February 4, 1955.
[56] "Complaints against the St. Louis Public School system, 1959," Urban League Papers, Series 2, Box 8, Folder 25, Washington University Archives.
[57] "Letter from William L. Clay, 1958–1960," Urban League Papers, Series 2, Box 8A, Folder 5, Washington University Archives.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Jake Leventhal, Interview with Author, July 10, 2014.
[60] "Types of Programs Survey, 1947," Box 2, Folder 19, Jewish Community Center Association Papers, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[61] Harris, "Our Neighborhood."
[62] Ibid.
[63] Gilbert Harris, "Speech to Annual JCCA Meeting," May 16, 1955, Gilbert Harris Papers, Box 3, Folder 5, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[64] Ibid.
[65] Bronsen, *B'Nai Amoona For All Generations*, 1985.
[66] "Draft of Guide re: Changing Neighborhoods," Jewish Community Relations Committee Papers, Box F, Folder, JCRC Committee on Changing Neighborhoods St. Louis/National, 1952–1966, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[67] Ibid.
[68] "Summary of Union Avenue Neighborhood Survey Report," Jewish Community Relations Committee Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[69] "From the Neighborhood Up," *St. Louis Post Dispatch,* February 15, 1954, Jewish Community Relations Committee Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[70] "Are you interested in our neighborhood?" Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[71] "The 'Holding Action' on Windermere Place," July 21, 1957, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[72] Ibid.
[73] "West End Conference Has a Rift that Will Be a Test of its Merit," *St. Louis American,* January 14, 1960, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[74] Herbert Simmons, "West End Community Group Faces Critical Policy Issue," *St. Louis Argus*, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid.
[77] "West End Conference Has a Rift that Will Be a Test of its Merit."
[78] "One Night Last Week" *St. Louis Argus,* January 15, 1960, Jewish Community Relations Council Papers, Box F, Folder Neighborhood Councils St. Louis 1952–1976, Jewish Archives of St. Louis.

When SLEEPY HOLLOW Came to St. Louis



Washington Irving (1783–1859) wrote short stories, essays, and biographies throughout his life. He and James Fenimore Cooper were the first American writers to gain acclaim in Europe. Irving's interests compelled him to write about a wide array of topics including biographies of George Washington and Mohammad, the Moors, and fifteenth-century Spain. *(Image: Library of Congress)*



The Sketch Book of Geoffrey Crayon, Gent., published in 1819 and 1820, included some of Irving's best-known short stories. Both "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow" and "Rip Van Winkle" first appeared among the 34 essays and stories in *Sketch Book*. *(Image: Little Otsu)*

With the new television series *Sleepy Hollow*, there's a lot of talk about headless horsemen these days. And with reason—Washington Irving's story of a headless horseman chasing Ichabod Crane in "The Legend of Sleepy Hollow" (first published in 1820) remains a classic. In fact, Irving's influence reached all the way to St. Louis during his lifetime.

Just months after returning to the United States after living in Europe for some 17 years, Irving traveled West, including two days in St. Louis in September 1832. Despite struggles traveling the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers—his steamboat ran aground twice and was hit by a racing *Yellow Stone*—he wrote his sister that, "I have been charmed with the grand scenery of these two mighty rivers."

It was a short trip, a stopover on the way west with Henry Leavitt Ellsworth, who was heading a commission appointed by Andrew Jackson to survey western lands to relocate Native American tribes through the Indian Removal Act, which led to the Trail of Tears later in the decade. Irving struggled to understand the nature of Indian relations as he pondered the recently captured Sauk Chief Black Hawk: "I find it extremely difficult, even when so near the seat of action, to get at the right story of these feuds between the white and red men, and my sympathies go strongly with the latter."

Irving traveled to Jefferson Barracks to view Black Hawk, now "an old man, upward of seventy, emaciated and enfeebled by the sufferings he has experienced, and by a touch of cholera."

