

# William Clark, Black Hawk, and the Militarization of Indian Removal

BY JEFFREY SMITH



When William Clark stepped off a steamboat at Jefferson Barracks, just below St. Louis, in September 1832, he figured he had finally won. Clark, Indian Commissioner for the region, took the Sauk chief Keokuk and his entourage to the barracks prison to visit the latest arrivals, Black Hawk and a half-dozen of his fellow leaders. Clark and Keokuk knew they were in the midst of a new era of relations between the native peoples and the expanding United States. All three leaders—William Clark, Keokuk, and Black Hawk—thought they were promoting the best interests of Native Americans, too. During the 1820s, Clark had come around to the view that proximity to whites was hindering the process of “civilization”—making the Indians in the white man’s image—and that clearly the Indians needed to relocate away from the corrupting influences of white society where they could grow and evolve—become “civilized”—at their own pace. American officials like Clark and Lewis Cass held that the federal government was obliged to provide everything needed to facilitate the process; Clark believed the move should come of mutual consent, whereby the Indians agreed to move and to an agreeable location.

Thanks to William Clark, Keokuk had risen to a position of prominence and leadership among the Sauks. Clark supported the rising Sauk leader with gifts and supplies that he could take back to the tribe, solidifying his position there. He was among the Native American leaders Clark took back to Washington to meet the president. There, Keokuk became convinced that American expansion was inevitable, that whites were too numerous to resist, and that survival depended on figuring out how to accommodate them. By decade’s end, the Sauk leader was squarely in the American camp and held substantial (but not total) control within his community. Black Hawk, by contrast, held fast to traditional views. He had a strong connection to the land in northwestern Illinois, distrusted the Americans, and felt that the Sauk should never succumb to American lifestyles, alcohol, clothes, or dictates. Yet these three men came together in 1832 at the prison at Jefferson Barracks as symbols of fundamental changes under way. When they stood at the barracks on that fall day, they represented a critical change in the relations between the United States and the Native American tribes it had pushed farther and farther west, as proof that the United States government would stop at nothing to spread its



By the time George Catlin painted this portrait, William Clark had been overseeing relations between western tribes and the United States government for almost a quarter of a century. In Washington, officials generally thought of Clark and Secretary of War (and former Michigan territorial governor) Lewis Cass as perhaps the most knowledgeable federal officials on tribal affairs. *(Image: National Museum of American Art)*

wings and people across the continent. How did they get here, how did it end up like this, and what did it mean for future relations between the United States and the tribes?

The roots of the problem stretched to the “three flags ceremony” in St. Louis in March 1804. It really wasn’t much, as ceremonies go, although the impact of the transfer of Louisiana to the United States was profound. Spain symbolically transferred the territory to France, which then transferred it to the United States the following day. Among the highest-ranking American military officials on hand were Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, co-commanders of the Corps of Northwest Discovery. But Lewis and Clark weren’t the only foreign dignitaries in town when the transfer took place. Also on hand was a delegation of Sauk and Fox Indians, most likely including a warrior named Black Sparrow Hawk, in town to settle a dispute over the murder of some white settlers by four Sauk hunters the previous

Left—Black Hawk came to symbolize the fight over land ownership between the tribes and the United States government and the problems with former treaties. *(Image: Missouri History Museum)*



When the United States purchased Louisiana from France, a ceremony in St. Louis in March of 1804 symbolized the land transfer in upper Louisiana. Often referred to as the “three flags ceremony,” the land was transferred from Spain to France, then from France to the United States. Black Hawk was almost certainly on hand for it, as was Capt. Meriwether Lewis, Clark’s co-captain in the Corps of Discovery, which was encamped across the river in Illinois. (Image: Missouri History Museum)

year.<sup>1</sup>

The event historians call “Black Hawk’s War” was the culmination of almost three decades of strained relations with the Sauk and Fox tribes in northwestern Illinois and eastern Iowa; for most of that time, William Clark was a central player representing the interests of the United States. It was a relationship that tested not only Clark’s natural patience but everything he had learned as well. Clark had signed more treaties with Native Americans than perhaps any other white American—some negotiated with tribal leaders, others imposed upon them—and had generally opposed using force. By the time Andrew Jackson took office in March 1829, Clark had a long-standing reputation for civil firmness in dealing with western Indians, and as the one man they were most likely to trust and listen to. Indeed, a main reason he lost the gubernatorial election in Missouri in 1820 was the perception outside St. Louis that he was “soft” on Indians. Yet Black Hawk never trusted the Americans, and that included the Red-Headed Chief in St. Louis, no matter what Keokuk and others said. The two men—and their respective peoples—had a turbulent relationship for a quarter of a century that grew more so after 1822. Black Hawk and his so-called “British band” challenged the United States at decade’s end, ultimately leading Clark to support attacking the troublesome subset of Sauks and chasing them down like dogs as they sought to retreat west across the Mississippi. Black Hawk’s War represents one of the great paradoxes

of William Clark: How and why could and did he come to his position in 1831 and 1832? Ultimately, it brings to sharp focus the fact that Clark found himself truly straddling two worlds and two sets of priorities—his belief in progress and the advance of civilization as white settlers moved westward into the frontier and the government’s duty to facilitate a peaceful transition, while at the same time wrestling with his own views about handling the native peoples living there.

Part of the issue is that Black Hawk—and the federal government’s response to his actions of 1831 and 1832—speaks to the different views of Indians held on either side of the Appalachians. Easterners (and especially northeastern thinkers), now largely distanced from direct and regular experience with indigenous peoples, had come to see them as “noble savages,” childlike victims who required care and patience from the United States government. So long as easterners from the New England and the mid-Atlantic states like James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and their administrations dominated the executive branch, federal policy and actions would reflect a desire to continue acquiring Indian lands in the West while providing tools and mechanisms to “civilize” the Indians in their new western homes. But Andrew Jackson represented a completely different mindset that was more typical of westerners. He saw Native Americans as “morally depraved, diabolically cruel killers of innocent white women and children, and brutish, subhuman obstacles to the advancement of republican civilization.” William Clark was one of the few men straddling this intellectual chasm. He thought more like an easterner, but he lived and had extensive experience in the West. This hybridization of lessons learned, vast experience, and regional viewpoints led Clark to recommend and support a military solution to the “Black Hawk problem.”

The relationship between the Sauk and Fox and the United States got off on the wrong foot almost immediately. Changes in political status, Americans cozying up with the dreaded Osage, a dubious land purchase, and a potential threat to the Sauks’ lucrative fur trade with Europeans made tribal leaders uneasy.

Now, Indiana governor William Henry Harrison imposed a new treaty on the Sauks. At the time of the treaty, the allied tribes claimed substantial territory on both sides of the Mississippi River spanning present-day southwestern Wisconsin, northwestern Illinois, and eastern and central Iowa.<sup>2</sup> Their main settlement was at Saukenuk, just up the Rock River from the Mississippi in Illinois, where women grew

corn and other agricultural products and chiefs orchestrated hunts, commerce, and foreign relations. Exactly what transpired (and why) remains open to conjecture, and whether it included Harrison's liberality with promises and liquor or the chiefs' thinking that they were merely normalizing economic relations with the new Americans, the resulting treaty turned out to become a source of misunderstanding and, ultimately, Black Hawk's War.<sup>3</sup>

To us looking back at 1804 from today, it seems like a formula for disaster. The problem all stemmed from the land boundaries. The Sauks gave to the United States all their land east of the Mississippi. But Article VII permitted the Sauks to live on the land "as long as these lands remained the property of the United States." To the Americans, this meant the Sauks could live there as long as it was *federal* land, but once the government surveyed it and sold tracts to homesteaders (as it did in fall 1829), the Sauks and Fox would have to move across the Mississippi River to present-day Iowa and never return.<sup>4</sup> It seems unlikely that the chiefs fully understood the implications of this clause; while they had extensive dealings with whites for more than a century, those relations with Europeans had never pertained to land ownership, and they probably saw this as "a purely formal gesture of extending United States protection over a substantial party of their territory."<sup>5</sup> Regardless, when the delegation returned to Saukenuk, they continued to live on the land, plant and harvest corn, and bury their dead, just like they always had. The relationship became stormy in subsequent years. Like a number of western tribes, the Sauks joined the British in the War of 1812. At war's end, Secretary of War (and State as well, temporarily)<sup>6</sup> James Monroe appointed Clark, along with Illinois Territorial governor Ninian Edwards and St. Louis fur czar Auguste Chouteau, to bring together the pro-British tribes and lay down the law in new treaties. But Black Hawk's group of Sauks didn't show up. Clark was furious, fuming to Washington that "[t]he conduct of those savages, in the cold indifference with which they received several communications in regard to the late treaty, . . . together with the suggestions and admonitions of the British officers themselves, to be on our guard against them, leave no doubt on our mind that it is the intention of those tribes to continue the war, and that nothing less than a vigorous display of military force can change their disposition."<sup>7</sup> Threats and ill-will finally led to their coming to St. Louis to sign the treaty with the Red-Headed Chief the following year.<sup>8</sup> In the 1816 treaty, the Rock River Sauks "do hereby unconditionally assent to recognize, re-establish,