More importantly, he traveled into the country to visit Indian Commissioner William Clark, the former explorer and territorial governor, "a fine healthy robust man—tall," Irving said, and seeming younger than his 62 years. He dined with Clark ("good—but rustic") and brought up the subject of Clark's slaves.

Irving's notes are the only record we have about York, Clark's slave who accompanied the Corps of Discovery to the Pacific. Clark said he eventually freed three of his slaves, setting up each one in a business or farm; York had a drayage business, hauling stuff short distances. Irving said that Clark noted "they all repented and wanted to come back."

At least according to Clark, York's business didn't pan out, telling perhaps more about Clark's views about race than anything. The business failed because of York's failings, Clark thought: he couldn't get up early enough, kept his horses in ill health, and after two died he sold the rest but was swindled. Irving says that Clark heard that York had said, "Damn this freedom. I have never had a happy day since I got it." En route to St. Louis, Clark said, York died of cholera.

Irving's words were quoted in St. Louis again in 1863, just three years after the grave of William Clark was moved to Bellefontaine Cemetery. In the front of the cemetery's newly published *Rules and Regulations*, the board quoted none other than Washington Irving, the founder of Sleepy Hollow Cemetery in Tarrytown, New York, thinking that Irving's sentiments were theirs: "But the grave of those we loved—what a place for meditation! There it is that we call up in long review the whole history of virtue and gentleness." And so Clark and the creator of the headless horseman, or at least his sentiments, were united again.

Washington Irving, *Western Travels*[1]

Arrive at St. Louis about 11—sleep on board.

Thursday Sept 13. St. Louis—mixture of French & American character—French billiard room—market-place where some are speaking French, some English—put up at Union Hotel—see Mr. Chouteau pere et fils—Dr.O'Dwyer—Judge Peck—Mr. Bates.

Drive out to Gov. Clark's—cross prairie—flowering & fragrant shrubs—the Gov[ernor's] farm—small cottage—orchard bending & breaking with loads of fruit—negroes with tables under trees preparing meal—fine sitting room air—little negroes whispering & laughing—civil negro major domo who asks to take horses out—invites us to walk in the orchard & spreads table with additional covers—sitting-room—rifle & game bag & c. in corners—Indian calumet over fireplace—remains of fire on hearth, showing that morning has been cool—lovely day—golden sunshine—transparent atmosphere—pure breeze.

Fine nut trees, peach trees, grape vines, catalpas &c. &c. about the house—look out over rich, level plain or prairie—green near at hand—blue line at the horizon—universal chirp and spinning of insects—fertility of country—grove of walnuts in the rear of the house—beehives—dove cote—canoe—Genl arrives on horseback with dogs—guns. His grandson on a calico poney hallowing & laughing—Genl on horseback—gun on his shoulder—cur—house dog—bullying setter.

Gov. Clark fine healthy robust man—tall about 50—perhaps more—his hair, originally light, now grey—falling on his shoulders—frank—intelligent—his son a cadet of W.P. now in the army—aid de camp to Genl Atkinson.



By the time Irving met William Clark (1770–1838), the former explorer had gained a certain amount of fame. For a New Yorker like Irving, the presence of slaves was particularly striking. It is clear from Irving's account that Clark crafted his narrative about York in the context of his views about slaves and African-Americans. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

Dinner plentiful—good—hut rustic—fried chicken, bacon and grouse, roast beef, roasted potatoes, tomatoes, excellent cakes, bread, butter, & c.

Gov. C. gives much excellent information concerning Indians.

His slaves—set them free—one he placed at a ferry—another on a farm, giving him land, horses, &c.—a third he gave a large wagon & team of 6 horses to ply between Nashville and Richmond. They all repented & wanted to come back.