John Reynolds (1788–1865) became governor of Illinois in 1830. He was responsible for calling out the Illinois state militia and took active command of it in Black Hawk's War. To reward his efforts, President Andrew Jackson named him a major-general. He resigned as governor in 1834 when he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives. (Image: *Portrait and Biographical Album of Whiteside County, Illinois, 1887*)

and confirm the treaty" of 1804, but without any reference to its terms.<sup>9</sup> As far as the Americans were concerned, the Sauks were merely guests on the land along Rock River until white folks moved in.

Some, like Keokuk and most of the Mesquakies, saw the writing on the wall in the 1820s and began migrating westward across the Mississippi. Others, like Black Hawk, refused to recognize the land cession and remained, saying that the original treaty was signed without the consent of the tribe; besides he argued, by not accepting annuities, they were not giving up their homeland. American expansion pushed more Native Americans westward so that more Indians were living in and competing with more Indians in less space, leading to heightened competition with both one another and with tribes farther west like the Sioux. The United States saw this competition as a low-budget way to control the tribes, keeping any one from getting too large and

strong, since the army was shrunken so small that it could not police the frontier itself.<sup>10</sup> So, when whites began moving to northwestern Illinois to farm and mine lead on the same land, the situation became even more volatile.

By decade's end, Clark made sure that the Sauks knew it was time to move; some did so as ordered, others did not. Clark was still exhibiting his typical patience in 1829, telling Indian Superintendent Thomas McKenney that the Sauks who remained held "the opinion that they have been defrauded of an immensely valuable Country," and that being removed with such a small annuity "produces unfriendly feelings, particularly among those who are under British influence," which was bound to create problems with the fast-encroaching whites. Perhaps, Clark suggested, the United States should meet with the chiefs and try to work out a new treaty with a timetable for moving that both sides found workable.<sup>11</sup> After all, he told war secretary John Eaton, "no power is vested in me to stop the progress of settlements on ceded land, and I possess no other means of enticing the Indians to move than persuasion," which would require substantial presents. Worse yet, Clark said, the hard feelings were unnecessary since "[t]he encroachments of the whites in this instance is to be regretted, as the removal of those Indians would have most probably been effected in the course of the next year. Other Tribes complain of the encroachments of the whites and on that subject, a general discontent appears to prevail among the Tribes of the state of Illinois."<sup>12</sup>

Federal land around Saukenuk went up for sale in September 1829, and settlers began moving in. Keokuk proved unable to persuade Black Hawk and his followers to vacate as they continued to farm the land themselves. About three dozen settlers wrote to Illinois governor John Reynolds for help. Some six or seven hundred Sauks from "the Black Hawk's party" were nearby, reportedly destroying fences and wheat, taking land, threatening settlers trying to plant spring crops, and accusing settlers of stealing tribal lands.<sup>13</sup> Reynolds apprised Clark of the predicament and suggested "perhaps, a request from you to them for them to remove to the west side of the river would effect the object of procuring peace to the citizens of the State."<sup>14</sup> Or, Clark responded, perhaps not, saying that "every effort on my part has been made to effect the removal from Illinois of *all* the Tribes who have ceded their Lands."<sup>15</sup> The same day, Clark wrote to Gen. Edmund Gaines, commander in the region, to say that it was time to make good on the threats of military intervention against the recalcitrant bands.<sup>16</sup> Clark remained committed to the idea of civilizing



Gen. Edmund P. Gaines (1777–1849) was a veteran of the War of 1812 and, later, commander of the Western Military Department at the time of Black Hawk's War. He was perhaps most famous in his lifetime for having arrested former vice president Aaron Burr and testified in his treason trial. (Image: National Archives)

cooperative Indians, though, and told Gaines to take care to not harm those who "have constantly and zealously cooperated with the Government Agents."<sup>17</sup>

Within a week, Gaines met with Sauk leaders over the issue. Illinois land was not theirs and had not been since 1804, Gaines explained (echoing the arguments Clark sent him). Jumping Fish said he had sold enough to free a brave in 1805, but certainly not such a swath as that.<sup>18</sup> Gaines's meeting with the volatile Black Hawk went even less smoothly. The Great Spirit placed the Sauk on the land, the warrior said, and he intended to stay, then exploded, "You asked, 'Who I am'—I am a Sauk; my fathers were great men, and I wish to remain where the bones of my fathers are laid."<sup>19</sup> Later, Black Hawk tried to argue that the Sauks received nothing for their cessions in treaties. With exasperation clearly mounting, Clark reported to Cass that Black Hawk didn't have a leg to stand on this time. "The treaties referred to [1804, 1816, and 1824] have been frequently explained to the Sacs and Foxes," Clark fumed, "and [one] of which (the 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1816) was signed by Black Hawk himself, the principal




Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied (1782–1867) was a German prince who had a great interest in ethnology and the natural world. He had explored in South America in the 1820s and published his findings, and he traveled to the United States in 1832 to explore and describe the upper Missouri River. Before leaving for the upper Missouri in March 1833, Maximilian sat in on the negotiations between Clark and Keokuk at Clark’s meeting house; his description of the summit is the most complete record of the meeting extant. After returning to St. Louis in the spring of 1834, he traveled back to Germany and wrote his *Travels into the Interior of North America*. Artist Karl Bodmer, who Maximilian hired to join him, painted some 88 illustrations for it. (Image: *Qualitat fur Menschen*)

Man of the party who signed the treaty. They have been frequently told by myself and their Agent, that they must move to their own land on the West side of the Mississippi and assured that if done so peaceably that assistance would be offered them. They however persisted in their refusal to move and settled within their own Country.”<sup>20</sup> Keokuk tried to smooth things over the following day, but Gaines wanted none of it; the Sauks had to leave right away, and abandon the corn they had planted. In fact, he said, he would even replace the harvest, but Keokuk had to get his people out of Illinois or suffer the consequences. The arrival of some 1,400 Illinois Militia in late June made it easier for Gaines to bully the Sauks into

signing “Articles of Agreement and Capitulation,” filled with language designed to leave Native Americans feeling both defeated and humiliated: They had tried to destroy settlers’ homes and farms and tried to orchestrate other tribes in the region to fight removal, but their “being convinced that such a war would tend speedily to annihilate them, they have voluntarily abandoned their hostile attitude and have sued for peace.” The terms of the agreement read as those that could only have been dictated by vengeful victors: permanent submission to American authority, ending any communication with British or unlicensed traders, allowing the Americans to build and use roads through their lands whose boundaries were ostensibly guaranteed. Left with little choice, Black Hawk touched the quill to the paper.<sup>21</sup> Clark supported—even applauded—Gaines’s approach, saying the Sauks had been “insolent,” but “[t]his show of force, with the cool and determined course pursued towards this disaffected Band of Sacs has produced the desired effect, and I have no doubt will tend to convince the disaffected parts of Tribes on this frontier of the folly of their opposition to the U. States without a just cause.”<sup>22</sup> When the Sauks traveled west for their annual winter hunt, many hoped that none would return to Saukenuk.

Reports in late winter of 1832 suggested otherwise. Clark received word from the region that much was happening. Still, as late as early April, Clark thought a war could be averted; Gen. Henry Atkinson had already left for Rock Island via steamboat in hopes of intercepting the Sauks crossing the river to convince them to return west.<sup>23</sup> But such was not to be; Black Hawk had mustered together some 600 warriors, and “the arrival of the Troops seems to have considerably affected on the friendly Indians, but it appears, that nothing short of force of Arms, will deter the British band from their purpose.”<sup>24</sup> That was it; Clark was ready to settle the issue once and for all, seething to War Secretary Lewis Cass, “I am fully of the opinion that a very considerable force, and properly concerted measures, will be indispensably necessary to drive those hostile bands from the lands they have invaded. . . . I am inclined to the belief that those Indians have well merited a severe chastisement; and would respectfully recommend the adoption of such measures as would ensure to the offenders such a degree of punishment as might be not only useful to themselves hereafter, but which would serve as a warning to others.”<sup>25</sup>

Events accelerated quickly. Keokuk denied responsibility for Black Hawk’s actions to Atkinson, then skedaddled to St. Louis to express fear to Clark