The waggoner was York, the hero of the Missouri expedition & adviser of the Indians. He could not get up early enough in the mornng—his horses were ill kept—two died—the others grew poor. He sold them, was cheated—entered into service—fared ill. "Damn this freedom," said York, "I have never had a happy day since I got it." He determined to go back to his old master—set off for St. Louis, but was taken with cholera in Tennessee & died. Some of the traders think they have met traces of York's crowd, on the Missouri.

Returned by another route escorted by young Clark—ride thro prarie—flowers—waggon—huts, etc.—pass by a noble farm—every thing in abundance—pass by a circle of Indian mounds—on one of them Genl Ashley has built his house so as to have the summit of it as a terrace in the rear.

St. Louis—old rackety gambling house—noise of the cue & and the billiard ball from morning till night—old French woman accosting each other in the street.

Friday Sept 14. Drive out with Judge Peck, Judge's uncle, & our party to Fort Jefferson to see Black Hawk—ride thro open country—formerly forest—drive to Genl Atkinson's quarters.

Black Hawk. old man upwards of 70 with aquiline nose—finely formed heard—organs of benevolence—his two sons—oldest a fine-looking young man—his brother in law the prophet—the little Indian stables.

They are all chained arms & ankles with cannon, but are allowed to walk about escorted by soldier.

Old French town nicknamed Vuide Poche—old French settlers retain their dress, manners &c.—cared little for two or three times a week to dance—very sober and temperate tho gay—kept aloof from Americans but begin to intermarry with them.

Black Hawk—had a skin of a black hawk in his hand & fanned himself with the tail.

Black Hawk (1767–1838) was a famous Sauk born in northwestern Illinois. While the Sauk and Fox tribes had ceded their Illinois lands in an 1804 treaty, they were permitted to use the region until the United States government wanted the land. In the late 1820s, settlers began moving into the area, but Sauks under Black Hawk refused to evacuate the region. After a confrontation in summer 1832 in which hundreds of Native Americans were killed at Bad Axe Creek, Black Hawk and several other Sauk and Fox leaders were captured and imprisoned at Jefferson Barracks. After being transported to Fortress Monroe, Black Hawk returned and told fellow natives that it was futile to resist the Americans since they were so numerous. This image is from Thomas McKenney's *History of the Indian Tribes of North America*. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*

ENDNOTES

[1] Excerpt reprinted by permission of the University of Oklahoma Press.

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Daniel Gonzales earned his MA in Museum Studies from the University of Missouri-Saint Louis in the Spring of 2010 as the E. Desmond Lee Fellow. Following graduation he worked in museum education and exhibit development at the Missouri History Museum. In 2013, Daniel took on the position of Museum Curator with the St. Louis County Parks system.

Quinta Scott is the author of *The Mississippi: A Visual Biography*. She is also the author of *Along Route 66: The Architecture of America's Highway*, a great read-aloud guidebook of the old road. She is the photographer/author of *Route 66: The Highway and Its People* with Susan Croce Kelly, and of *The Eads Bridge: Photographic Essay by Quinta Scott; Historical Appraisal by Howard S. Miller*. She and her husband, Barrie, live in Waterloo, Illinois, close to the American Bottom and the great Mississippi River Bluffs.

Andrew M. Cooperman earned a BA in History and International Relations from McKendree College (now University) and an MA in History from the University of Toledo. He grew up in Cahokia, and has spent the last thirteen years either working or volunteering at the Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Sites Complex. He is the author of "Cahokia's Territorial Post Office" (*Journal of St. Clair County History*, Vol. 33, 2004) and "Legal Landmarks" (*St. Louis Magazine*, February, 2012). He is currently working on a display panel recounting the history of slavery in Illinois for Cahokia's Jarrot Mansion State Historic Site.

Sarah Siegel is a second-year history PhD student at Washington University in St. Louis. She studies mid-twentieth century urban history, with a focus on community activism. She holds a BA in History from Yale University and a MA in Secondary Education from the University of Missouri-St. Louis. Before beginning her graduate research, she was a social studies teacher at Soldan High School in St. Louis.













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