Hundreds of Sauk and Fox men, women, and children died at the Battle of Bad Axe on August 1 and 2, 1832, many in the river trying to escape. It ended conflict between the United States military and the tribes in the Michigan and Illinois territories. Most historians today characterize it as a massacre. (Image: Wikimedia Commons)

that the Americans would take out their anger on his peaceful—and cooperative—people. Relying on reports from both military leaders and Clark, Lewis Cass threatened “a general Indian war,” saying that no one less than Andrew Jackson himself had authorized war against Black Hawk and his followers. Clark agreed heartily, telling Cass that “it [is] highly gratifying, inasmuch as it develops the determination of the Government in relation to the war in which we are now involved with blood thirsty and ferocious savages. The faithless and treacherous character of those at the head of our Indian enemies appears now to be so well known and understood,

as to permit an expression of the hope, that their wanton cruelties will eventually result in their own destruction; and as they have afforded sufficient evidence not only of their entire disregard of Treaties, but also of their deep-rooted hostility, in shedding the blood of our women and children, a War of *Extermination* should be waged against them. The honor and respectability of the Government require this:—the peace and quiet of the frontier, the lives and safety of its inhabitants *demand it*.”<sup>26</sup>

But Clark also covered for his ally, Keokuk, assuring Cass the problem was an isolated one, and that once Black Hawk was out of the way, removal



Gen. Henry Atkinson (1782–1842) had a long career working with western tribes as an emissary of the United States government. He led two expeditions to the Yellowstone River (in 1819 and 1825) and signed treaties of friendship with a number of tribes in the upper Great Plains. Given his experience, Atkinson was named to the general command of the army during Black Hawk's War, for which he was criticized. (Image: Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library and Museum)

and civilization of the Sauks could proceed. At last, the hunger for land forced the two men—who reputedly knew and cared more about western Indians than any other whites—to resort to force.<sup>27</sup> Jackson himself gave the final orders to end the problem once and for all in mid-June.<sup>28</sup> The army spent the next two months chasing Black Hawk and his followers around northwestern Illinois and southeastern Wisconsin until finally cornering them at Bad Axe Creek, slaughtering hundreds, and capturing Black Hawk and his fellow leaders for return to the prison at Jefferson Barracks.

While all this was taking place, Clark and Cass worked to cement the loyalty of the rest of the Sauks in Iowa. Clark authorized 40,000 rations of provisions for “friendly Indians as may seek protection within the Indian agencies” in early July.<sup>29</sup> Soon after, he asked the war department to sign off on giving a blacksmith, gunsmith, and “assistance for Agriculture” to the friendly Sauks, Mesquakies, and Ioways who complied with American wishes, since they “will imperiously require some assistance in early preparations for agriculture.”<sup>30</sup> A month later, Clark wrote to Lewis Cass with preliminary

reports from the war; it appeared to be almost over.<sup>31</sup> Soon after, Clark left St. Louis for Rock Island to provide “aid of his advice and experience in certain contemplated arrangements with the Indians in that quarter” in preparation for the treaty talks scheduled for that fall.<sup>32</sup>

It is often hard to tell when one is standing on the precipice of change. If William Clark thought so, he never wrote it down. Black Hawk returned from Washington defeated and convinced that Jackson was right—the Americans were as many as the leaves in the forest. From Keokuk's standpoint, a new *realpolitik* was emerging where he would not be challenged by the likes of Black Hawk as he sought ways to work in the emerging order with the Americans. Now, though, the United States confirmed that it would do most anything to facilitate westward expansion—even bring out the military against Native Americans—and that a more Jacksonian view of Indian removal had become the order of the day. But when they stood in that prison at Jefferson Barracks, they all straddled a time of great change.

Keokuk (1767–1848) was a Sauk leader in Illinois and the Iowa Territory. Unlike Black Hawk, Keokuk was willing to work with American officials. In September 1832, Keokuk headed a delegation that traveled to St. Louis to try to negotiate Black Hawk's release from imprisonment at Jefferson Barracks. (Image: National Museum of American Art)





## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Prelude to Disaster: The Course of Indian-White Relations Which Led to the Black Hawk War of 1832* (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1970), 19.
- <sup>2</sup> William Thomas Hagan, *The Sac and Fox Indians* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 228, for map of Sauk and Fox land cessions.
- <sup>3</sup> Wallace, *Prelude to Disaster*, 20–21.
- <sup>4</sup> Charles J. Kappler, *Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties* (Stillwater: Oklahoma State University Electronic Publishing Center); Wallace, *Prelude to Disaster*, 17.
- <sup>5</sup> Wallace, *Prelude to Disaster*, 20–21.
- <sup>6</sup> Monroe, already Secretary of State, took over the War Department when Madison fired John Armstrong after Great Britain’s attack and sacking of Washington, D.C. He only held the job until early March 1815; William Crawford became Secretary of War the following August.
- <sup>7</sup> Extract of a [second] letter from Messrs Clark, Edwards, and Chouteau, Commissioners for treating with the Indians, dated St. Louis, 22d May 1815; MHS, Native American Coll, b1 f4.
- <sup>8</sup> A delegation of Sauks did attend and sign a treaty in September 1815, which was signed by (among others) Quashquammee (Jumping Fish), who also signed the 1804 treaty. See Kappler, 121.
- <sup>9</sup> “Treaty with the Sauk, 1816,” Kappler, 127.
- <sup>10</sup> Kerry Trask, *Black Hawk: The Battle for the Heart of America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), 24–27.
- <sup>11</sup> William Clark to McKenney, 20 May 1829, Kansas Historical Society, Records of the United States Superintendency of Indian Affairs, St. Louis, MO; v. 4, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 9–11. Hereafter KHS Sup. Letterbook. In fact, Clark reported that the British were responsible for sowing the seeds of discontent by convincing the Sauks that their annuity was far too small for the vast territory they were ceding.
- <sup>12</sup> William Clark to sec of war 1 June 1829, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 12–13.
- <sup>13</sup> Citizens of Rock River to John Reynolds, 30 April 1831, *The Black Hawk War, 1831–1832*, vol. 2: Letters and Papers, Part I, Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, vol. 36; compiled and edited by Ellen M. Whitney (Springfield: Illinois State Historical Library, 1973), 3. Hereafter Whitney, *Black Hawk War*.
- <sup>14</sup> Reynolds to Clark, 26 May 1831, Whitney, *Black Hawk War*, 13.
- <sup>15</sup> Clark to Reynolds, 28 May 1831, *ibid.*, 19–20.
- <sup>16</sup> Clark to Gaines, 28 May 1831, *ibid.*, 16–17.
- <sup>17</sup> Clark to Gaines, 28 May 1831, *ibid.*, 16–17.
- <sup>18</sup> Memorandum of Talks between Edmund P. Gaines and the Sauk, Rock Island, June 4, 5, 6, 7 1831, *ibid.*, 27–28, quote on 28. The original meeting in 1804 was instigated to settle the matter of a Sauk brave murdering a white settler, who had then been captured. Ironically, the brave was never released; American soldiers shot him in an escape attempt in 1805. See Territorial Papers 13, 165.
- <sup>19</sup> Memorandum of Talks between Edmund P. Gaines and the Sauk, Rock Island, June 4, 5, 6, 7 1831, Whitney, *Black Hawk War*, 29.
- <sup>20</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass Sec of War, 12 August 1831, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 248–49.
- <sup>21</sup> “Articles of Agreement and Capitulation between the United States and the Sauk and Fox,” 30 June 1831, Whitney, *Black Hawk War*, 85–87.
- <sup>22</sup> William Clark to John Eaton, 6 July 1831, *ibid.*, 102.
- <sup>23</sup> Clark to Herring, 10 April 1832, *ibid.*, 85–87; William Clark to John Eaton, 6 July 1831, *ibid.*, 244.
- <sup>24</sup> Felix St. Vrain to William Clark, 18 April 1832, *ibid.*, 277–78.
- <sup>25</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass, 20 April 1832, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 356–57.
- <sup>26</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass, 8 June 1832, Whitney, *Black Hawk War*, 550.
- <sup>27</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass, 8 June 1832, *ibid.*, 550.
- <sup>28</sup> “John Robb to Andrew Jackson and Jackson’s reply,” 12 June 1832, *ibid.*, 579–80.
- <sup>29</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass, 2 July 1832, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 385–86. Cass ltr of 19 June notifying him of congressional act “for the relief of such friendly Indians as may seek protection within the Indian Agencies.” Passed June 15, section 4 allocating \$20K; see Register of Debates in Congress, 22d Cong, 1st session, v. 8, pt. 3, app., p. xviii; in *ibid.*, 630.
- <sup>30</sup> William Clark to Elbert Herring, 19 July 1832, KHS Sup. Letterbook, 393–94.
- <sup>31</sup> William Clark to Lewis Cass, 9 August, 1832, *ibid.*, 404.
- <sup>32</sup> John Ruland (Sub Agent Indian Affairs) to Elbert Herring, 24 August 1832, *ibid.*, 406–7.